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Mr. BROWN. It goes a little further than that. I would suggest, if you check the records, that while we authorize many expenditures, the money is not always appropriated, and even if so, the expenditures are not always made by the President. But usually when the word "authorized" is used in legislation, the Chief Executive accepts it as more or less expressing the desire and the will of the Congress, and quite often he goes along with that.

Mrs. ST. GEORGE. I thank the gentleman for the explanation.

Mr. BROWN. Of course, that is one of the things that makes life in our Nation's Capital interesting—they do change the use of the words and the rules of the game now and then to meet changing circumstances.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROWN. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Georgia, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. VINSON. In view of the statement of the gentleman from Ohio and the statement of the gentlewoman from New York [Mrs. ST. GEORGE], I want to say that the word "authorized" in this particular instance means more than ever before.

Mr. BROWN. As I pointed out, the gentleman from Georgia, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, usually has his way in the end.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROWN. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CANNON].

Mr. CANNON. The gentleman will recognize, I am certain, as all Members of the House understand, that the word "authorized," as used in this connotation, means "permitted"—and nothing more.

It does not direct; it does not commit the House to affirmative action so far as appropriations are concerned.

Chairman Nelson Dingley, of Maine, disposed of that question for all time when he rendered an opinion on January 17, 1896, in which he said:

The House has the right to refuse to appropriate for any object which it may deem improper, although that object may be authorized by law.

Mr. BROWN. Now we have had two completely different opinions expressed by two of the deans of this House, by two of the most learned men in the House of Representatives, both of whom are chairmen of very, very important committees of the House of Representatives. So decide for yourselves, if you please, just what the word "authorized" means.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to say in conclusion, in connection with this bill, of course, it is only an authorization bill, that is true; but, yet, it is a very, very necessary piece of legislation. All of these items that are authorized in this bill will have to be considered later by the House Committee on Appropriations.

But, I wish to go just a bit further, if I may, although I am not going to get into this argument over the B-70's.

I have been around here for a long, long time, some 24 years; but I am still very much of a junior to both the gentleman from Georgia and the gentleman from Missouri. In the years I have been here, however, I have learned that there has never been in the history of this country—and I mean exactly what I say—there has never been any individual in this country who had as great a grasp or knowledge of military matters and our military needs as the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I believe this has been agreed to by a great many qualified observers, all over this country, as well as our greatest military experts, and others. He has been honored many, many times by many patriotic organizations for the contributions he has made to our national defense. Like the gentleman from Mississippi, I have not always agreed with everything the gentleman from Georgia has said, or done, yet I do recognize his great knowledge and his great ability; and I believe that his judgment is as sound as that of anyone who may move from civilian life into the swirl of governmental affairs down here and, in a few weeks, or a few months, or a few years, have suddenly become an expert.

I recall we had a witness from one of the departments before a committee on which I sat not long ago. I noted in the paper that he had been confirmed by the Senate a day or two before, but he was appearing before the committee as an expert because he was an Assistant Secretary in that department. I asked him when he took office. He said he had been sworn in that morning before he came to Capitol Hill. I mention that because sometimes I think we had better base our judgment upon knowledge and information gained by men in this Congress who, through long years of service, are often in a far better position to know and to judge the right thing to do than some of those who may serve a much shorter time in other capacities of Government.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROWN. I yield.

Mr. FORD. May I say to the gentleman from Ohio that I join with him wholeheartedly in the complimentary things he has said about the fine gentleman from Georgia. He is not only an expert in all aspects of the military, but also he is an exceedingly fine gentleman.

In the light of the previous discussion here regarding the word "authorized" and its definition, perhaps I can clarify it somewhat—or maybe muddy the waters.

Mr. BROWN. I am very happy to have the gentleman's contribution. I want to call the gentleman's attention to the fact that the gentleman from Ohio held a very flexible position regarding what the word "authorized" actually means.

Mr. FORD. We do have some history in this body in reference to the meaning of this word. Back on May 27, 1950, the distinguished gentleman from Georgia brought a proposal to the floor of the House. It was H.R. 7764, a bill to authorize the construction of modern naval vessels, and for other

purposes. The bill in part—and I quote from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of that date, read:

"Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States is hereby authorized and directed to undertake the construction of not to exceed 50,000 tons of modern naval vessels in the following categories:"

And the categories are subsequently set forth. The House of Representatives passed that bill. It went to the other body. In the meantime the then President, Mr. Truman, and his then Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Matthews, became concerned about the use of the word "directed" in an authorization bill. Apparently in conference the conferees on the part of the House agreed to the deletion of the word "directed."

When the conference report came back to the House on July 31, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], when asked some questions by Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts, had the following to say:

Mr. Speaker, one Senate amendment strikes out the words "and directed."

The Senate did not like the word "direct."

Mr. VINSON went on to say, and I read again from the RECORD:

The words "authorization" and "authorize" and "direct" are practically the same thing.

I do not know whether the dictionary will agree with that interpretation or not, but we do have some legislative history on the meaning of the words "authorization," "authorized," and "directed." Personally I firmly believe that there is a distinct difference between the words "authorize" and "direct." I respectfully say they are not "practically the same thing" and any dictionary will agree with my observation.

The gentleman from Michigan has indicated that the gentleman from Georgia is still of the same mind as he was back in 1950. The gentleman from Ohio is completely aware of the fact that we have authorized various Presidents, of all types, stripes, and breeds, to do many things that they have failed or refused to do. Of course I know of no particular method or means the Congress of the United States, as the legislative branch, has to compel or to force any President to expend any funds which may be authorized and appropriated. That situation has existed many times in the past, and nothing was ever done about it.

I presume that first of all, in connection with this bill, under the gentle direction of the gentleman from Missouri, [Mr. CANNON], chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, that committee will scan this measure very carefully and decide, in its own innate wisdom, what particular changes should be made in connection with the authorizations carried in this bill.

Finally, the other body will take a look at this legislation and probably add some more to it in the way of appropriations and authorizations. Then finally it will all go down to the White House and be signed into law, both this authori-

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zation bill and the appropriation bill. In the end usually the President, the bureaucrats, and the other officials who serve under him, will do what they please about it anyway. So perhaps this has all been more or less a tempest in a teapot.

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. SELDEN). The question is on the resolution.

The resolution was agreed to and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

| | | |
|---------|----------------|---------------|
| | [Roll No. 42] | |
| Andrews | Derwinski | Moulder |
| Ashley | Diggs | Passman |
| Ayres | Fogarty | Pfost |
| Baring | Gary | Powell |
| Battin | Grant | Rains |
| Blatnik | Griffiths | Rivers, S.C. |
| Blitch | Harrison, Va. | Roberts, Ala. |
| Boykin | Hoffman, Mich. | St. Germain |
| Buckley | Jones, Ala. | Sheppard |
| Collier | King, Calif. | Spence |
| Cooley | McMillan | Whitten |
| Dawson | Mason | Widnall |

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall, 397 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, AND NAVAL VESSELS

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 9751) to authorize appropriations during fiscal year 1963 for aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill H.R. 9751, with Mr. KARSTEN in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON] will be recognized for 2 hours and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ARENDT] for 2 hours.

The gentleman from Georgia is recognized.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will proceed.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, this bill authorizes appropriations for the procurement of missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels.

The committee's authority to legislate in this area is based upon section 412(b) of Public Law 86-149.

Pursuant to the authority granted by that law, the committee recommends a bill authorizing appropriations in the following amounts: Missiles, \$4,052,182,000; aircraft, \$6,034,390,000; and naval vessels, \$2,979,200,000.

This is a grand total of \$13,065,772,000.

The committee began its hearings on January 24 and concluded them on March 1.

The committee had before it every conceivable detail with respect to the programs. We looked at the inventory of each individual aircraft, missile, and ship—we compared the inventory to the requirements of the department—and we then studied each individual item of the 1963 program to see how it fitted into the whole picture.

With respect to each item, we know how many the department has—the individual cost of each item—we know who the manufacturers are—the capabilities of the particular missile, airplane, or ship—and every other thing of any importance whatsoever.

Of course, much—perhaps most—of the information is classified and I regret that it cannot be spread on the record.

AMENDMENTS

The committee made a total of six amendments to the bill. I will speak briefly about each of these at this time and refer to them again when dealing with the individual programs later in my remarks.

The first amendment added \$55,290,000 for Army aircraft. For the most part, this amendment represents authority for more airplanes of the same kind which were in the program last year and which are in the program this year.

The other Army amendment adds \$31,182,000 for missiles. The story here is virtually identical to that with respect to airplanes. It is more of the same—trying to get the Army a little bit closer to its actual requirements.

In the case of the Navy, the committee made only one amendment. It reduced the Navy shipbuilding authorization by \$2.8 million.

MILITARY STARTS

The larger and more important amendments to the bill were in the Air Force portion. There were three of them.

First, the committee added \$10 million for a start on 100 additional Minuteman missiles. It is only a start, but it is an important step toward the kind of intercontinental ballistic missile position which the country much achieve.

The other two Air Force amendments relate to the B-70 bomber, or as it is called today, the RS-70—RS means reconnaissance strike.

The first of these amendments added \$491 million for the RS-70 and the second of them amended existing law to

place all aspects of the RS-70 within the provisions of section 412.

Now, those are the amendments. I will speak at length about the RS-70 at a later point in my remarks.

It is my intention now to speak about the individual military department programs as they are reflected in this bill.

ARMY

Let us look at the Army first.

The bill authorizes \$273,790,000 for aircraft for the Army. A list of the aircraft to be bought and a description of each airplane appears on pages 17 and 18 of the report.

Briefly, the Army plans to buy three kinds of helicopters—the Chinook, the Iroquois, and observation helicopters of the Sioux and Raven types.

The bill authorizes also three kinds of fixed wing airplanes. The Caribou, the Mohawk, and the Seminole.

A glance of pages 17 and 18 of the report will give you a good picture of these aircraft.

And I might say that the aircraft used by the Army is, of course, the kind that is flown within the battlefield area.

There is no conflict or duplication at all here with the Air Force.

The Air Force provides the tactical support but the Army needs aircraft for surveillance and to enable the commanders to travel from unit to unit, to evacuate the wounded, and operate generally within the restricted battle area. The planes are also used to move a squad of soldiers from one place to another as the battle situation might dictate.

Today, there are about 22,000 people in Army aviation of which 7,000 are pilots. The Army has about 5,631 airplanes in its inventory.

In the field of missiles, the bill authorizes \$589,482,000 for Army missiles.

These missiles are the Hawk, the Nike-Hercules, the Redeye, the Honest John, the Little John, the Pershing, and the Sergeant. And also some target missiles and some antitank missiles.

Of these, the Hawk, Nike-Hercules, Honest John, and Little John are operational.

And the Nike-Hercules, as you know, is the surface-to-air missile that defends many of the great metropolitan areas, industrial complexes, and military bases throughout the country.

Again, a glance at pages 17 and 19 of the report will give you the picture of these missiles.

NAVY-MARINE CORPS

For the Navy and Marine Corps, the bill authorizes \$2,134,600,000 for aircraft.

The Navy and Marine Corps are buying the Skyhawk, the Intruder, the Vigilante, the Phantom, and a number of others all listed on page 20 and all described on pages 20, 21, and 22.

The bill authorizes missiles for the Navy in the amount of \$930,400,000 and missiles for the Marine Corps in the amount of \$22,300,000.

These missiles include the Sparrow, the Sidewinder, the Terrier, the Tartar, and a number of other missiles which are listed on page 20 and described on pages 22 and 23.

You will note from that list that Sparrow, Sidewinder, Terrier, Tartar, Talos,

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Bullpup, Polaris, and Hawk are operational.

NAVAL VESSELS

The bill provides \$2,979,200,000 for the construction and conversion of naval vessels.

The program covers the construction of 37 new ships and the conversion of 35 other ships. The larger and more important areas of the shipbuilding program involve an aircraft carrier at a cost of \$310 million—and I might say that this is a conventionally powered carrier.

Also, there is one guided missile frigate at a cost of \$190 million—eight nuclear powered submarines of the attack kind at a cost of \$510 million—and six Polaris submarines at a cost of \$720 million.

These are the biggest, more important portions of the shipbuilding program but every one of the ships in the program is set out on pages 23, 24, and 25 of the report with a description of the ship and its cost.

AIR FORCE

For the Air Force, the bill authorizes \$3,626 million for Air Force aircraft.

These aircraft include the KC-135 jet tanker—the F-105 fighter-bomber—the F-110 tactical fighter—and a number of other airplanes which are listed on page 26 and described on pages 26, 27, and 28.

In the field of missiles, the bill authorizes \$2,510 million for Air Force missiles.

These include the Atlas, the Titan, the Minuteman, Bullpup, and others, which, again are listed on page 26 and described on pages 29 and 30.

You will note that Atlas, Bullpup, Firebee, and Sidewinder are operational.

As you know, the ICBM's are the Atlas, which is operational today, the Titan, which will be operational in the very near future, and the Minuteman, which will be operational later on.

The Atlas and Titan are liquid fuel missiles while the Minuteman will use solid fuel.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to talk to the committee with reference to the amendment relating to the RS-70, heretofore referred to as the B-70. After this program gets underway it will be designated and known as RS-70.

Mr. Chairman, I want to announce at this point that it is my intention at the appropriate time, when the amendments are being considered, to offer an amendment by direction and by unanimous vote of those who were present at the Armed Services Committee this morning to delete from the bill the word "direct" and substitute the word "authorize." This may come as a surprise to many of you, but I do not think it will be a surprise to those of you who have followed the logical progress of this whole controversy.

Now, let us look at what lay behind the language "directed that the Secretary of the Air Force use the \$491 million." It is a realistic and a natural conclusion of the whole matter.

It was simply this: I and the whole committee felt that we were getting out of the bomber business. How strongly we felt about this is clearly reflected in the committee report.

How could we change the course being followed by the Department of Defense? Merely authorizing the additional funds, as heretofore happened in the past, was not enough. This has been tried. Most of the time it has not worked. So some other course had to be found which would impress the Department of Defense that we meant what we said: that we were not going to stand idly by and see ourselves heading down the road that had nothing at the end but missiles. What course could we follow to see that this did not happen? It had to be something drastic, something unusual, something that had not been tried before. That "something" turned out to be a direction that the funds would be spent.

I realized that there were some constitutional questions involved, questions that had never been answered. But there seemed to be nothing else we could do. So we put in the word "direct." What happened? Exactly what could be expected to happen. A great controversy in the press, some taking one side and some taking the other, and none of this was lost on the Secretary of Defense. He saw we were going to get something done.

Mr. Chairman, from here on I am in the field of conjecture. But there can be little doubt that this is what happened: The Secretary of Defense was worried about two things: First he was worried about flying directly in the face of the Congress, because this was a war he could never win—even if he did win a battle now and again. This was his first worry. His second worry was that maybe he was wrong about the RS-70. Maybe he was going too slowly on this bomber. So, what could he do? He did not want to fly in the face of the Congress, and he had an honest concern that he was wrong about the bomber, and about the RS-70. He could do only one thing. He could only seek some compromise which would dispel both of these facts. And, what compromise could he make to take care of that? This had to be something firm and at the same time well reasoned. It had to be something that an aroused Congress will accept.

Well, he arrived at the right answer—and I, for one, am very glad that he did. Because, we were engaged in a controversy that if allowed to go on could only result in a disruption of relations that would be harmful to both sides—and harmful to the country.

The kind of a fight that nobody wins. What did he do? This is what he did. I am now going to read to you two letters. One is from Secretary McNamara and the other is from the President himself. This is what they say.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the Clerk be permitted to read these letters.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, March 20, 1962.

HON. CARL VINSON,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: While the President is writing to you directly concerning the constitutional problems raised by the present language of H.R. 9751, I want you to know that we are anxious to work with you, your committee and the Congress in the spirit which a Government of divided powers such as ours must maintain in order to function successfully. Consequently we are initiating immediately a new study of the RS-70 program in the light of the recommendations and the representations of the Armed Services Committee. This study will give full consideration to the magnitude of the committee program and the depth with which the committee has emphasized this. Furthermore, if technological developments related to sideview radar, and associated data processing and display systems, advance more rapidly than we anticipated when the fiscal 1963 Defense budget was prepared, we will wish to take advantage of these advances by increasing our development expenditures; and we would then wish to expend whatever proportions of any increases voted by the Congress, these advances in radar technology would warrant.

Again let me express my continued friendship and admiration for you personally, and our gratitude for the work you are doing on behalf of our national defense.

Sincerely,

ROBERT S. McNAMARA,
Secretary of Defense.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington March 20, 1962.

HON. CARL VINSON,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: With the profoundest respect for your leadership in national defense and congressional affairs, I must take this opportunity to urge your reconsideration of the language added by your committee to H.R. 9751. The amendment to which I refer states that the Secretary of the Air Force is "directed" to utilize not less than \$491 million of this authorization (fiscal year 1963 funds for aircraft, missiles and naval vessels) to proceed with production planning and long leadtime procurement for an RS-70 weapons system. I would respectfully suggest that, in place of the word "directed," the word "authorized" would be more suitable to an authorizing bill (which is not an appropriation of funds) and more clearly in line with the spirit of the Constitution.

Each branch of the Government has a responsibility to "preserve, protect and defend" the Constitution and the clear separation of legislative and executive powers it requires. I must, therefore, insist upon the full powers and discretions essential to the faithful execution of my responsibilities as President and Commander in Chief, under article II, sections 2 and 3, of the Constitution.

Additionally implicit in the Constitution, of course, is the intent that a spirit of comity govern relations between the executive and legislative. And while this makes unwise if not impossible any legislative effort to "direct" the Executive on matters within the latter's jurisdiction, it also makes it incumbent upon the Executive to give every possible consideration in such matters to the views of the Congress. For that reason, Secretary McNamara has indicated to you in a separate letter his willingness to reexamine

the RS-70 program and related technological possibilities.

Your devotion to our continued military effectiveness is admired and appreciated; and I look forward to working with you and receiving your counsel for many years to come.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

Mr. VINSON. Now, if my colleagues will bear with me while I make some observations as to what this letter of the Secretary says. Let me emphasize what the letter said:

Consequently we are initiating immediately a new study of the RS-70 program.

I ask my colleague to listen to these words:

In the light of the recommendations and the representations of the Armed Services Committee. This study will give full consideration to the magnitude of the committee program and the depth with which the committee has emphasized this. Furthermore, if technological developments * * * advance more rapidly than we anticipated * * * we will wish to take advantage of these advances by increasing our development expenditures; and we would then wish to expend whatever proportions of any increase voted by the Congress these advances in radar technology would warrant.

Now let us see what the President said. The President said:

It makes it incumbent upon the Executive to give every possible consideration in such matters to the views of the Congress. For that reason, Secretary McNamara has indicated to you in a separate letter his willingness to reexamine the RS-70 program and related technological possibilities.

Now what is the sum and substance of these letters? Well, the first thing they mean is that the Congress has made its point and has won the fight—or maybe I should not say "won the fight," but maybe I should just say we caused the Department of Defense to see the error of their ways. Reasonable people don't go bumping into each other and having difficulties that can be avoided. There is always room for a little give and take. That is what makes our kind of government work. We are not infallible, they are not infallible. There is room for differences. We are all headed for the same goal. We have just been disagreeing as to how we would get there. So here we are—reason and commonsense have won out. The committee has made its position crystal clear. The department is now going to take a good, hard look at that portion. It would be an unreasonable man, indeed, who would object to this kind of solution. We want an adequate Military Establishment with all of the things that such an establishment needs. We want bombers and, certainly, we have no objection to taking a good hard look at how we will get them. We would be in a pretty shaky position if we said, "Go ahead, spend this money and never mind any more thought on the subject, just spend these dollar bills."

Now the Department is going to turn their whole solution to the RS-70. They have gotten the message. They know that the Congress is not just talking. They know we mean business. So we can congratulate ourselves that although we had to raise a good ruckus and a good

fuss, we got our point across. We are on the right road now. I might say this, we are going to watch this new study by the Department every step of the way from this point on. I advised the Committee on Armed Services this morning that periodically I was going to respectfully request these people who are dealing with this new study to come before the Committee on Armed Services and give a report on the progress of the study.

We are going to make sure that every advance developed by this study will be translated—and immediately translated—into the expenditure of funds for the most rapid development possible of the RS-70.

Let me say that I am completely satisfied with what we accomplished by the sensible approach that was taken yesterday in an hour and a half conference at the White House.

I mean every single word I am saying.

I feel that any reasonable man is willing to abide by the results of a thoroughly objective study such as that which is now going to be made by the Department—and with the full, personal support of the President.

The President is interested now.

He has injected himself right into the middle of this whole matter.

And another thing, the committee will get a full assurance that the group making this study will have not only scientists and representatives of the Secretary of Defense in it, but will have people from the Air Force, not only the technical ones but the policy ones; and not only civilians, but military people whose background and experience in the development and operation of bombers gives them special understanding of the problem that we are talking about.

Just what is the net effect of this whole action?

First. In the first place, this committee has expressed a complete unwillingness to place this Nation in a position where its sole method of warfare would be massive retaliation.

The committee's concept on this matter is preserved by this action.

Second. This committee had expressed its total unwillingness to junk manned bomber systems as a weapon in our future defense arsenal.

That position is respected in this action.

Third. There have been no indications that the Secretary of Defense was in the least concerned with the size of the program which this committee approved or the depth of its conviction in approving that program.

The Secretary states in his letter that the study which he will promptly institute will take into full consideration not only the size of the program recommended by the committee but the depth of the committee's conviction in approving that program.

Fourth. The Secretary has publicly stated that he could not and would not spend any more money in fiscal 1963 for the development of the RS-70 than the \$171 million which he requested.

He now states that if technological developments advance more rapidly than was anticipated when the fiscal 1963 defense budget was prepared, he will wish

to take advantage of these advances by increasing development expenditures. He also states that, in that event, he would wish to expand whatever proportion of the increase voted by the Congress these advances in technology would warrant.

The foregoing represents the four major points which have been stressed by this committee. In view of the results which have been achieved and the assurances now given to the committee, I have no hesitancy in concluding that the committee's program remains intact and that the committee has achieved its objectives in a far more logical way than was provided in our initial approach.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VINSON. If the gentleman will withhold his question for a moment, for I wish now to talk about the justification of asking the Appropriations Committee to follow the modern version of what "authorized" means. The correct version was quoted by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Ford] from a proceeding that took place some 12 years ago. But time changes everything, and so we will now accept the modern version.

I hope the committee will bear with me patiently here. This is very important. As I say, this is the turning point. You are either going to have bombers or you are not going to have bombers. Where does it lead you? It leads you down but one road, massive retaliation.

It would lead to defeat if intercontinental ballistic missiles were to be outlawed.

Mr. Chairman, now, that is the picture of the whole aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels program for fiscal year 1963.

RS-70

Mr. Chairman, of course, there will be differences of opinion between the Department of Defense and the Congress as to just exactly what should be done in particular areas of defense.

This is a healthy situation.

I do not believe that, after the Armed Services Committee has held extended detailed hearings that we have only engaged in an exercise of self-improvement in the area of knowledge.

To me, knowledge is something to be used, not merely to be possessed.

Now, the committee was briefed in the greatest detail about the RS-70. We obtained the knowledge we wanted. And it is on the basis of the knowledge gained that we amended the bill in the fashion we did.

Last year, the Congress authorized \$525 million for manned bombers. The Appropriations Committee found itself in complete agreement with this action and recommended an appropriation of \$515 million against this authority. The Congress accepted this recommendation.

And the same thing is true of the B-70. Last year there were \$220 million in the bill for the B-70 and the Congress raised this by \$180 million to a total of \$400 million.

I have mentioned the strong position taken by the Appropriations Committee last year in increasing by \$180 million

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the amount requested by the Defense Department.

This was a courageous act. I congratulate the Appropriations Committee for adding this \$180 million, and the Congress approved it. The Appropriations Committee has been the trailblazer in the field of the B-70. Indeed, I can say in a very real sense the Armed Services Committee is following the leadership which has been furnished by our great Appropriations Committee.

I think it might be well to review Congress' action last year in providing \$525 million for manned bombers.

This is the history of it. As I said, the Armed Services Committee was very concerned that we are getting out of the bomber business entirely. With this in mind, the committee added \$337 million for B-52 or B-58 or a mixture of both. And the bill passed the House this way.

The Senate committee felt that we should not designate what kind of airplanes—and that the amount should be \$525 million which is, incidentally, just about the cost of one wing of B-52's.

In conference the House agreed to the Senate figure and the Senate language—and that is how the law came to read \$525 million for manned bombers. And as I have said the Appropriations Committee appropriated \$515 million.

Now, let us look at the money situation with respect to the B-70. The first funds were appropriated in 1955—7 years ago. And funds have been appropriated every year since that time for a total of over \$1 billion to date.

All of the funds so far have been appropriated for a B-70 which was a bombing airplane exclusively.

These funds have been used and are being used for the three basic airplanes which, of course, could become either a B-70 or constitute steps toward the system which is now called the RS-70. These first three are experimental planes and constitute the basic structure of whatever plane finally would be decided on.

None of this money has been wasted. Nor will the additional \$300 million, which will make a grand total of \$1.3 billion, be wasted since proper experimental models will be provided.

However, the concept today is not to have a plane which is just a bomber, but to have an airplane which is a bomber and a lot of other things, too.

It will be used as a plane for observing, reporting, evaluating, and exercising on-the-spot judgment and action. It will have unusual communications equipment and a number of other facilities and capabilities which are classified.

So, this is a very different kind of airplane than the B-70 as it was first conceived—not different in appearance, but different in the great number of functions it can perform.

The \$491 million added by the committee does one immediate thing: It is a major step toward three additional airplanes so that there will be a total of six.

But it does something perhaps even more important than that. It raises the level of progress so that instead of ac-

quiring only three flying laboratories, we will be acquiring in addition something very close to a complete fighting machine. So close indeed that should the program be pursued completely, the second three airplanes would become an actual part of the inventory.

The Department of Defense feels that the present program of \$1.3 billion will permit the exercise of an option as to whether to continue on after the third plane.

I have serious doubts as to whether this is actually so—because the present program has its sights set too low and the program will produce only basic prototype airplanes which will prove little more than that they can fly.

The committee's program more clearly preserves the exercise of an option since it will produce an airplane configured as a combat aircraft which is a very far thing, indeed, from a flying laboratory.

I would also like to say this. Mr. McNamara is quoted as saying that in view of the size of our existing forces, ICBM's, Polaris submarines, B-52's, and so forth:

It does not appear wise at this time to make a final commitment to a \$10 billion B-70 production program. To do so would in my opinion be a serious waste of the Nation's resources.

The committee's action is by no means a commitment to a \$10 billion program.

It is designed, however, to give us an opportunity to decide what commitment should be made in the area of an advanced follow-on strategic bombing system.

I join Mr. McNamara in his objection to the waste of our Nation's resources. I do not join him in his belief that the B-70 should be pursued at the low level that it is today.

It is a human trait—to oversimplify issues. I think that is exactly what has happened here. The problem has been presented in black and white. Mr. McNamara says we are committed to \$10 billion if we do anything at all, other than follow the present plan which is to build only three planes.

This is not the case at all. And I would like to set the record straight.

The actual issue that is presented to us is whether we should go along with a policy that would result, in the long run, in the extinction of bomber aircraft, or whether we should provide a reasonable option for the continuation of bomber aircraft as a part of our strategic force. This is the sole issue.

I cannot stress this point too much: the \$491 million which the committee recommends is not directed toward production which would lead to a large number of aircraft.

What it would do is to provide development that will maintain a true option for a subsequent decision to go ahead with a full weapon system program.

To reach the \$10 billion figure quoted by Mr. McNamara you would have to include cost of design, development, testing, and you would have to procure and operate a large number of these aircraft for an extended period of time.

Now, what happens if the \$491 million is not made available? We will find our-

selves at the end of fiscal year 1963 with a 3-year lag in engine deliveries, about a year lag in the important areas of honeycomb panels for the airframe, a real possibility that critical tools will be disposed of, the plant facilities being used for other purposes, and a concentrated skilled labor force scattered throughout the country in other jobs.

Now, that is what would happen if we do not raise the level of funding to \$491 million.

But if we do grant this authority and these funds, we will permit the start of development of reconnaissance-strike subsystems, we will permit the third airplane to change over from a B-70 type to an RS-70 type. The additional authority would also allow long leadtime commitments for the fourth, fifth, and sixth aircraft, and very importantly, permit a wide range of options in 1965.

Then in 1965, we will determine what course to follow—whether to produce airplanes or not—and we would be doing it on the basis of true factual knowledge.

These options range all the way from completion of the sixth aircraft to going ahead to a full weapon system development leading toward a force of actual fighting planes.

As is clear from what I have said, we are buying more than three additional airplanes. We are buying the critical element of time, perhaps as much as 3 years.

It is said that much of the equipment for the RS-70 still has to be developed.

This is true. There is no doubt about it. It is for this very reason that we need the larger program for the RS-70.

Why should we wait until the third plane is built before starting on the subsystems which need further developing. Let us save time which is so valuable to our Nation.

It is said that further research must be done on some of these elements before they are far enough along to initiate a development program aimed at actual operational use.

This is not the case. These elements are within the current state of the art.

For example, a very important part of the RS-70 is the "high resolution radar." Now, this radar, which concededly is a very complicated device, had its first working model made by the University of Michigan years ago. One company has even built and demonstrated in flight a system very similar to the one that would be used in the RS-70.

I can say, and this is important, that the quality of the radar picture obtained today is such that the radar operator can see and identify targets that cannot be seen at all with current systems.

We can all recall that very much the same arguments were made against the Polaris submarine years ago. If the Congress had not taken up for Admiral Rickover's ideas and supported him in his fight, we would have no Polaris submarines today.

What the committee has been trying to get across now for 2 years is simply this: We think it is dangerous to get out of the bomber business entirely.

Consider this: Where would we have been 5 years ago if we did not have

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bombers? Where would we be today if we did not have bombers? In all probability, we would have been attacked and would have been unable to strike back.

Today's B-47's, B-52's, and B-58's, have kept the peace, have been the one weapon which has deterred an enemy from attacking us. There is no doubt about the accuracy of this statement.

This is no special plea for the RS-70. If it were some other advanced bomber, the committee would feel exactly the same way. The whole point of the committee's action is that we don't want to be entirely dependent on missiles—whether they be ICBM, IRBM, Polaris, or any other kind.

And the very simple reason for this is that it permits us only a single way to fight a war.

A missile cannot look at something and report back. It cannot turn around once it is shot off. It cannot do anything but go and explode its nuclear warhead.

Let me make my position clear.

The last B-52 and the last B-58 will come off the production line this year in August and October. We have over 1,200 bombers today. These bombers will wear out. If we do not start out on a new bomber, then the time will soon come when we will have no bombers.

A complicated weapon system such as the bomber cannot be bought off the shelf.

Perhaps some Members do not realize that from the beginning of a bomber to the time they are in the inventory covers a period of 10 years. It is this very consideration—the element of time—which could threaten our national security.

Now, let us look at the argument that in a few years the country will be bristling with intercontinental ballistic missiles—and for that reason, we would not need bombers.

What does this mean? It means that we have a massive deterrent which we do need, and a capability for massive retaliation which we may never need.

Our hands are tied. We have no flexibility. We can fight a nuclear war, but we cannot fight a general war in which nuclear weapons would not be used. It is all or nothing.

Now, just suppose that nuclear weapons are banned by international agreement. This would eliminate the intercontinental ballistic missile entirely because no one would ever use an ICBM to carry a mere high explosive warhead.

If this should come to pass—or if we engaged in a general war in which by mutual agreement nuclear weapons would not be used—as we did with respect to poison gas—then the side that has the bomber force is a winner by that very fact alone.

Perhaps the view of the Armed Services Committee is an overly conservative one—perhaps the bomber has lost its glamour—but if the committee is going to push hard on one side or another, it is going to be on the side of having too much rather than too little. Having a strong conventional capability such as the bomber with a man's brain guiding

it rather than an electronic device which purports to have all the answers but which cannot ask a question.

Today our bomber force is made up of B-47's, B-52's, and B-58's. The B-47's are already rather old airplanes. They will start to fade out of the force in the not-too-distant future. Then the B-52's will start to fade out. And finally the B-58's will go out, too.

I am logical when I say that when the only bombers we have are gone, then we will be out of the bomber business. And this is an absolute certainty if there is no new bomber coming along to take their place.

Let me say to you—the Soviet Union is by no means following this course. The Soviet Union is developing newer and faster bombers right today.

The Soviets have had three bombers in their inventory since 1954. They are known as the Badger, the Bison, and the Bear. Altogether the Soviets have over 1,000 medium and heavy bombers in operational units.

Most important is the fact that their long-range air arm is capable of delivering nuclear weapons to targets anywhere in the United States.

But have they stopped developing new bombers as we propose to do? The answer is "No."

They have a new supersonic heavy bomber, known as the Bounder. And another supersonic bomber—roughly comparable in size to our B-58 medium bomber—known as the Blinder. And I might mention that the Blinder most probably has the capability of our B-58 which last year set a record of 3 hours and 20 minutes from New York to Paris—about 3,700 miles.

It does not make much sense to me for us to go out of the bomber business while the enemy is getting more and better ones.

So, here we have a problem made up of two elements: One of the elements is a thing and the other element is a principle. I have already dealt with the thing, which is the RS-70, and as for the principle I will simply say this:

I ask you—What is Congress' function in defense? Is it a partner? Does it have a voice? Or is it just Mr. Moneybags, to give or to withhold funds?

That is not what the Constitution says; the Constitution grants the Congress the exclusive power to raise and support and make rules for our military forces. The language of the Constitution is clear.

Congress does not want to run the Department of Defense—Congress just wants to sit at the table and get across an idea once in a while.

I say the country loses something if it loses the voice of Congress in Pentagon deliberations.

I simply do not like the idea of Congress being thought of as a kindly old uncle who complains but who finally, as everyone expects, gives in and raises his hand in blessing, and then rocks in his chair for another year, glancing down the avenue once in a while wondering whether he has done the right thing.

This is not the kind of picture that I have of the Congress.

I think of the Congress as an active participant in the direction of policy, and as a partner in the achievement of adequate defense for the Nation.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VINSON. With pleasure.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman, I should like to say that the gentleman from Georgia has just made a magnificent presentation dealing with the defense of the United States of America. I think that those of us who have had the privilege of serving with him for a short time or for a long time may feel very confident of the security of our country as long as he is directing the affairs of this great committee. I think the fact that his committee time and time again has supported him unanimously, the fact that the leadership of the House time and time again has supported him unanimously, speaks more eloquently than anyone can for his devotion to our country, for his understanding of its problems.

I read some time ago where some columnist had described the gentleman from Georgia as "the Fox." I think if it requires the knowledge and the cunning of a fox to succeed he will succeed; but I would rather think that he has the courage of a lion and the vision of an eagle; and I commend the speech that he has just made.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VINSON. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. GAVIN. It is quite evident how much interest they had in this bomber when they only asked for \$171 million and we had to add \$320 million to bring it to \$491 million to get prototypes of this RS-70. Why is it necessary for you as chairman of the Committee on Armed Services to go to the Secretary of Defense and to the President of the United States to get them to acquiesce in this, and to permit the Department of the Air Force to proceed with the development of this development program which, in my estimation, is the most important matter that this committee can consider here today?

Mr. VINSON. Let me suggest to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman knows when it is necessary to act, the Committee on Armed Services acts. We felt it was necessary in this instance to act. We did not think \$171 million was sufficient so we added on additional of \$491 million.

Mr. GAVIN. Well, when we run out of the \$491 million how are they going to get the money to expedite this project?

Mr. VINSON. The Congress will meet again next year and, if they can spend \$491 million this year toward getting the three RS-70's we will be ready to give them more money—and we will get the planes.

Mr. GAVIN. Would the gentleman care to make an estimate of what the three RS-70's will cost?

Mr. VINSON. Yes. I think I should tell the House this. While this item is only for \$491 million—to get these three additional planes in the next 3 years or

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so, it will cost a total of \$1,200 million to \$1,300 million. Now bear in mind we have already committed ourselves to spend \$1,300 million and we get nothing but a prototype airplane that I classify as a flying laboratory. That is all you get for that money. But, if you add \$1,300 million more, we will get a modern bomber of the kind and capability that the country and the world has never seen produced.

Mr. GAVIN. What has me disconcerted is the fact that your committee, and with you with 48 years of experience behind you, must go to the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States, to get something done.

Mr. VINSON. I have tried to point out that the Department of Defense and the executive branch, with these letters in the RECORD, are going to have a little different viewpoint on things that the Congress wants done and on the determination of the Congress to get them done.

Mr. GAVIN. I think it is about time we took a determined stand. When the committee arrives at a conclusion that certain materiel or hardware is needed, they should pay more respect and attention to our conclusion. It is quite evident, Mr. Chairman, that after the committee had arrived at a decision, you still had to go down and talk to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. If you had not this RS-70 might not have been given any consideration.

This should not be necessary for a man who is concededly the greatest leader in the field of defense the Congress has ever seen. Here we have a man who represents to the country their own personal leader in the area of defense. CARL VINSON is elected by the people of the Sixth District of Georgia. So far as defense is concerned, he represents not only that district but the whole of the United States and every person in it. The word of this kind of man should be listened to just because he said it.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, as always, the distinguished gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Vinson], the chairman of our Committee on Armed Services, has presented to you a complete explanation of the contents and purpose of this bill. I shall not take up your time merely to repeat the details he has so ably presented. As a matter of fact, neither he nor I could go into much more detail than embodied in the committee report itself without risking a breach of security.

I shall, however, risk repetition to what the chairman has said and what is set forth in our committee report solely to emphasize certain salient facts in connection with the defense measure now before us. I should like to make one or two observations which I hope will be persuasive with you in giving your full support to our Committee on Armed Services.

In the first place, we present this bill to you without a dissenting vote in our committee. Every single member of our committee has had the benefit of all the data available, secret and nonsecret, military and civilian, diplomatic and domestic, to enable him to arrive at

sound conclusions. The bill before us is based on the knowledge and recommendations of our best military minds of all the services, and the recommendations of our brilliant Secretary of Defense.

The measure now before you represents the considered judgment of your Committee on Armed Services in the discharge of our constitutional responsibility for size and kind, in men and weapons, of a national defense we shall have. We present this to you as our conviction of what we must undertake in our defense planning and procurement that we may have a national defense second to none. We have such a defense today, and we intend to keep it that way.

When I say that this bill is the unanimous considered judgment of our Committee on Armed Services, there is another point I believe might justly be emphasized. Whenever, as in this bill, the committee departs from the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense the capacity of the committee to make such a military decision is inevitably brought into question. Who are we to be so presumptuous as to substitute our judgment for that of the Secretary of Defense who is advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

There is no denying that we have an extremely able man serving as Secretary of Defense. He is a dedicated man of remarkable ability and limitless energy. As able and knowledgeable as he is, it is hardly possible that in the brief period of a little more than a year his capacity to evaluate our overall defense needs exceeds that of our own committee chairman who has been dealing with such matters for almost 48 years. Or go down the committee roster and reflect on how many Secretaries of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff members have appeared before the committee over the years.

Reflect on the number of military questions, in peacetime and in war, upon which the members of the Armed Services Committee have had to pass judgment. Reflect on the questions the committee has had to resolve when, as in this instance, there is a difference of opinion among the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves.

And so, Mr. Chairman, when I refer to the bill as reported by our committee as being the considered judgment of our Committee on Armed Services there is involved more than a few weeks of hearings and briefings. Into the decision made by the committee went the composite of years and years of hearings, briefings and study of each and every phase of our national defense.

We do not claim that our committee judgment is infallible. By the same token, we do not believe that any such claim can be made for the Secretary of Defense nor for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If military judgment were infallible we would not have had the case of Billy Mitchell as an object lesson. Nor would we have had in more recent years before World War II the controversy over the wisdom of constructing more battleships rather than carriers and aircraft,

with the administration then insisting upon more "battlegions," as battleships were called. If military judgment and executive judgment were infallible, we would not have had the construction of the carrier *Forrestal* stopped. And we would not have found ourselves so unprepared for the Korean war.

I am not trying to fix blame on any one, any President, or any Department of Defense Secretary. I am doubtless laboring my point. I am simply trying to emphasize that while our Committee on Armed Services can be wrong, it is not wrong—*ipso facto*—because the Secretary of Defense is always right and he, and he alone, can be right.

There is only one feature of the pending bill that is in issue. That is, as Chairman Vinson has pointed out, with respect to the B-70 bomber, now called the RS-70. This is a supersonic aircraft in the development stage. It is an aircraft that can be much more than a bomber. Fully equipped it will be capable of detection or reconnaissance to the extent almost unbelievable. At the same time this new plane will carry an enormous bombing power, so that it can not only report what our missiles may have missed but can also proceed to make its own strike on target. That is the meaning of the symbol RS—reconnaissance-strike—that we now call this advanced B-70 the RS-70. It does considerably more than drop bombs.

It is the considered judgment of our committee that if we are to maintain a national defense second to none in the foreseeable future, we must proceed with the development of the RS-70 weapon system program as a supplement to our missile program.

That was our decision last year, in which the Committee on Appropriations and the Congress as a whole concurred. For fiscal 1962 we authorized and appropriated additional funds for manned bombers and for a prosecution of the RS-70 weapons system program. The Committee on Appropriations itself added \$180 million to the \$220 million requested for the B-70 development program.

Those funds were impounded. The Secretary of Defense for reasons not convincing to me decided not to use the funds. Other secretaries of defense have impounded funds, and we find no satisfaction in having to say that subsequent developments vindicated the judgment of the Congress over that of the Defense Secretary.

You will recall how disturbed the American people and the Congress were to discover suddenly with the launching of "sputnik" by Russia how far behind we were in the development of missiles. It was an alarming awakening to learn that immediately following the end of the war, Russia proceeded with a missile program while we did practically nothing in this field. We can congratulate ourselves on the remarkable strides that have been made in the field in the last few years. We have since brought into being missiles of destructive power beyond imagination.

But it would be folly for us to put complete reliance on an arsenal of missiles

as our deterrent force. It must be borne in mind that the ICBM's and other missiles carrying nuclear warheads is an untried weapon. Its component elements have been tested. We have every reason to believe our missiles will be operationally successful in actual combat. But we do not really know whether they will do all the things we believe they will.

When we launched Lieutenant Colonel Glenn into orbit we had every reason to believe from all the tests made that it would be a successful flight. But we did not actually know whether, and to what extent the flight would be successful until it was actually made. And were it not for the fact that it was a manned flight, with adjustments made by Colonel Glenn, the flight probably would not have succeeded.

But even assuming that our complete missile system to be everything we expect it to be under combat conditions, it must also be borne in mind that it has its limitations. Once the decision is made to launch a missile there is no turning back. On the launching an irrevocable, unchangeable military decision has been made. This type of weapon is indispensable in an all-out war, but it is of questionable value in any other type of warfare.

To place all our reliance on the ICBM's and a huge arsenal of such missile would be tantamount to the same mistake France made in placing all its reliance on the Maginot line. Our committee has always taken the position that we must have a balanced flexible defense establishment, one that can be effectively employed anywhere, everywhere, in whole or in part, to meet any emergency whenever and wherever it may arise. A bomber program in process is essential for this continued flexibility. A man operated bomber itself has the flexibility that the automation of missiles cannot possibly have. As we pointed out in our committee report last year, unlike missiles the bombers "can go part of the way and wait; it can go part way and turn around; it can proceed or not proceed in any fashion whatsoever since it is at all times under the intelligent control of a human being."

There is an old adage: "Do not put all your eggs in one basket." But that is what the Department of Defense would have us do by refusing to recognize the need for developing the RS-70. They contend we have on hand a great and powerful force of bombers. That is true. Surely we are not so unimaginative and so shortsighted that we intend to stop there.

We delayed until it was almost too late in developing a missile program. We cannot afford to delay proceeding with the development of the intricate RS-70 weapons system. A single year lost can never be regained in our determination to have a defense second to none now and in the years ahead. We are now proposing that we put RS-70's in our military inventory next year or the year after. We are not committing ourselves to any vast RS-70 procurement program. We are merely proposing that we proceed in an orderly manner with the develop-

ment of such a program and to explore its great potentials.

There is a military adage that you should never plan an attack unless you plan a retreat, that you should always base your military strategy on alternatives that if plan A does not prove successful you can immediately adjust to plan B. If our missile weapons system does not work according to plan, What is our alternative? What perchance would be our situation if nuclear warfare should be outlawed just as poison gas was outlawed as an instrument of warfare? How prepared will we be for the day that no one would dare employ ICBM's?

What is our defense alternative? Will we have nothing more than a fleet of outmoded bombers which will be no match to the type of manned aircraft our enemies may have developed? We are far ahead of Russia in bomber know-how, both in operation and production technique. The only way for us to make certain we stay ahead for our own security and the peace of the world is to develop this unique RS-70. We must explore its potentials to keep ahead, we must always be developing. We must recognize the need for trial and error.

That, in substance, is the considered judgment of our Committee on Armed Services. We make that decision in the exercise of our responsibility under the Constitution as to the size and nature of the Armed Forces we shall have. That is our responsibility and we seek to discharge it. We have no intention to transgress upon the constitutional duties and responsibilities of our President, as Commander in Chief. We shall give him our fullest cooperation. We ask of him and of his Secretary of Defense that they cooperate with us.

It unfortunately took extraordinary action by our committee to get assurance from the President and the Secretary of Defense that they would give the Congress some recognition in what we consider necessary for our defense. While somewhat belatedly, we now have an expression from them that they will give attention to what we believe to be a weapon we may sorely need in this long cold war.

There are some who believe that our Committee on Armed Services has surrendered, that we have capitulated in not insisting upon the provision we originally proposed to incorporate in the bill. I, for one, have not capitulated nor have I surrendered. I, for one, shall insist that this President and every other President recognize the constitutional responsibility—a right as well as a duty—of the Congress to determine the size and nature of our Armed Forces.

The chairman says we have won our point in this respect. But why should it have been necessary to rally forces prepared to do battle on this constitutional principle at all?

If we have won, it is a paper victory. I shall await the translation of the assurances we now have into affirmative action. The President forced us to get ready to make a fight we should never be forced to make.

As to the great victory claimed by my chairman, future events will determine.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ARENDS. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

(Mr. VAN ZANDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman, I arise in support of H.R. 9751. As has been mentioned by Chairman VINSON and my colleagues on the House Armed Services Committee, the purpose of the bill is to authorize appropriations in the amount of \$13,065,772,000 for the procurement of aircraft missiles and naval vessels for our Armed Forces.

In discussing the bill, I wish to point out that the Military Construction Act of 1959 in section 412(B) states as follows:

No funds may be appropriated after December 31, 1960, to or for the use of any Armed Forces of the United States for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels unless the appropriation of such funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after such date.

Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Armed Services of this House has conducted extensive hearings to determine the requirements of the military departments for new equipment under this provision. H.R. 9751 represents the unanimous opinion of this committee as to the program for fiscal year 1963 which should be pursued by the Department of Defense and funded by fiscal year 1963 appropriations.

The programs of the Navy Department and the Marine Corps coming within the purview of section 412 include aircraft, missiles and ships in the total amount of \$6,066 million. For the fiscal year 1963, the Navy has requested procurement authority to permit the continuation of readiness to meet assigned responsibilities around the world, to apply the fruits of research and development to the fleets, and to compensate for obsolescence of older equipment.

The aircraft authorized by this bill for the Navy and Marine Corps total \$2,134,600,000 and will provide a versatile combination of capabilities for conventional and nuclear attack, reconnaissance, air defense, antisubmarine warfare, early warning, and amphibious warfare. Aircraft procurement this year is about 16 percent higher than in fiscal year 1962 and will enable the purchase of 887 new aircraft and related equipment as compared with 803 aircraft for the previous year. Of this 887 aircraft, 863 will be combat types.

Fifteen different types of aircraft are being authorized. The most important of these is the F-4H Phantom, which recently joined the fleet. This remarkable carrier-based aircraft holds the world's speed record for combat aircraft and is also being bought by the Air Force. Admiral Anderson, the Chief of Naval Operations, has characterized the F-4H as the best all-around fighter aircraft in the world today.

Another high-performance aircraft in the Navy budget is the A-3J-3 Vigilante,

which also is already augmenting our carrier attack capabilities. This aircraft is effective at very high altitudes or on treetop level missions, and is capable of more than twice the speed of sound.

The program also contains follow-on procurement of the A-4D-5 Skyhawk and the A-2F-1 Intruder carrier- or land-based attack aircraft, and the F-8U-2N Crusader all-weather fighter. These five aircraft comprise the bulk of combat procurement. Other aircraft for which continued procurement is authorized include the W-2F Hawkeye, an improved carrier aircraft for early-warning and fighter control; the P-3V-1 Orion, a long-legged antisubmarine warfare patrol aircraft; and the S-2F-3 Tracker, a versatile carrier-based ASW aircraft. The HSS-2 Sea King, and ASW helicopter, for which the Navy would be authorized additional numbers, set several world's speed records over the last year.

Further procurement of the HRB transport helicopter and introduction of an improved assault support helicopter are authorized for the Marine Corps. A utility helicopter, navigational trainer, and two tactical reconnaissance versions of aircraft now in production complete the aircraft program.

The Navy has requested authorization for missiles, drones, and related equipment, totaling \$930,400,000, which is about 10 percent more than in the previous fiscal year. Continuation of procurement is authorized by the bill for the Sparrow III and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and the air-to-surface Bullpup missile. Initial procurement of the air-to-surface Shrike, the Subroc, the underwater-launched ASW missile, and a training version of Bullpup, is provided. The program will continue to furnish the Terrier, Tartar, and Talos antiaircraft missiles to destroyers, cruisers, and carriers in the active fleet. The procurement of Polaris missiles is phased with the construction schedule of ballistic missile submarines.

Authorization is also provided for the funding of shipbuilding and conversion, in the amount of \$2,982 million, an increase of about 1½ percent over the previous year. The 1963 construction program of 37 ships includes 6 fleet ballistic missile submarines, a conventionally powered attack aircraft carrier, 8 nuclear powered attack submarines and a nuclear powered frigate to be armed with the Typhon missile system.

The 6 additional Polaris submarines will raise the number of that type to a total authorized of 35; we are also authorizing long leadtime procurement for 6 additional SSBN's for a program of 41. The authorization for 8 more nuclear powered attack submarines will raise the total for that type to 38. The aircraft carrier will allow the Navy to maintain its carrier forces at the requisite level of modernity. Representing a new advance in an integrated antiair missile and radar system, the Typhon frigate will be in the first ship to be armed with this powerful equipment.

A conventionally powered carrier is provided rather than a nuclear powered one on several grounds of professional

judgment. Firstly, it has been estimated that a nuclear powerplant would increase the construction, operation, and maintenance costs of a carrier to 30 to 50 percent. Such greater cost could more advantageously be allocated to other shipbuilding which the Navy very urgently needs. Secondly, nuclear power has been applied to surface ships for only a very short time so that broad experience with the operation and maintenance of a nuclear powered force is essentially very limited. With the technological progress being achieved in nuclear power, it would thus seem prudent to more closely observe the performance of the nuclear surface ships now in commission and to afford sufficient time for developments in the field of nuclear reactors to enable us to reduce cost and weight, and to increase efficiency. This does not mean that there is not every expectation of success in the operation of nuclear surface vessels, just as there has been with nuclear submarines, but simply a well founded decision to defer construction of additional nuclear powered carriers at this time.

Other ships in the program are four amphibious transport docks, an amphibious assault ship for Marine helicopter assault operations, five escort ships and three guided missile escort ships, and two new-design gunboats. There is also included a fast combat support ship, a tender for Polaris submarines, two oceanographic research ships, a surveying ship, and a roll-on roll-off cargo vessel.

The conversion of 35 ships is authorized, as against 22 conversions in fiscal year 1962. Twenty-four of the conversions in the current bill will continue the modernization of World War II destroyers to extend their lives as well as to improve their effectiveness. The other 11 conversions authorized will transform 2 old light aircraft carriers into a major communications relay ship and a command ship; will provide a mine countermeasures support ship, 2 fast ammunition ships, 2 jumbo or large oilers, and 2 technical research ships, in addition to a Polaris resupply ship and a Typhon guided missile development ship.

The provisions of H.R. 9751 reflect extremely thorough exploration into the detailed requirements of the Navy Department by our committee. I am convinced that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have exercised sound judgment in their recommendations to us. This bill will provide the Navy and Marine Corps, within the limits of funds which can reasonably be made available, with the best new aircraft, missiles, and ships, as well as the maximum degree of modernization of older vessels. In conclusion, this bill, H.R. 9751, is entitled to unanimous support because it concerns the security of the Nation which depends solely upon an adequate national defense.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ARENDS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MAHON. As the gentleman well knows, I was among those who were disturbed by some of the language in the original bill, especially by the language designed to direct the expenditure of certain funds by the Secretary of the Air Force. I want to say that I am highly pleased with the way the Committee on Armed Services has resolved this matter in the settlement today. You have not surrendered, in my judgment. I think you have done a magnificent job in dealing with this matter and in finding a way to resolve differences. You have dramatized for the Congress, for the executive branch, and for the country a very vital and important matter.

I want to commend the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ARENDS], and I want to especially commend the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], chairman of the committee, for the matchless way in which he has handled this very difficult situation. I think we are on the right road in the steps being taken today.

Mr. ARENDS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PRICE].

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, at the outset I want to assure my colleagues in the House that I am in full support of the position taken by our distinguished Chairman [Mr. VINSON] and the full Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. VINSON and Mr. ARENDS have, and others will, cover the bill as reported by the Armed Services Committee, and will deal at length with the RS-70.

In the light of the Defense Department's attitude toward the RS-70, I would like to outline briefly just what the Soviet Union is doing in the field of manned bombers.

The U.S.S.R. has made phenomenal progress in creating air power needed to support the drive toward world domination. They have built a large and powerful tactical aviation organization and an effective military transport service. They have created an air defense system equal to any in the world, and, most important of all, they have created a long-range air arm which is capable of delivering nuclear weapons to targets anywhere in the United States.

Soviet long-range aviation is organized into long-range air armies, with the bulk of aircraft based in western U.S.S.R.; the remainder are based in the Soviet Far East. These long-range air armies have over 1,000 medium and heavy bombers in operational units.

When the Korean war ended in July 1953, long-range aviation consisted of a force of approximately 1,200 copies of our old B-29.

Since then the Soviets have demonstrated their ability to develop a modern, effective strategic bomber force with a nuclear capability. They began this demonstration with the June 1954 Moscow Air Show by displaying nine swept-wing jet bombers similar in performance to the U.S. B-47.

These aircraft, which we have designated Badger, have an estimated gross

weight of 150,000 pounds, and a speed of about 500 knots. The Badger is powered by two turbojet engines, each developing an estimated 18,000 pounds of thrust. It has a radius of over 2,500 nautical miles with one refueling and with a 3,300-pound payload.

Also displayed in the 1954 air show was a large bomber comparable to the U.S. B-52. This aircraft, designated Bison, has four jet engines which are probably similar to those installed in Badger. It has an estimated weight of over 350,000 pounds, a wing span of 170 feet, and a radius of over 4,000 nautical miles with refueling and a maximum speed on the order of 500 knots. This aircraft, in spite of its size, can be accommodated by over 200 airfields within the U.S.S.R.

Another long-range bomber, the Bear, first appeared in April 1955. The Bear is powered by four turboprop engines, each developing approximately 12,000 equivalent shaft horsepower and turning counter-rotating propellers. It is approximately midway in size between the Badger and the Bison. It has an estimated combat radius of around 4,200 nautical miles, and a maximum speed of approximately 495 knots.

Although the Bear, Bison, and Badger all appeared initially prior to 1956, modification of existing units and production of new aircraft has continued until very recently.

We have seen that resurgence of Soviet long-range aviation began with the dramatic demonstrations of new bombers in the 1954 air show. Now the operational equipment derived from the showpieces are obsolete. Just at the time that the developmental life was passing from the 1954 series of bombers there has begun a new resurgence. In the summer of 1961 was another spectacular demonstration of new Soviet bombers.

The display of Soviet military aviation at Moscow on July 9, 1961, indicates that the U.S.S.R. has again made major progress in the development of all types of aircraft despite Premier Khrushchev's statement on January 14, 1960, that, "We have been curtailing sharply production of bombers and other obsolescent equipment."

A new supersonic, heavy bomber research vehicle known as the Bounder was displayed in public for the first time, although it had been under development for a number of years. The Bounder is powered by four turbojet engines and is obviously a supersonic design with its highly swept delta wing configuration. It is about 200 feet long and has a wing span of about 80 feet.

The Soviets also displayed 10 new Blinder bombers. The Blinder is a supersonic aircraft roughly comparable in size to the U.S. B-58 medium bomber. The B-58, as you know, on May 26, 1961, set a record of 3 hours, 19 minutes, and 51 seconds from New York to Paris, a distance of 3,652.97 statute miles.

In addition to the previously mentioned conventionally powered aircraft, the Soviets are known to be interested in a nuclear powered bomber, a development in which I have always had a

strong personal interest. I regret to say that my experience with the nuclear powered airplane is very much the same as that being experienced with respect to the RS-70. In my opinion the Defense Department is being equally shortsighted about both of them.

There is no doubt that Soviet long-range aviation crews regularly undergo extensive training and can navigate adequately to any point within their aircrafts' range under all weather conditions. Their bombing accuracies are undoubtedly compatible with requirements to place high-yield nuclear weapons on target from all altitudes.

The Soviets are evidently continuing the design and development of new and advanced long-range bombers. They are thereby in a position to introduce into their operational units new models as well as improvements in existing designs during the next several years.

So that is what the Soviets are doing. But in the face of the rapid advance that the Soviets are making, our Defense Department apparently proposes to let the bomber die on the vine. I support my chairman, Mr. Vinson, and the Armed Services Committee wholeheartedly in urging that the House exercise its constitutional right to insist that the unimaginative, shortsighted, and dangerous direction in which the Defense Department is leading us with respect to manned bombers be reversed—and reversed by an affirmative vote on H.R. 9751 as reported with authorization for \$491 million for the RS-70 program in lieu of the \$171 million requested by the Defense Department.

Mr. OSMERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. OSMERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that I am in full support of the bill.

(Mr. OSMERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OSMERS. Mr. Chairman, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, Mr. Vinson, has made an excellent and complete statement with respect to the need for the enactment of the H.R. 9751. He has also explained in great detail the reasons why it is of the greatest national defense importance for us to continue the development of the RS-70 weapons system at least for the coming fiscal year. The outstanding leader of the minority members of the Committee, Mr. Arends, has also explained several important aspects of the measure before us.

We need the weapons authorized in this bill even though, in my opinion, an all-out nuclear war between the U.S.S.R. and the United States is extremely unlikely. Both nations have too much to lose and too little to gain from such a war. Only the development of a really effective anti-missile missile would change this situation and the development of such a weapons system does not seem likely in the near future.

Within the next 5 or 10 years, however, Communist China can reasonably be expected to acquire a nuclear-weap-

ons capability. It is from Red China that the United States, and even the U.S.S.R., could expect such an attack. The heartless, cynical attitude toward human life that seems to motivate China's leaders, coupled with their failure to either develop their nation's economy or even feed its people, might well cause them to launch a nuclear attack. The powers-that-be in Peiping might reasonably figure they would gain more than they would lose considering their huge population and low state of development.

It is my earnest hope that the statements in the President's letter to Chairman Vinson about the RS-70 weapons system will not be forgotten by the President in the fiscal year ahead. Many of us are suspicious about the sincerity of the President with respect to any defense statement. The President's attitude on defense is likely to be affected by the great success with which he used the "big lie" technique in his 1960 campaign. All will recall how he charged that the Eisenhower administration had been derelict in permitting a missile gap to develop between Russia and the United States. It was probably the greatest single factor in his winning the election by a few thousand votes. There are those, of course, who will argue, with some cause, that phony promises made to Negro voters with respect to civil rights were the dominating factor in providing his 1960 narrow margin. It is important to the Nation that the RS-70 program be better remembered than the missile gap.

Mr. Chairman, because we are discussing national defense, it might be well to take a look at the so-called disarmament negotiations now going on at Geneva which may have great impact on our defense future. The scientific community that is associated with our missile and nuclear programs is almost unanimous with respect to the need for U.S. nuclear atmospheric testing at the earliest moment. There have been grave doubts that our Nation will ever obtain the scientific benefits expected from these tests simply because the President left the door open for cancellation of the tests at the very moment he announced them. There has been considerable evidence in the newspapers that leads one to believe that the Russians may succeed in talking us out of our much-needed test program by giving us empty promises of possible future inspection privileges. Such a result at Geneva would indeed be a national calamity.

While not directly related to this authorization bill, it seems appropriate while discussing defense to make comments about the callup of the reserves last October. On the news ticker a few minutes ago, it was stated that plans are under consideration by the Secretary of Defense to release the reservists, called to active duty last fall, between August and September of this year. The reserve callup may have served a domestic political purpose last year when the administration wanted so much to pep up our citizens after the depressing Cuban fiasco and the unchallenged building of the Berlin wall. However, there was no

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proven need then, or now, for the reserves called, and, neither adequate plans for effective training nor proper facilities were available for most of those who were called to duty. This is true of the Army in particular. The decision apparently was political, not military. Intransigent and stupid decisions at the highest level with regard to releasing those men, who were suffering great hardship, have caused distress for families in every area of the country.

The Department of Defense should permit those reservists who want to return to civilian life to do so now. Why wait until August or September? Vacancies created can be filled by volunteers and draftees where necessary.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, I congratulate the gentleman on a very forthright statement and associate myself with him in his remarks.

Mr. PRICE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BATES].

(Mr. BATES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, if there is anything that really characterizes the world in which we live today it is change and transition. Time has been telescoped in the last 20 years as never before in the history of our country or, indeed, the history of the world.

I remember about 10 or 12 years ago we had a bill before our committee, under which a general was asking for more money. All of us become a little aggravated at the request of this particular general and a member of the committee pointed his finger at him and said, "General, if we let you, you would fortify the moon."

Now, Mr. Chairman, how far are we really from that today? A concept, an idea, a hope of today becomes practically a reality of tomorrow. Those of us who work on the Committee on Armed Services are considering to a lesser extent what we have today, but instead most of our thoughts are projected 5 and 10 years hence as we move ahead at this tremendous pace. Associated with this is the question of things becoming obsolete even before they become a reality. There was a time, Mr. Chairman, when we could dip back into the archives or mothballs and withdraw from our fleet, for instance, ships that had been built 25 and 30 years before. That is what we did during World War II with the *Nevada* and the *Texas* and the *Arkansas* and the *Pennsylvania*, and all the destroyers that we gave to Great Britain likewise were ships that had been built during World War I. But those days are gone. We no longer have time on our side. We no longer have that great army of France upon which we once depended. No longer is England the Queen of the Waves. No longer is the Atlantic and the Pacific with the great protection to us that they once afforded us. Today we are within a half hour's time of po-

tential destruction either for ourselves or for others. Time is of the essence and we must move with tremendous speed and dispatch. That, of course, Mr. Chairman, was the sum and substance of the controversy that arose with respect to the RS-70 which our committee considered at great length.

As we make this transition from that which is tried and proven and tested and move into a new field of missiles, where we have never actually fired a missile with a warhead along its full and complete course, there is some question in our minds, Mr. Chairman, even though military authorities assure us they have perfected these missiles. But as I remember, and as all of us here today remember, prior to World War II when we had the assurance that we would sink the Japanese fleet in 2 weeks and that day never came to pass as we well know. So our committee, properly concerned for the defense of this Nation, saw to it that we put into this bill an amount of money which might be necessary in the event that certain developments were forthcoming. We wanted to make certain, if those developments did come to pass, that the money would be available so that we could proceed full speed ahead with the RS-70. I think that decision on the part of the committee was a wise one. I support it wholeheartedly and I believe that the Secretary of Defense, prompted as he will be by members of the Committee on Armed Services, will see to it that until that day comes to pass when we can proceed with absolute certainty, at least this Nation will have a weapons system in the form of the RS-70 that can operate effectively against any enemy no matter where he might be found. So I am in accord, Mr. Chairman, with the action taken this morning on the part of our committee. We have indicated to the Pentagon and to the Secretary of Defense and to the President of the United States and to the world at large that as we wean ourselves away from the manned bombers and enter into the field of missiles, we want to make certain that at least we have in our inventory a bomber upon which we have depended so much in the past, until such time as we know absolutely and positively and definitely that these missiles will work without fail. We owe that much to our country and we cannot give our people less.

Mr. Chairman, there is one question I would like to bring up which has not been discussed by any of the preceding speakers.

That is the question of the future of the U.S. Navy. Today we have some 900 ships; 75 percent of our ships are of World War II vintage. When we consider that the life of the average naval vessel is only 20 to 25 years we must contrast it with the authorization in this bill today of but 37 new naval vessels. As we look ahead 5, 6, or 7 years we see mass obsolescence of our Navy. Because of that situation and the concern that has been expressed by myself and the chairman of the committee and others, we are undertaking an investigation of this whole subject that we shall pursue in the very

near future. If we do not take action now, if we do not chart our course, if we do not know exactly how many ships we need or the various sizes and types there will be a bill presented to this Congress and the American people in about 5 or 6 years that will approximate \$25 billion. So we must set ourselves to the task for a normal buildup of the number of ships that might be needed and look forward and correct the situation.

The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HARDY], is working hard on this.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. I yield.

Mr. HARDY. Let me commend the gentleman for his presentation of this most important subject. I would like to associate myself with his remarks. I feel certain that as our subcommittee begins to function under the chairmanship of the gentleman from South Carolina we will produce results that will show clearly what our Navy needs.

Mr. BATES. There is just one other thing, Mr. Chairman, that concerns me. As I said, we are living at a tremendous pace and in an age of transition. So we must do the things this committee feels need to be done to protect our own security. We place great reliance on our Navy, yet today we have no program for a buildup. In my own thinking I am sure that in the long run, if we ever have a long run, our form of government will win, but in a short run no one knows what will happen. I was gratified when the President of the United States indicated he would proceed with nuclear tests, because from the results of recent Russian tests it is clearly indicated that we must go ahead in that same field if we are to remain supreme. If the Russians should come up with a new breakthrough, some things that we did not have, we would be in a very difficult situation indeed. If they should develop, as we developed in the forties, a new type of atomic bomb, I know they would blackmail us immediately. There are many countries, so-called neutral and uncommitted countries, throughout the world who caution us against such a course of action as nuclear testing, but I want to say to them, Mr. Chairman, and to you that we should do the things that are necessary for our own protection. Let us hope that these other nations of the world will go along with us, but if they do not, Mr. Chairman, let us still do the things we must do for our own security.

(Mr. HIESTAND asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. HIESTAND. Mr. Chairman, in the middle of this discussion of the constitutionality of this bill, I think we want to be sure and not lose sight of the tremendous importance of its substantive content—namely, the continuation and stepping up of the great B-70, now RS-70, program.

The Defense Department has announced that the B-52 and B-58 production will be phased out this year. Thus, unless we reactivate the RS-70, by 1964 we shall have no planned bomber pro-

gram and will, in effect, be creating a bomber gap.

Now, Mr. Chairman, there are a great many reasons why we need manned aircraft. Although tremendous progress has been made in the development of missiles, we all must agree that they have not been successfully tried in actual warfare. Manned bombers have and their success is a matter of record.

But we must have better and faster manned bombers, certainly better and faster and more capable than the Soviets.

Now, the Soviets have delta-winged manned bombers of great size and capability. We have seen photographs of them as flown over Moscow in Soviet air displays. I believe we are substantially ahead of them with our B-52 operation, especially since we have kept it improved and up to the minute. But why be content when we know full well the great B-52 and probably the B-58 will be well on their way to obsolescence within 2 years? In fact, previous delays on the RS-70 may lead to a bomber gap in spite of any immediate action we take today.

Mr. Chairman, let us not repeat the missile gap folly and the procedure which created it, from 1946 to 1952. At that time despite the demands of the then General Eisenhower, we had practically no missile program. It requires 5 or 6 years since 1952 to close that gap.

But when we start a program let it be one far in advance of anything today.

Let us bear in mind that although the proposed RS-70 program will be expensive, the important thing is it will cost potential enemies 10 times as much to devise a defense against such an advanced weapons system.

The Secretary of Defense declares that we shall need a breakthrough in radar and other electronic equipment and contends that this cannot occur for the next 2 or 3 years. But supposing it does take 3 years—need we sit on our heels waiting for it to happen, thereby setting our defenses back another 3 years? Of course not. We must prepare for the future today.

Why not take the expert advice of the professions the military experts who have made the military their life careers? They are practical men skilled in military science and tactics. They have scientists there who have worked on these problems for years. The theorists have their value, but the practical men whose careers are at stake have pleaded for this program for years.

Great progress was being made when the B-70 program was originally cut back from some 18 major subcontractors. Might not that breakthrough have already occurred if we had been pushing the project the past 3 years?

Mr. Chairman, this could well be the most important action this Congress will take this year. The whole safety, the entire defense of this Nation, depends upon it. It is vitally important, almost tragically so. Let us be sure and not lose sight of the value of this program in our discussion of rights of the Congress to make laws for all departments, including the executive. Here we can take a

giant step forward—if we remain firm and back up our committee.

Mr. Chairman, I am heartily in support of the bill.

(Mr. ROUDEBUSH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Mr. Chairman, this Nation's defensive posture is of extreme interest to all of us.

I think without exception every Member of this body wants to do everything possible and provide every means to assure the safety of our citizens—and to provide the military with weapons of retaliation in the event of nuclear war.

Therefore, I do not consider the proposition before this House today to have any partisan-political significance. Rather, any discussion results from two different opinions or ideas as to how we can best provide this safety and assurance to our Nation.

I submit to you here today that the investment requested by the Armed Services Committee to get the RS-70 program moving is most essential and certainly justified.

I feel that the decision we must make here today could well be the most important and the most decisive that Congress must make during this session. It affects the future security of our Nation.

Many of you know that I serve on the House Space Committee, and I feel I am familiar with our present level of excellence in missileery. With this in mind, I have carefully analyzed the potential of the so-called massive retaliation by missiles alone.

I have analyzed both the reliability and the failures of the long-range missile practice firings accomplished by the various agencies of our Government.

With what knowledge I have on this matter, I am completely unwilling to see this Nation depend solely on missiles for retaliation. I say this whether these missiles are borne by nuclear submarines—are launched by manned aircraft—launched from foreign lands by our troops or friendly allies—or are of the nature of the huge projectiles capable of interoceanic flight and guided by mechanical brains.

I am also unwilling for this Nation to be placed in a position of failing to compete in the field of manned bombers. I think we all know that the B-52 program is being phased out—and even with skybolt-type missiles, rapidly approaches obsolescence.

The B-52 first was placed in service in 1955—7 years ago. This aircraft, now rapidly facing obsolescence, forms the very backbone of the striking power of our SAC forces.

In my judgment, the RS-70 is the most awesome weapon ever conceived by any nation. It travels faster than a rifle bullet at an altitude of nearly 14 miles.

The RS-70 would provide us a striking force that is necessary in limited warfare, yet it would be a tremendous asset in case of massive retaliation.

Most nations still would have to rely on water transports to move large numbers of troops. The RS-70 could travel 5,000 miles while a troop transport traveled 50 miles or less at sea.

After leaving its base here in America, if orders were changed it could do a fly-over and still return to base.

We have nothing which compares to it in our arsenal of weapons—and neither does any other nation.

I believe one of the best demonstrations of the capabilities of man was by John Glenn. I am sure one of the most valuable lessons coming from his flight is that there is no substitute for man's ability to make decisions and perform tasks under extreme conditions of speed and weightlessness.

A missile cannot think—nor can it change its mind after launch. It cannot even be safely destroyed in flight should a change in plans occur.

I hope that this tremendously important program will be approved.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BRAY].

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, the issue before us today goes far beyond the RS-70 program. At stake is the future of the manned bomber in the American Air Force. Not only is the Secretary of Defense rapidly downgrading the RS-70 program, but he is "phasing out" all bombers.

Last year the Armed Services Committee, over the objections of the Department of Defense, included in the authorization bill one wing of B-52 bombers and one wing of B-58 bombers. The Department of Defense refused to allow these planes to be built and has now begun to close down all Air Force bomber production lines. By October, if the McNamara plan holds, all production on Air Force bombers will be finished. We are going out of the manned-bomber business.

Today we are well ahead of Russia in manned bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles, but Russia is proceeding with the development of new and better bombers. If the Department of Defense persists in its present line of thinking and acting it will soon be the old story of the tortoise and the hare. We will be the hare and Russia will be the tortoise. As the bombers we have today gradually wear out and become obsolete, Russia will become superior to us in the air—the tortoise will pass the hare.

When this will happen I do not know. The time will surely come, however, unless our planning changes. We will be behind Russia in manned bombers. Some will say that we should buy bombers as needed. They fail to realize that we cannot go down to the hardware store and buy them. The bombers which we will have in 1966 and 1967 are the ones we plan today.

I do not claim to be an authority on the efficiency and capabilities of the RS-70, but I assure you that I have studied it carefully and have discussed it with the best authorities in the world. Its potential as a bomber and reconnaissance craft is enormous. Whether it will live up to all of the expectations of its designers, no one knows of a certainty, and the technical matters involved are too complex to adequately discuss on the floor. However, I do know that the RS-70 as planned unquestionably will be

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the finest bomber in the world in speed, altitude, range, carrying capacity, reconnaissance, capability, and versatility. However it will not be in operation for several years. Its capabilities are well recognized by practically all authorities on aviation.

Do we want to be first or do we want to "phase out" of the entire bomber program? President Kennedy recently stated that he does not want America to depend altogether on massive retaliation. That is, he does not want the United States to be entirely dependent upon massive destruction alone to resist aggression. Yet today, if we follow the course that is being developed by the Department of Defense, we will have only two answers to aggression. We must say that we are helpless to resist or we must destroy our enemy by using nuclear warheads by means of intercontinental ballistic missiles. I want us to have another alternative—the ability to stamp out small "brush wars" without resorting to total destruction.

A good example of the importance of having strong conventional forces to take care of limited aggression occurred 4 years ago this July when President Eisenhower sent forces into Lebanon and stopped Communist aggression there. This operation did more for American prestige than any other incident in recent years, without the loss of an American life. Firing an intercontinental ballistic missile into Lebanon certainly would not have been considered by any responsible government, yet unless we had done something at that time the entire Middle East might now be lost to the Kremlin. Without a powerful air force and an ability to resist limited aggression by land, sea, and air, we could never have another Lebanon.

If we desire only to be strong in massive retaliation, the path now being followed by the Department of Defense would be the correct one. We are developing an intercontinental ballistic missile capability which together with the Polaris submarine can destroy Russia or any other country at will. I want us to have such a capability but I certainly do not want our defense strength to reach such a condition that we must totally rely on such a capability. While such massive retaliation may some day be necessary, we shudder to think of such a day coming. We can contemplate a situation arising, however, where strong bomber forces backed by strong conventional forces could stop limited aggression before it reached the point of our having to resort to full nuclear defense.

Last year I took the lead in the committee fight to restore the RS-70 program to the status that it had in the Eisenhower budget. President Kennedy, in the 1960 campaign, criticized Eisenhower three times for not pushing the RS-70 program, yet when Kennedy presented his budget to the Congress in February 1961, for fiscal year 1962 it was \$138 million less than the amount submitted in the budget for fiscal year 1962 by President Eisenhower. We lost this fight in the committee to restore the \$138 million that Kennedy had deleted by two votes, but after reconsideration

the Congress finally did raise this amount. President Kennedy never used the additional money authorized.

There has been a growing belief in America, and one of its strongest proponents has been President Kennedy, that our defense should not be totally dependent upon nuclear bombs carried in intercontinental ballistic missiles. Yet, the course that the Department of Defense is pursuing is directly contrary to the goals announced by President Kennedy; that is, not to rely wholly on massive retaliation. Rather we should build up our conventional forces and maintain our superiority in manned bombers for possible conflicts in which massive retaliation with nuclear missiles certainly could not be used. This is why we insist upon the importance of the RS-70 program.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. HEBERT].

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, there still seems to be some confusion as to exactly who won what and who lost what. I think it quite necessary that an effort be made to clear the atmosphere now and present to the committee exactly the situation in which we find ourselves.

The distinguished gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, has made the statement here in the well that today we make history. We certainly do make history, because for the first time this Congress has come to grips with the executive department as to each one's responsibility related to the other. The resolution is long overdue. It should have come to pass 12 years ago when the Congress authorized the building of the flush-deck carrier *United States* and the funds were refused by the Secretary of Defense. If we had come to grips with the problem then, we would not be discussing it here today. But, through the succeeding years the will of the Congress has been cast aside; the will of the Congress has not been adhered to, and nothing has been done about it until this present situation arose.

In past years the Congress has authorized the full strength of the Marine Corps to 200,000. It was not adhered to. It authorized funds for the modernization of our Army. It has not been adhered to. It authorized money for the extension of the B-52 program. It has not been adhered to. In other words, to put it in simple language that we all understand, this situation of the RS-70 is the straw that broke the camel's back, and some vigorous and direct action had to be taken, some vigorous and direct language had to be used, and that language was the word "direct" in the amendment offered to this bill by the committee.

Mr. Chairman, I think we should know some of the background. I think we should understand exactly the events which have led up to this situation, and this exercise which I think has been a most healthy one, and one which I think will have its effects in future days to come. I want to say here right now that

in the 22 years I have been here I have seen many Secretaries of Defense, and great ones, including Forrestal, Lovett, and Gates. I do not know of any one individual that I have seen come here with the genius for administration and the ability to act as an effective administrator as the present Secretary of Defense. In the field in which I am most knowledgeable—in the area of procurement—he has done things in the last year that we have been asking to be done at the Pentagon for certainly 12 or more years. He is a master administrator. He is a dedicated individual. He is perhaps the most unique man to occupy the Office of Secretary of Defense in the last two decades. But here let us pause and examine exactly what his qualifications are to make military decisions. If I operated a huge hospital, I would have the gentleman as my administrator, and he would do an excellent job. But if it came to operating on a patient, I would call on a doctor and follow his advice.

Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Armed Services did not come to this decision on the RS-70 program without the advice of high military authorities. We had a full and complete briefing by the Air Force. We had the benefit of the knowledge and experience of men who actually have worn the uniform, the men who know what the military needs. Backed up with that, we had the judgment and the wisdom of a committee which reflects its seniority in the 48 years during which the chairman, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], has served in this House. I submit that in view of this experience we are in just as good or better position to judge or to make a judgment upon the needs of the military as related to an individual who came here shortly more than a year ago. Washington is a bad place for a man to attempt to play God, even if it be the Secretary of Defense. I think as a result of what has happened in this matter the Secretary of Defense has learned a lesson, and I hope he has. He has learned the lesson that this Congress does stand for something; that the Committee on Armed Services does have a responsibility and will not hesitate to discharge it. It has been a long time coming, but I congratulate Secretary McNamara on the position which he has now taken, though belatedly. I think all of us should know this because it is most important: This is the first time that the Secretary of Defense has given any indication of acknowledging that other people can make decisions and do not have to use an IBM machine to do it. It has been said of him, and I think in a critical though charitable vein, that he is as inscrutable as the sphinx, and twice as inflexible. That observation was before yesterday afternoon.

Mr. Chairman, I want to pay particular tribute to the President of the United States in this instance. When he came into this picture, he came into the picture with the knowledge that he had acquired through the years as a Member of this body, and as a Member of the other body. He came in with the full affect-

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tion and understanding of the problems which we have here. In order to give an indication of how this whole thing has been misrepresented to the public, I will cite one instance, or two instances: Every time the Secretary of Defense has talked to the American people, and he has given his views on many occasions on the subject, the rejection of the RS-70 has always been referred to as "the President's program," and the press has picked it up and said "The President backs Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense."

Now, actually what did the President say publicly, and that one time was in a news conference, when he said that he relied on Mr. McNamara, and had full confidence in him, but suggested there was some compromise available. That is all he said. That was the President's position. The President has never assumed responsibility for this program per se, but his name has been bandied about as though indicating that he was in full accord with the abandonment of the RS-70 program.

There is another facet to this controversy which I think you should know about. Unfortunately, those of us on the Committee on Armed Services have been unable to get our story over to the public because we are under the compulsion of security. We have had meeting after meeting under top secret direction. The last time Mr. McNamara appeared before us, his speech was stamped "Top Secret." We could not discuss that speech nor could we discuss the questions which were asked him, nor even now can we discuss what went on in that meeting. I think it would be very enlightening if you knew the colloquy, but we are still under the compulsion of security and secrecy. The presentation which Mr. McNamara made to us, every page of it, marked "Top Secret" was given out almost in toto the next day at a hurriedly called press conference in the Pentagon.

I think this is serious business when we cannot discuss these matters in public. As a matter of fact, and I think parenthetically, I should inform you of this rather amusing incident. A very articulate and able young colonel was testifying before us during the hearings that were in secret and his biography was stamped "Secret." We could ask him where he was born, and he could tell us within the confines of the committee room, but outside of that none of us could open our mouths if we were going to respect the stamp of secrecy.

So I think it quite necessary that everybody in this body should understand exactly what the situation is.

I compliment the distinguished ranking member of our committee, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ARENDS], who certainly made a very lucid explanation of the problem today. Of course, it is not necessary to add more laurels to the crown now worn by my distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON]. He and I have differed on many occasions, as many of you know. But my devotion and affection and respect for him have never been diminished. I might almost paraphrase

what the President has said, that he had confidence in his Secretary of Defense; I may say that I, too, have confidence in the Secretary of Defense; and not that I have less confidence in the Secretary of Defense, but I have more confidence in my chairman, the distinguished gentleman from Georgia.

So today this is not a battle won or lost, or something we should gloat over. This has been a constructive exercise. This has been an exercise which has focused the attention of the Nation on a serious problem of conflict in approach to problems.

The President wisely has pointed out his powers under the Constitution, but we, too, must point out that under article I, section 8, we have the responsibility and the backing of the Constitution to raise and maintain armies and navies, and to appropriate moneys for their upkeep; and also to make the rules and regulations for the control of those bodies.

The Department of Defense is much in the position, I think I would say, as that of a baseball manager; or perhaps I should say the Secretary of Defense is. He is in full command and charge on that field. But he has got to play according to the rules. He may not change the size of the ball or shorten the distance between the bases. Nor do I think he is in a very enviable position when he tells you, as the gentleman from Indiana has pointed out so well, that we are at the end of the road in bombers. It means that when the B-52 and the B-58 go out we have no other bombers on the drawing boards to replace these manned weapons. The Secretary of Defense gives out great figures. I cannot compete in his realm with numbers, statistics and figures, other than to approve them if they are on my side. But it is like the football coach who said that in 1967 he is going to have the greatest team he has ever had in history.

He will have reached his peak and he can defeat any team against him.

But, I submit what will happen after 1967, if they have nobody on the bench to come up and fill the ranks of the seniors when they go out, and that is the situation in which we find ourselves in this particular instance, unless there is a weapons system, a manned bomber weapons system on the drawing boards and ready to replace the deficiencies in the inventory, at the end of 1967 we will be absolutely lost in the field of retaliation in this particular atmosphere. Up to this time the Secretary has been writing the obituary of the RS-70 in installments. Today, I hope his letter retracts those words and that he will begin to take a constructive and progressive view. His language is clear in his letter. There is absolutely no doubt in the world that this Committee on Armed Services has not capitulated. It has won a very distinct and very deserving victory in the interest of representative government and in the interest of the American people. We have a responsibility to meet from here on out. I agree with the gentleman from Illinois in referring to that. This may be a pa-

per victory. It can only be a paper victory however if we, in the Congress, allow it to become a paper victory.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HEBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. GAVIN. It must be remembered, we have to get ourselves elected every other year and when we express ourselves, we are expressing the sentiments of our people back home whom we are proud and honored to represent.

Mr. HEBERT. I thank the gentleman. I think his remarks are well chosen because we do have a representative form of government, and here is being demonstrated one of the advantages of representative government. I think this point should be stressed right here, sir, that when the vote comes later today the resounding and solid vote of this House will reflect what the people of America believe when it comes to the RS-70 program. And I hope the Secretary of Defense will be impressed with the decision not of one lone man backed by dubious authorities on military weaponry, but the decision of millions of Americans reflected in the vote today of their constitutional representatives.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. WILSON].

Mr. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I am entering this controversy today not as a constitutional lawyer, but rather as an aviation historian. Progress in aviation has been a fascinating thing. Even within my lifetime, which incidentally is less than the 48 years that our distinguished Chairman, CARL VINSON, has served—even within my lifetime, the airplane has progressed from a flimsy, unpredictable, sputtering toy, literally nothing more than a box kite with a motor into the greatest defensive weapon and deadliest instrument of war ever devised by man, and a magic carpet of worldwide transportation.

The airplane we know today did not just appear like magic. It is the result of generations of applied imagination and effort, from glider pioneers like John Montgomery and others to the scientists and engineers of today. Each new airplane, with its own improvements, added a building block to the structure we know today as the Air Force and as our commercial airline system.

Before World War I only the dreamers could visualize the airplane as anything more than an exhilarating experiment. The first airplane dogfight in battle was between pilots with pistols. But as airplanes became faster and more maneuverable, it was inevitable that they would be armed with machineguns and later rockets. The first load that a military airplane carried was an observer who spotted for artillery forces. Later on, messages were carried by airplanes from headquarters to the frontlines. And, of course, inevitably the obvious advantage developed for using the airplane as a means of delivering destructive explosive power on the enemy. The first

bombs were little more than glorified hand grenades, and from there, through progression, the means of dropping blockbusters and later nuclear bombs developed into the ultimate and awesome capability of the latest SAC aircraft, which today in the form of the mach II B-58 is capable of flying 1,200 miles per hour and flying from Los Angeles to New York and back to Los Angeles nonstop in a period of some 4 hours.

It is an ill wind that blows nobody some good. Certainly the greatest instrument of war has also resulted in the greatest instrument of peacetime transportation known to the world. The modern airlines today exist only because of the initial development of military aircraft. We would not have our network of airlines had it not been for the billions of dollars that have been poured into the development of military aircraft in the period since World War I. The first airmail and passengers were carried in surplus World War I airplanes. The workhorse of the airlines after World War II, the famous DC-3, was a direct outgrowth of a military airplane produced by Douglas. The modern jet transports produced by three leading companies, Convair, Boeing, and Douglas, had their design origination and early development based on the B-47 and later the B-52 bombers.

Progress in aviation has not always been easy. There have always been the doubters and the scoffers who were willing to tell why it could not be done. Many scientists and engineers at the time of the Wright brothers, using their slip sticks and their equivalents of Univac and IBM, whatever they were in those days, had it all figured out that it was physically impossible for man to fly. They could prove it with statistics. Yes, and there were plenty of doubters within the military, too. The Secretary of the Navy in 1912 made the statement "If you can demonstrate to me that the aeroplane is capable of taking off and flying out to a battleship, landing alongside and capable of being lifted aboard, then I shall believe it to be of some value to the military."

Our own distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, participated in the 1920's in the investigation of the rather absurd proposal by Col. Billy Mitchell, that the airplane was capable of sinking a battleship. Perhaps that is one of the reasons why this distinguished gentleman believes so strongly in the RS-70.

Bombers, in particular, have always had to fight hard for their existence. I mentioned the Billy Mitchell controversy. In more recent times we have seen the B-36 controversy, when many people felt the long-range intercontinental bomber was unnecessary as long as other forces were available today. Well, I say, thank God for the visionaries and the experts of their day who provided us with the B-17 and the B-24 and the B-36 and the B-47 and the B-52 and the B-58. This country has been safer because of them and without them I think it is no overstatement to say we would not be here today as freshmen in a free nation.

These are the thoughts that have been running through the minds of many of us who serve on the Armed Services Committee today. This is the reason for the apprehension we indicated through our unanimous vote in favor of the continuation and extension of the B-70 or RS-70 program. These are the reasons why we reject completely the contention by the Secretary of Defense and his subordinates that we can phase out the bomber program and rely in the future on missiles for our defense. All of the Univac's and the IBM's in the Pentagon, had they been available back at the beginning of World War I and World War II, couldn't have predicted the fantastic development in uses and capabilities that grew out of these early aircraft. I submit to you that all of the Univac's and the IBM's and the thinking machines that are available to the modern Pentagon are incapable of predicting with infallibility the forces and materiel that might be necessary to protect this country in the future.

For the first time in our history we are laying down our tools that have helped to forge the greatest protective force and the greatest peacetime transportation force in history. No, my friends, I cannot believe that the people of this country are willing to legislate man out of the air. Yet in effect, that is what the throttling of the B-70-RS-70 program means. It means we have no faith in the future of aircraft. It means we are putting our entire reliance on the little black boxes that may be electronic marvels, but that even today have been known to blow a fuse.

Now I have no personal quarrel with the Secretary of Defense. I am willing to rate him as a genius, as many people have called him today. I think he is probably the closest equivalent to a real live flesh and blood thinking machine that modern industry has ever produced. Yet he would be one of the first to tell you that a computer is valueless if you do not have enough input. In other words, you have got to take all the factors into consideration when you press a button and ask a computer to make a decision for you. You have got to crank in all the possible variations and information into the machine before you can get an answer out the other end on a roll of printed tape. Until these thinking machines at the Pentagon get cranked into them the factors of unpredictable future needs and the supplemental benefits that derive from continued development of the aircraft, I am sure they are going to continue to get the answers that say we do not need airplanes for the future.

Certainly, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Mr. VINSON, our distinguished colleague from Georgia, has a sense of history. His championing of a stronger Navy, of nuclear-powered submarines, of a modernized expanded Air Force, are factors that are rather hard to crank into a Univac. As for me, I would rather put my faith in a hunch of CARL VINSON's than in the punches on all of Mr. McNamara's IBM cards. Yet today we see the Congress in conflict with the Secretary of De-

fense and with the President of the United States, a man who was highly touted during the 1960 campaign as having a sense of history. I think that Mr. Kennedy, the candidate, probably did have more of such a sense then than he has now. He was in favor of an expanded B-70 program at that time, before he started listening to the experts and their printed tapes. Listen to what he said on November 2, 1960, in my own hometown of San Diego. Here is what he said:

I endorse wholeheartedly the B-70 manned aircraft. We could not get the administration to release the funds until this week.

That does not exactly jibe with the recommendations he has been sending up to Congress through the Secretary of Defense, does it?

How about the Vice President; where does he stand? I have been reading a rather remarkable document. It is called the investigation of the preparedness program by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. Senate, printed in 1960, the 2d session of the 86th Congress. LYNDON JOHNSON, the chairman of the subcommittee, conducted a sweeping investigation into the B-70 and he came out with some remarkable recommendations. In the first place, he proved that the B-70 would be of tremendous use to the military in limited war. He pointed out its efficiency for the rapid support of troops and the delivery of missiles and equipment. He pointed out, for example, that it would take 10 days for 25 turbojet airplanes to airlift 4,000 tons of cargo over a 3,500-nautical-mile range and this same job could be done, not in 10 days, but with the RS-70, or the transport equivalent of the RS-70, in 2½ days.

Can an IBM machine predict that some time in the future it may be important to get 4,000 tons of vital war material up to the frontlines of some remote fighting front of the future? You know it cannot. Well, let us just read for a minute what Mr. JOHNSON recommends to the Congress of the United States. These are the conclusions of the Senate Investigating Preparedness Subcommittee. I like the title of that "Preparedness." We need that.

First. The advent of the ICBM does not preclude the necessity for continued development and use of advanced, manned weapon systems.

Second. Manned weapon systems—such as the B-70—could strongly complement other strategic weapon systems.

Third. There is a need to develop a bomber beyond the capabilities of those presently in being, since a bomber-missile or mixed-forces concept is essential to our defense posture.

Fourth. There is a continuing requirement for a manned bomber with supersonic and intercontinental characteristics.

Fifth. The Nation possesses the necessary resources to build a B-70 type weapon system.

Sixth. The technology required to build a B-70 type weapon system is at hand and is not dependent upon technological breakthroughs.

Seventh. Successful development of a weapon system such as the B-70 program, could also advance the age of supersonic commercial and industrial transport and represent an essential link in the chain of continuous advances in controlled flight.

Eighth. Because of its size and basic configuration, the B-70 is suited to possible adaptation as a supersonic, nuclear-powered air vehicle.

Ninth. A B-70 type system, because of its planned altitude and speed capabilities, has potential application as a recoverable booster space system to perform recurring heavy payload orbital launches.

Tenth. Unless an operational supersonic bomber is developed now, there will be no replacement for the B-52 at the time at which it enters its period of obsolescence—mid-1960's—and experience has demonstrated that stretching out an essential military development program not only increases ultimate total cost but loses valuable time.

So here we have additional testimony indicating the value of the B-70. This, in effect, is the testimony of LYNDON JOHNSON, the chairman of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee. Has Mr. JOHNSON changed his mind today? I don't believe he has.

I can easily understand a man changing his mind; I have done it many times myself. But normally when this happens, it is a question of the scales tipping slightly in one way under one set of circumstances, and tipping slightly the other way in another set of circumstances.

However, with respect to the B-70 this condition does not obtain at all. Nothing could be more precisely, directly or forcefully stated than the position of the Preparedness Subcommittee—Mr. JOHNSON, chairman—with respect to the B-70. This was no slight tipping of the scales in favor of this weapon system. This was an outright and aggressively stated recommendation—and one made without equivocation of any kind.

A person of Mr. JOHNSON's intelligence and obvious capability does not whimsically arrive at a particular conclusion. Nor does a person like Mr. JOHNSON capriciously change a decision on a fundamental issue.

Mr. JOHNSON does not speak out in this controversy over the B-70 today, but his voice is heard—loud and clear—in the decision of his subcommittee from whose report I have just read.

Mr. Chairman, I support the expanded program for the RS-70. I do so in the certainty that the RS-70 is not in itself the ultimate weapon of ultimate aircraft. It is another step forward in man's conquest of the air. It is just a prelude to such fantastic airplanes of the future—as Convair's proposed space plane, which will make even the RS-70 as old fashioned as the Jenny of World War I.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. GUBSER].

(Mr. GUBSER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend our chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the Honorable CARL VINSON, for his vigorous leadership in a fight which is designed to gain the respect of the Congress which the Constitution intended.

The committee report states on page 7:

The role of Congress in determining national policy, defense or otherwise, has deteriorated over the years. In the place of joint formulation of national policy by the Congress and the President we have seen an acceptance of the principle that in some matters, defense in particular, government should be by "expert."

This is the greatest mistake that can befall a republic.

The German Reichstag made the mistake in 1933 and it did not get the chance to live to regret it.

In our republic we do not have a dictator of defense, we have a Secretary of Defense who holds no power except that which flows to him through the President.

Our entire system is based upon opposition to the concentration of absolute power in the hands of one man, regardless of his expertise, because, as the committee states, "expertise is not infallible."

Experts are human and no human is infallible. So, we dare not trust one man with making the decision which determines whether we shall survive.

Men make mistakes. It was some man, an expert—I do not know which one—who decided to build the Edsel, and the stockholders of Ford Motor Company know it was a mistake.

I am greatly impressed with the outstanding ability of Secretary McNamara, but he is only a man and, as such, bears some human limitations.

It was Secretary McNamara, an expert, who opposed me as a novice, when, last year on the floor of this House, I proposed an amendment to authorize six more Polaris submarines. He was wrong, and has now admitted it by his action to do administratively what I tried to do legislatively.

It was a man who said on January 23, 1960, that "America had become second in missiles" and it was the same man who worried all through 1960 about the effect of this missile gap on our national prestige.

To many, authenticity and expertise is the automatic windfall of presidential candidacy, so many thousands of people believed that we were second in missiles. As one member of the Committee on Armed Services I repeatedly said the missile gap did not exist, but nobody listened—I was not an expert.

Here again is another case where an expert, a man, was wrong. It is now admitted that there never was a missile gap.

We cannot afford to ignore the time proven constitutional formula for co-operation between Congress and the Executive. Thanks to Chairman VINSON, this issue has now been spotlighted to the extent where the Executive can no longer ignore it. We have won all we could expect to win and more than could have been won without the com-

mittee amendment striking the word "directed." Admiral VINSON has won our battle for us.

This morning a question was asked in a session of the Committee on Armed Services as to whether the letters from the President and Secretary could be interpreted as an intention by the administration to request all necessary funding up to \$491 million in fiscal year 1963 for the RS-70 program. The answer was affirmative and unequivocal.

With this battle the deterioration of the role of Congress is now at an end, and the American people will be the beneficiaries.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. BECKER].

(Mr. BECKER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman, it would seem to me that after the executive meeting we had of the Armed Services Committee this morning we are now proceeding in what I would call an exercise in futility. A great many words are being expressed about what we are doing here today—who has won and who has lost; who has capitulated and who has not capitulated. We have made quite a reversal in the discussion made here today about why we are doing this, and the concession made by the Secretary of Defense in the fact that now he has conceded to make a study.

Well, anyone who heard the reading of the letter from the Secretary of Defense before our committee this morning in executive session and those who heard the reading of that letter on the floor of the House today know that this is an old legislative trick—that when you want to get rid of something, agree to a study. This is the surest way to brush something under the rug that you want to get rid of. This is all the Secretary of Defense agreed to do in his letter.

Mr. Chairman, studies have been going on for years in this program, and for these studies we have appropriated over \$1.3 billion, and will agree to appropriate another \$1.3 billion to complete the additional RS-70 planes.

Mr. Chairman, we have heard the statement of our good chairman, the very distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON]. While we heard his statement today, I wonder how many read the statement in the report of the Armed Services Committee on the bill authorizing some \$13 billion, and dealing specifically with the RS-70 program? Let me read one paragraph of that report. I think it is quite different than that which we are getting today in this exercise in futility:

To any student of government, it is eminently clear that the role of the Congress in determining national policy, defense or otherwise, has deteriorated over the years. More and more the role of the Congress has come to be that of a sometimes querulous but essentially kindly uncle who complains while furiously puffing on his pipe but who finally, as everyone expects, gives in and hands over the allowance, grants the permission, or raises his hand in blessing, and then returns to his rocking chair for another

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year of somnolence broken only by an occasional anxious glance down the avenue and a muttered doubt as to whether he had done the right thing.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BECKER. I will be happy to yield to my colleague from Louisiana.

Mr. HÉBERT. May I say to the gentleman that the excerpt he just read from the report is probably one of the most accurate descriptions of the Congress today. There has been a change, however.

Mr. BECKER. I agree with the gentleman wholeheartedly. That is why I have used it here, in the light of what has been said in the previous statements before this House. Nothing could be clearer than this. Let me call attention to what we are doing in Congress, not only in the picture of our national defense, with which our committee is charged, and sits month in and month out in trying to design a program for the defense not only of the United States of America, but of the free world, we are again giving up our constitutional rights to provide a Military Establishment for this country.

In doing so let me bring this to the attention of the Members of the House. Are we doing differently than that which we are being asked to do? There is legislation proposed from the "Avenue" that is coming before the House to give up other constitutional powers this year in the fields of tariff and trade, and turn this over to the executive branch of the Government. This is the proposal of the administration. In article I, clause 3 of the Constitution, this is clearly empowered to the Congress of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, there is another piece of legislation to be considered this year wherein we are being asked to again give up our constitutional powers, and that is in the field of taxes wherein we are being asked to give the President and the executive branch of Government the right to lower taxes 5 percent, if he deems it advisable to do so.

Mr. Chairman, again in the same identical clause in the Constitution, these powers are spelled out to be the powers of Congress.

In another piece of legislation we are being asked to give the executive branch of the Government \$1 billion to spend at will on public works, in the event the executive branch feels it is necessary and advisable. This again dilutes the power of Congress to authorize and appropriate for specific projects as we deem advisable.

I say to you, Mr. Chairman, that what we are doing here is not a matter of yielding, or a matter of being unwilling to compromise with the executive branch of the Government, but we are yielding to the so-called civilian experts of the executive branch of the Government, who are telling the Committee on Armed Services and telling our Military Establishment—our Air Force, who came before our committee with every intent and with every means at their command to impress upon us why the RS-70 is vitally necessary. We agreed with them unani-

mously because over the years we have come to understand what they were really trying to do.

Why do I go along with Curtis LeMay, this great general, with the great record, and his advisers in the Air Force? I will tell you why I do and why I am willing to; because, in the history of the United States of America it has been our military leaders who have led us to victory in every war. It has been our civilian experts who have put the world in the mess in which it is today. I say that our military leaders are men who are dedicated to the defense of this Nation and who have proven that beyond any shadow of doubt. That is why I am willing so many times to go along with their reasoning; because of their great experience and their great dedication.

I think Mr. McNamara is a great, a wonderful man. I have nothing against him as an individual or as a personality. But when Mr. McNamara goes before the American people day after day to try to get the press, the news media on his side, as against the will of the Congress of the United States, I say that is wrong. It does not comport with the intent of having three equal branches of Government, each equal in its powers under the Constitution. I do not believe that any Secretary of Defense is carrying out his duty as he should when he uses those methods. The President of the United States as an elected official has a duty, and I have no criticism of him when he takes any means at his command to prepare legislation on those things he desires, because he has that responsibility under the Constitution. But we who are the elected representatives of the people—and I close on this note—have to take this position. I say this to you, that when I go back home and see what is reflected in the mail that I receive, there is a great disturbance in the minds of the American people as to the effectiveness of the Congress today. What are we doing to offset the many things that are happening in our Nation and the world? I think today is a good example. In all conscience I must vote for this bill. I have no alternative than to provide for the national defense. I do so with a full appreciation of what is necessary. I can only hope, and express the fervent prayer, that the Secretary of Defense will wake up to the will of Congress. And as to our good chairman, I am sure he will do what he said he will do, see to it that we get regular reports of what this study is going to do, and not have the matter brushed under the rug. So many studies that we have asked for in the years that I have been a member of the committee I never heard of again. This may be just another one.

So I say, Mr. Chairman, that while I certainly must vote for this legislation, because I must vote for it as others do, I do so with a great reservation insofar as the great need of bombers is concerned, one which the Committee on Armed Services has marked for study year in and year out. We know that this is a vital, an essential part of the defense weapons system of this great country of ours.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BECKER. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I have been waiting all afternoon to hear someone tell us, under this agreement that has been reported, how much of the \$491 million is going to be spent for the purpose for which it is intended.

Mr. BECKER. You heard the letter of Mr. McNamara. He did not say he would spend any, but he said if the study proved that technological advances in certain fields in the way of a weapons system of the RS-70 proved in the course of the year essential or moving ahead, he would spend part or all of it that was deemed necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, this bill, H.R. 9751, would authorize appropriations during the next fiscal year for aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels for the Armed Forces. The total amount of authorization is over \$13 billion. It constitutes the largest single authorization bill to come before the Congress during this session. It involves nothing, except the defense and security of our country since it includes authorization for everything from missiles to revolvers; in short, all the military hardware and weapons which comprise our military deterrent.

It is no easy responsibility, to sit in judgment on matters which result in such a heavy burden on the American taxpayer, and yet to realize that these are decisions on which our very lives may depend. The Armed Services Committee has been in almost daily session, listening to posture briefings by our military chiefs, hearing highly classified intelligence estimates of the military capabilities of the Communist bloc, and considering all the evidence which must form a basis for our decisions.

Bills which are reported out of the Armed Services Committee are unique in that much of the basis for committee action is highly classified and cannot be discussed in open debate on the floor of the House. Therefore, the Congress must rely on the judgment of the committee, to a far greater extent than they rely on other committees; whose recommendations can be fully discussed during debate, and any particular bill amended, and so forth.

I can report to you that the recommendations of our committee on this particular bill were originally unanimous. Party affiliation did not enter into our decisions, as indeed it should not on matters affecting our Nation's defense.

The major controversy on this defense authorization bill occurs between the Armed Services Committee and the administration's Secretary of Defense; and then only on two of our major weapons systems. One involves the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile. As you may know, several counties in the Seventh Congressional District of Missouri are included in the Minuteman-

complex which has its headquarters at the Whiteman Air Force Base, Knobnoster, Mo. SAC has already contracted for the construction of underground firing sites, several of which will be located in our northern tier of counties.

Twelve squadrons totaling 600 hardened and well dispersed Minuteman missiles have been funded through fiscal year 1962. Funds for four more squadrons are included in the 1963 budget and are included in the bill approved by our committee. This represents \$10 million more than the amount requested by our executive branch. It was the opinion of our committee that a larger force of Minuteman missiles should be initiated at this time in order that the ultimate number procured and placed will move us closer to the capability which our country must have in the years ahead. The first Minuteman missile was fired in February 1961 and was completely successful. Numerous tests since then have also been successful. In view of the rapid strides which Communist Russia has and is making in the field of missiles, the committee believed our Nation had no choice but to develop a strong deterrent capability in this area.

The other area of controversy involves the B-70 or RS-70 bomber. This supersonic bomber—or space capable platform—is still in the development stage and a high degree of secrecy is attached to its intended capabilities. The committee believed it has a very special place in our defense structure because it possesses the potential to do many things in the areas of reconnaissance, strike, and communications. Furthermore, unlike a missile, a bomber of this type give us greater flexibility. Once a missile is fired from its launching pad we have reached the point of no return. A nuclear explosion is as certain to follow as day follows night. A bomber with the capabilities of the B-70 would provide us with the option of waiting until the last possible second before making the fateful decision of whether to touch off a nuclear holocaust in the event of war. It can be recalled.

For the last 3 years, the Congress has authorized the expenditures necessary to produce three experimental types. But in each case the recommendations have not been carried out in full by the Secretary of Defense.

The bill finally, but not unanimously, voted out by the Armed Services Committee authorizes the Secretary to utilize an additional \$491 million to proceed with production planning and long lead-time procurement of the B-70 weapons system. The debate taking place this week undoubtedly would have dealt with interpretation of the Constitution as to whether the Congress has the authority to so instruct the administrative branch of Government. This question was sold out by the leadership and chairman, and majority party, after a White House conference of 3:30 Tuesday afternoon. I am on record—May 23, 1961—as urging more and firmer policy of the Armed Services Committee to the chairman.

In respect to our ability to finance the additional B-70 authorization, I

might point out that the foreign aid which we are now extending to Communist and so-called neutralist or non-aligned countries, would finance our entire B-70 development program. I certainly believe that this expenditure of tax funds will serve a far better investment in our defense posture and for civilian flight development and progress than in supporting and building up those countries, who would be likely to side with the Communist bloc in the event of war. When the foreign aid bill comes up again this year, I certainly will vote in accordance with these beliefs and convictions.

In all fairness, I want to point out that our committee, as a whole, has the highest regard for Defense Secretary McNamara. I personally believe he is capable, and dedicated to carrying out the enormous responsibilities which are his. The areas of agreement between the Defense Secretary and our committee are far more numerous than the areas of disagreement. This is as it should be. I regret the issue was not joined and that in the interest of expediency, principle was forgotten. Perhaps only time will tell whether the vaunted courage of the Armed Services Committee has served our country well, protected it faithfully, and lived up to our constitutional responsibilities. Certainly, the proverbial "walk" in the White House rose garden, changed things abruptly. I find it difficult to yield by altering the House's "direction," and still support unwanted, and unneeded, further spending, even for defense; when we are already completely deterrent capable and annihilatory. It would seem more appropriate to strengthen the demands and will of our total people and defend them by expediting an anti-missile missile, through not only the "whiz kids" and their ideas under control; but, also by utilizing the grizzled and tried and true knowledge and experience of our military leaders.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CHAMBERLAIN].

(Mr. CHAMBERLAIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the bill before the House and to say that when the chairman in his statement today stated that the Members of the House would be surprised at the news he was going to bring, I assure you, I, too, was greatly surprised, when I heard this news just an hour or so before. But though I have reservation about what has been done to the RS-70 program, I can say in all good conscience, I do not disagree with the decision that has been made with respect to striking the directive words in this bill. But, as we heard in a colloquy earlier in the debate as to what the word "direct" might mean or "authorize," I think now we should turn our attention, as my colleague from New York has pointed out, to what the word "study" means? So often when we reach a dead end here with these problems, we throw the legislative machine into neutral and stop for a study. When the Secretary of Defense says, "Consequently, we are initiating immediately a new

study"—I would like to ask when he says, "Consequently, we—" who is we? Who is going to be the head of this study or is it going to be composed entirely of those in the Department of Defense that had a negative attitude toward this B-70 program? Are we going to call in some people from the Air Force who might believe there is some merit to the RS-70 and listen to what they have to say?

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I am happy to yield to my colleague from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. I have an idea you will see the hiring of some kind of management or consulting firm to come up with the answer that the Secretary of Defense wants in this matter.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I would not be surprised, nor would I be surprised if it took a couple of years. Are we going to have a stacked committee to study this problem? I think that is something we should inquire into and I want to serve notice on my chairman that I am going to be making some inquiries as to who will be making this study in the weeks and months ahead.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. HEBERT. I would refresh the gentleman's memory as to what the distinguished chairman of our Committee on Armed Services said originally when he was speaking as to who would be on the study committee and who would participate in the study. He said:

And another thing, the committee will get a full assurance that the group making this study will have not only scientists and representatives of the Secretary of Defense in it, but will have people from the Air Force, not only the technical ones but the policy ones; and not only civilians, but military people whose background and experience in the development and operation of bombers gives them special understanding of the problem that we are talking about.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I am glad that my colleague has pointed that out. I hope he will join me in making certain that a stacked committee is not created.

Mr. HEBERT. I am sure, and the gentleman knows my record when it comes to matters of that kind and knows of my persistence in that respect that I will be on your side to see that that promise is carried out.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. There is one other thing that I want to point out. In the next paragraph in the Secretary's letter, he said:

Furthermore, if technological developments advance more rapidly than we anticipate, we will wish to take advantage of these advances by increasing our development expenditures.

Which raises the question of which came first, the chicken or the egg?

I think it is the will of this Congress to spend more money right now to make certain that we do everything we can to bring about technological advancement and get this program going, and get this plane off the ground.

I would like to say in conclusion that I share wholeheartedly the statement

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that was made by my colleague from Louisiana, about the testimony of Secretary of Defense classified top secret, yet the morning papers have had much of the same information spread in the press reports. Having failed for 2 years to convince the committee, in top secret sessions, of the soundness of his position the Secretary of Defense elected to take this complex issue to the people in an apparent attempt to have it decided on the front pages of the newspapers with unclassified information. This every Member of Congress should resent.

While I question that any funds that may be appropriated in excess of budgetary recommendations will ever be spent, I certainly share the view of my distinguished chairman and my colleagues on your Armed Services Committee that the time has come to speak up and find out whether we do have any voice in determining the level of our national security programs. It is my hope that the vote on this issue will cause our able Secretary of Defense to reflect about the mutuality of our responsibilities to the Nation. I urge your support of the recommendations of your Armed Services Committee.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to be the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT]. (Mr. BENNETT of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Armed Services has wisely resolved the RS-70 legislative debate by providing for joint legislation and Executive scrutiny of this development program. I was glad to hear the chairman of our committee announce that the research and development of this plane and its subsystems will have continuing periodic investigation by the committee to assure that progress is made in the maximum degree; so that when opportunities arise for pushing ahead to the prompt and possible final production that this will be done in fact.

Now I would like to turn to another aspect of this bill.

Aggression, of any magnitude, at any location, must be met with the proper force at the right time. Airlift helps to make this possible. Without it, our ability to meet aggression would be greatly reduced.

It was never more important that we do everything possible to reach our national objectives across the entire spectrum of conflict and international relations. Airlift has the power to support this country and free world aims to such an extent that it holds a unique position as a tool of national policy. A quick look at the past will show just how flexible airlift can be as a tool of national policy and just how important it is as a cornerstone of our strategy.

The Berlin airlift of 1948-49, Lebanon in 1956, and Taiwan in 1958 are three examples of how airlift supported our national effort in times of emergency. The recent deployment of forces to Europe is another more current example of the need and effectiveness of airlift.

Rapid airlift in proper quantities, using equipment designed for the job, can help stem possible aggression. Failing in this, it can put the forces in place and continue to support them as required. Timely airlift can often keep outbreaks of violence limited.

In my judgment, the case for airlift is made by just these examples, but there are more. Our strategic retaliatory force depends in part upon airlift support, as does our Mobile Strategic Army Corps and our Tactical Air Forces. The very mobility of these latter forces is given meaning only through the use of airlift.

The unique role which airlift plays today is best exemplified by the nature of U.S. support to the United Nations today. In the past 18 months, some 31,000 troops and 7,000 tons of cargo from 17 different U.N. member nations have been airlifted into the Congo in furtherance of the U.N.'s efforts to maintain order and provide for democratic development.

Now, if we can do all these things with today's forces, why is there still more needed? A brief review of today's force and its posture is perhaps the best way to seek an answer and identify some limitations.

Today, there are over 1,800 transport aircraft including some 230 of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet which are available to the Air Force during times of emergency. This is a sizable force, but one which has many demands made upon it, most of which can be met separately but which, taken together, create shortcomings in timeliness or method of delivery or mission accomplishment itself. In other words, there isn't enough airlift today to meet in quantity or quality all wartime airlift requirements. There are some requirements, such as missiles and certain Army equipment, which are heavier or larger than present aircraft are capable of airlifting and yet which require transportation by air. More importantly, the majority of the strategic airlift force is obsolescent and piston-type, operating in the 200 to 250 knot range. Also, the force is made up largely of converted passenger-type aircraft which lack flexibility because they can perform airlanded missions only and have no outsize cargo carrying capability. The latter is true of the entire CRAF fleet. In addition, the capability of the piston engine force is predicated on the existence of island bases en route to Europe and the Far East.

The Air Force has developed a program for airlift modernization both interim and long range which, when implemented, will reduce or eliminate most of the limitations I have just mentioned.

This Congress by its fiscal year 1962 authorizations enabled the program to continue when last year it authorized 93 C-130 aircraft, 15 additional C-135's and funds to proceed with a positive development and procurement program for the C-141—the most vital step to date toward a truly modern transport force. The items we see in this year's budget request and which we are being asked to authorize represent the coming

year's share of the total force, which will require 5 more years to build. This point bears emphasizing: The 16 C-141 aircraft to be authorized are merely the first increment and the 136 C-130 aircraft only a part of the total force of over 400 which modernize both the Tactical Air Command and Military Air Transport Service and provide a versatile aircraft for support of the Army. Each year some procurement of the C-141 aircraft will be requested until over 200 are bought and the program goal is attained. We must appreciate that the total objective force is required even though it is to be achieved by a year-by-year procurement program. Each year, in other words, we must be prepared to authorize 1 year's share of the ultimate force.

What are the objectives of the Air Force in projecting a force of the most modern transport aircraft the "state-of-the-art" can provide? Broadly speaking, they are to achieve complete flexibility in airlift forces so that support for all types of missions can be provided from any operating location and to permit the accomplishment of all the airlift requirements of cold, limited, and general war. Specifically, the aim is to relieve our dependence on island bases; to acquire the ability to deploy strategic Army forces up to several divisions, plus mobile strike forces anywhere in the world in the shortest possible time; and above all, to be able to undertake simultaneously airlift tasks of some magnitude to more than one theater of operations.

I am convinced by what I have seen of this program that the airlift force of the future will have impressive capabilities, distinguished by flexibility and versatility. It has my support and I am convinced it merits the continuing support of the Congress.

Before closing, I should allude to some requirements of the future which are not now a part of the airlift program I have just discussed, but which when presented to us will deserve our most thoughtful consideration.

I have reference to three items. First, a follow-on aircraft is required to replace the C-133 as an outsize cargo carrier capable of handling all missiles and space boosters now being planned or developed. The Air Force is currently preparing a specific operational requirement for this aircraft. Second, a light transport aircraft with true vertical or short field take-off and landing capabilities which will carry 8- to 10-ton payloads to provide support and combat zone mobility to the ground forces in the future. We can expect to see a specific operational requirement for this essential aircraft in the near future. The Army has already expressed its view in the form of a qualitative material requirement and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now studying the matter. Last, and looking to the 1970's, we should expect to see a valid requirement expressed for a supersonic transport—1,500 miles per hour or faster. Technology will inevitably permit its development and future strategy will dictate its acquisition. One dramatic example should illustrate this:

Today's battle group could be delivered in Europe with little warning, in less than 10 hours and with approximately 43 sorties.

Economic considerations alone will probably determine our position in this matter but we could ill afford on the one hand to see another nation develop this aircraft first and become the world's supplier and on the other to surrender our historical position in the forefront of aircraft development.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON].

(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, a good deal has been said on this controversy already and I shall address myself to just one or two points. Much has been said this afternoon as to who is winning and who is losing in the compromise that has been worked out by the committee. I think there is some confusion on this issue. In fact we are presented with two issues as I see it. The first is the constitutional issue, the question of whether the Congress has the right to direct the Executive to spend any particular sum of money. Many people have been interested in this particular issue and some perhaps have looked forward to a head-on clash between the legislature and the Executive on this particular point. This clash has now of course been avoided by the action of the committee.

In this connection I am reminded of a story that a former Governor of the State of New York, Al Smith, used to like to tell, about a young man who was taking an examination to be a railroad crossing guard on the New York Central Railroad. He passed his written examination with flying colors, but when it came to the oral examination they asked him this: "Suppose there is a train coming from one direction on a one-track line and then you look the other way and you see another train coming in the opposite direction on the same line. You wave your lantern but the wind blows it out. You wave your red flag but the wind blows it away. What would you do then?" The young man looked up and said: "I would go and call my wife." The examiner said: "No, no, this is a serious matter. I do not think you understood the question. I will repeat it: "There are two trains on the same track coming from opposite directions; the wind blows your lantern out and tears your flag off the stick. What would you do?" He said again, just as emphatically: "I would go call my wife." They asked him: "But why would you call your wife?" And he replied: "I'd call her to come and see the darndest railroad wreck she'd ever seen."

Well perhaps this is what some folks had hoped to see here today.

But the real issue here is not the constitutional issue, the real issue is the progress of the B-70 or the RS-70 weapons system. Will it be expedited as rapidly as possible? And on this point I do not think there is any question but what the committee has won its point

and that the Congress in adopting the legislation as proposed by our committee will also be winning its point.

Last week Defense Secretary McNamara appeared before our committee, as has been mentioned. Later on he held a press conference and presented publicly at least a great portion of the material he had presented to the committee.

The interesting thing about the Secretary's appearance and his subsequent press conference is that on the basis of the information he gave us the B-70 or the RS-70 was a complete waste of money and a completely worthless weapon system.

The Secretary is a brilliant man, as has already been testified to here earlier, but his testimony before the committee proved too much, because in his own budget there is set aside the sum of \$171 million to promote an aircraft which he was trying to tell us last week, on the basis of his computers, was completely worthless and a complete waste of money. That \$171 million was in the budget, of course, because the President of the United States and his officials in the Defense Department had already very wisely recognized that you cannot base the future of the Nation solely on what a computer tells you. Any computer has to have certain assumption, fed in to get started. The fact of the matter is that the Defense Department, in spite of Mr. McNamara's analysis, has been proceeding, but proceeding all too slowly in the judgment of our committee, toward the development of a new manned plane, a new manned bomber, in case the time should ever come when it might be needed.

So all that our committee was doing was to tell the Defense Department that it should proceed more rapidly on this advanced plane than the Secretary wanted to proceed. The point at issue is whether we are going to proceed at \$171 million worth or whether we are going to proceed as rapidly as humanly possible to develop this new aircraft so that it might be ready even sooner in the event it is needed, that is, as the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. HEBERT] said a moment ago, be ready when the seniors on the team have graduated, and when we are looking at the bench for somebody else to replace them to carry on the battle.

Our committee is not willing to put all our defense eggs into the missile basket. So we have insisted that the new generation, the mach 3 bomber, be prepared more rapidly. The result of the letters that have been read into the committee record this afternoon is to demonstrate that the President and Secretary of Defense are now both in complete accord with the committee, that money shall be spent on this system just as rapidly as it can be effectively used.

We are not asking here to spend \$10 billion. We just want six of these planes instead of three. That is the real difference and that is the real measure of the concession that has been granted to us. It may well be that our country will never have to use the B-70. We did not have to use the B-36, either, as you recall. We might not even have to use

any of the money we are providing today in this great bill for missiles, tanks, guns, ships, and all the other things. But this committee is charged with the defense and the security of the Nation, and we would be doing less than our solemnly pledged duty if we did not do everything possible to guarantee our security in the years to come, when the decision will not rest on the IBM computers, but on a situation that we can only guess at today will be upon us.

I want to commend the chairman of our committee for the action he has taken. I fully support the amendment he will offer this afternoon, and I congratulate the members of the committee because I am sure we will all go along with an action that will not, it is true, result in any great railroad wreck, but will protect the security of our Nation as we believe it needs to be protected in the face of Communist challenges and aggression from abroad. I support the committee's position on this bill.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. PIRNIE].

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman, what constitutes adequate military preparedness for our Nation? The better informed one becomes as to the nature and scope of the threats to our security and the technological problems involved in modern weapons to meet these threats, the less inclined one should become to assert an arbitrary opinion. However, the Armed Services Committee has a direct responsibility to prepare and submit to this body measures which in its well-considered judgment support our Defense Establishment at the level of military preparedness the current world situation requires. Balancing factors of economic and military requirements, we have unanimously brought to the floor H.R. 9751. In it is embodied the results of weeks of briefings, hearings, and detailed presentations during which we have heard our leading military authorities, uniformed and civilian. The bill embodies all basic recommendations of the Department of Defense and adds a further important item which has become a subject of considerable controversy. It is vital to the Nation that the dispute be kept in perspective.

Our able Secretary of Defense early demonstrated a surprising grasp of the vast program he directs. Our committee has great respect for his sincerity, diligence, and ability. The bill before you gives him the tools he requested to do the job, but it goes beyond his request by authorizing additional funds for the development of the RS-70 weapons system—the reconnaissance version of the mach 3 bomber. The development of this aircraft was first authorized in 1955. Funds have been appropriated in each fiscal year since that date until now we have approximately \$1 billion invested in the program. The Department of Defense recommended that a follow-on sum of \$171 million be expended for the fiscal year 1963. The question before the committee and now before the House is whether instead of \$171 million, the sum of \$491 million be provided to expedite the prototype development of this unique

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weapons system. The Secretary of Defense has consistently maintained that the additional funds are not required, but in the opinion of our committee, the Air Force made a convincing case for the authorization of this additional sum.

Knowledge of the background of this difference in opinion is helpful. Last year the Congress voted funds for additional conventional bombers. That action was prompted by a conviction that the missile program has not proceeded to the point where complete reliance could be placed upon its capabilities to the exclusion of the manned bomber. Despite approval by the Congress, the Secretary of Defense declined to make use of the funds so appropriated, and the assembly lines on these bombers—our most advanced operational types—have ground to a halt. The best intelligence available makes clear that the Soviets have not taken similar action but instead are adding and developing new manned bomber strength.

It may well be, and we sincerely hope it to be so, that our program for 1963 will be effective without the addition we propose. We would like to feel that provision for 1,000 Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles, plus 41 submarines with over 650 Polaris missiles, plus our existing great bomber fleet would constitute sound protection for the Nation. Nevertheless, we believe that nothing has transpired to cause us to ignore the potential of the RS-70; that it is vital to our interests to develop and fly the best manned weapons system modern technology can devise. Time is of the essence. We must avail ourselves of the technical miracles which this flying laboratory will provide. Its survivability, its reconnaissance potential, and its weaponry will reflect scientific achievements yet to be placed in a flying configuration.

The sum of \$491 million made available now will move this program faster and more efficiently. It would be false economy not to make full use of the latest advances in sophisticated communications and manned weaponry. A short time ago, Col. John Glenn indicated the significant advantages of man-directed systems. Furthermore, approval of the committee's action in this instance in no way constitutes an irrevocable commitment to a later multi-billion dollar production program—but only buys valuable leadtime should mass production be required. Whether its prototype performance and later developed counterweapons will dictate squadron procurement, time will tell, but if we are to have any bomber program, and I believe we should, it should proceed now and with all possible speed and efficiency.

Surely Congress was intended by the Constitution and is expected by our people to have more than a veto power over military programs. In this bill we are not trying to usurp prerogatives of the Executive, but are solemnly exercising our constitutional duty "to raise and maintain the armed force necessary for the preservation of our Nation." If Congress has a firm conviction that any affirmative action is necessary or desirable,

it should give full expression to that conviction. This is our duty. Although we may change the language of the bill so as to eliminate the word "direct," our intent is clear and we have the assurance of the President and the Secretary of Defense that our concern will not be ignored. Our able chairman has detailed this measure. Our committee unanimously brought this bill to the floor. It represents our best judgment.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. DORN].

Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, I am for this bill. I wish to thank the distinguished Committee on Armed Services of the House for the work it has done on the bill. I hope the RS-70 program can proceed as expeditiously as possible.

(Mr. DORN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, it is with particular pleasure that I rise to support the distinguished, able, and farseeing chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Vinson], and his great committee.

Mr. Chairman, when war comes to the United States, it will begin in the Far East. Red Communist China, seething with unrest and seeking a foreign scapegoat, will attack Quemoy and Matsu or Formosa. Red China will launch her overwhelming land juggernaut into South Korea or into South Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, or India. China may decide to attack all of these objectives simultaneously. In any case, the United States will be involved in war. The Far East is the key area of the world. The road to Paris is still the road through Peiping. The road to Latin America and the soft underbelly of the United States is the road from the Far East through the Near East and through Africa. Red China is anxious for war. Her population is increasing rapidly and in a few years will reach a billion people. She can afford to lose a half billion population to win a war. The United States cannot possibly win a ground war with the millions of Red Chinese soldiers.

Mr. Chairman, by 1970 the only deterrent to Red Chinese aggression could be a powerful RS-70 strategic bomber command. With the outbreak of war, a powerful RS-70 command might be our only means to stop such an avalanche of manpower pouring into southeast Asia. It is quite possible that in such a struggle Russia may remain neutral. She may deny Red China the use of her air defense forces. It will be many years before China will or can develop adequate defense against strategic bombing. In addition to a lack of technicians, China does not have the billions of dollars necessary to create the air defense necessary to even remotely challenge the RS-70. We must not fall into the fatal error of being hypnotized by the bombast of Khrushchev. We must not permit our whole attention to be attracted by him and his dazzling feats in space. All of this may just be designed to divert our attention while the Red Chinese amass their forces to conquer southeast

Asia. We must prepare for the almost certain war with China while at the same time be prepared for possible conflict with Russia.

I might remind the House that Herman Goering, commander and chief of the German Luftwaffe, boasted before the entire world that no bomb would fall on Berlin. He boasted that the anti-aircraft defenses of Berlin and of Germany were impregnable and could not be pierced. Herman Goering based his fallacious belief on the calculations of a mathematical "quiz kid," Dr. Ludwig, who was serving on his staff. Dr. Ludwig had informed Goering that no bomber could get over Berlin as he could prove by slide rule, mathematical deductions, and computations that the bombers simply could not pass the anti-aircraft batteries. I greatly fear that some of our "quiz kids" in America today have figured out on paper and by mathematics that they have all the answers against air attack. They may have, but we still need the RS-70 for insurance. The chances are your house will not burn; but it may; therefore you have fire insurance. During the initial period of our conquest of space, bases on the moon and on planets, we will need something to protect us while we get there. The answer is the RS-70.

Mr. Chairman, I was in this House when we passed a 70-group Air Force. The year was 1947. It was a bitter struggle, but this Congress looking ahead, looking to the future, appropriated money for a 70-group Air Force. It was a tragic mistake when the first Secretary of Defense and the President impounded the money and refused to carry out the wishes of the Congress and the American people. Three years later the bloody Red forces of North Korea crossed the 38th parallel and launched another world war. Again, we were tragically unprepared. We had to appropriate billions of additional dollars, and place new plans on the drawing board. We now had to build a 124-group Air Force. I have wished many times that this 70-group Air Force had been built promptly. Had this happened, I believe the Korean war would have been averted, 33,000 American lives saved, and billions of American dollars not to mention the other hundreds of thousands killed and wounded in Korea.

Sometimes men are so close to their profession that they can not see some of the simple, basic, elemental truths. I believe this was true of many of our great military leaders following World War I when the great and incomparable Billy Mitchell was court-martialed for pointing out obvious facts about the future role of aircraft in war. Back through the history of this great Nation, many Members of Congress were ahead of the time and could see into the future with uncanny accuracy relating to future instrumentalities of war. One Member of this Congress expressed great shock when conferring with the President in the late thirties he noticed miniature battleships and cruisers on the President's desk. This Congressman trembled with fear for the future security of our country and told the Presi-

dent that airplanes could sink those battleships and cruisers. The President laughed and said impossible. A few years later, America learned the hard and tragic way early one Sunday morning, December 7, the place Pearl Harbor. The Congress was right in 1947; the experts and the executive branch were dead wrong. Billy Mitchell and many Congressmen were right; the experts and executive leaders were dead wrong. I believe today that we must conquer space. We can not predict future military science and tactics on concepts of the past. We must prepare for war in space. We must master pushbutton warfare; but, Mr. Chairman, while we are preparing for this war of the future, we must be prepared for the war of the immediate future. We must be ready during this transitory period. We must bear in mind Red China and the Far East.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. PIKE].

(Mr. PIKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Louisiana for yielding me this time to speak on this highly important bill. No one knows better than our able and eloquent chairman, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], that I do not like this bill. On the contrary, I dislike it thoroughly—for a most primitive reason. It is going to mean serious economic dislocation for the district I represent. A very major procurement which the so-called experts at the Pentagon were talking about speeding up as recently as last fall is being cut back this legislation. So I do not like this bill one bit. But I respect this bill. I will offer no amendments seeking to continue production of a wonderful aircraft. The fight was made in the committee. Anyone who cares can find it in the hearings, but the fight was lost. The fight was not made on any political considerations or on any economic considerations or on any consideration other than what I believe would provide the best defense for America at the least cost to America. I lost. So, I rise in support of a bill that I do not like, a bill that may mean that I shall not survive to support next year's military appropriation bill. I do so gladly because there is at issue in this bill a principle far more important than the survival of any number of freshmen Congressmen. The question is this: Can Congress only say that we have too much strength, or can it also say we have too little? Can it only pull up on the reins or can it apply the spurs? Those who say that Congress has no greater power than to say "no" occasionally base their position on one of two theories: First, is the constitutional question; and, second, there is the argument that no one should question the experts at the Pentagon.

Mr. Chairman, as to the first, there are better qualified constitutional lawyers than I among the Members to challenge the constitutional lawyers who apparently abound in the Pentagon. A

reading of the language: "Congress shall have the power to raise and support armies" has, to this simple country lawyer, a fairly clear meaning. Raise means get the men—support means get them the equipment they need. It does not mean to tell them where, or how, or when to use it; that would be the responsibility of the Commander in Chief. But the constitutional issue is being bypassed, which brings us to the experts.

The experts in the Defense Department say they do not need the money and cannot spend the money to further the development of the RS-70 aircraft. The experts in the Air Force say they can use the money advantageously; not waste it, not squander it, not spend it uselessly, but spend it usefully toward the day when a new generation of manned strategic aircraft will come into being. If there is anything which the magnificent exploit of John Glenn taught me, it is that in the most advanced of systems, man is not yet obsolete.

As between the experts who will have to fly the plane and those who will simply watch it go by, I will cast my lot with those who are prepared to risk their lives in manning it. I have learned, to my sorrow, that no experts are infallible. This year's experts are next year's experts.

Two years ago, the experts called a plane being built in my own district the best fighter-bomber available. Today they are saying that a plane which has been available for 4 years was really better all along. It just took the experts 4 years to find out. So I am not overwhelmed by the word "expert." I am impressed by the fact that in a nation where we feel obliged to produce new models of every make car every year for the pleasure of our people, we have not produced a new strategic aircraft since the B-58 for the benefit of those who risk their lives daily to keep us free.

If we pass this bill and spend the money authorized we will still not have a new bomber until 1967 or 1968. By that time our newest bombers will be 6 or 7 years old. I hope that regardless of the semantics involved, the RS-70 project is pushed forward as rapidly as possible.

I urge the support of this bill, and state that I would have been happy to support it in its stronger language.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may require to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HALL].

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at that point in the RECORD following the remarks of Mr. BECKER.)

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. STAFFORD].

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise to urge the passage of H.R. 9751. I recognize that it authorizes the expenditure of an enormous sum—\$13,065,772,000 for ships, planes, and aircraft for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1962. I feel certain that all of us regret the necessity for devoting so much of our treasure, our energy, and our intelligence to the production of military hard-

ware in the next 12 months. I am certain that there is no one in this body who would not prefer, if the safety of the country permitted it, that this money and these efforts be devoted to activities forwarding the peaceful advance of human society.

But the present state of the world precludes such action on our part and requires the action that we must take here today. The refusal of the Soviet Union to agree to any meaningful provisions for international disarmament make it necessary that we authorize the program this legislation encompasses.

In a word this bill represents a major part of the price of freedom during the next 12 months. Anything else, any reduction of the level of effort provided in this bill would make it impossible for us to reasonably guarantee so far as we can the security and freedom of our country and her ability to meet commitments to friendly nations.

The fiscal year 1963 request for total new obligational authority for the entire Department of Defense totals over \$50 billion. Of this amount, the administration, as has been indicated to you, requested \$12,481 million under section 412(b) of Public Law 86149. The committee, as my colleagues have already outlined in detail, has increased this request by \$584,672,000 a very substantial sum of money even in these times and even for this great Nation.

I regret to find myself in a position of advocating that any aspect of this or any other budget recommendation be increased. I would rather be a party to a cutting of the budget recommendations. Indeed, we hope that cuts may be possible in other aspects of the Department of Defense allocation which will balance out this half billion dollar increase in the present bill.

As a matter of fact, unbalanced budgets and deficit spending represent, in my opinion, a threat to the future of this country which is second only to the danger of our encountering a military disaster should our deterrent power be allowed to lag. Accordingly, it is only because I am convinced that the safety of my country requires it that I can bring myself in the belief there is no alternative but to say that we must pass this bill with the additional \$584 million included. The extra money will expedite the modernization and mobility of our Army. It will provide the necessary research, development, test and evaluation to enable us to substantially expedite the time when we can exercise the option to build a fleet of RS-70 aircraft, if that seems desirable.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the passage of the bill with these authorizations intact.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. CLANCY].

(Mr. CLANCY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 9751, which provides for the authorization of \$13,065,772,000 for the procurement of aircraft, ships, and missiles. This amount is \$584,672,000 more than was provided for in the bill that was originally presented to Con-

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gress. The greatest part of this addition, \$491 million is for the RS-70 program.

The adoption of this legislation will assure the people of this Nation that we are intent upon maintaining a military posture that is more than sufficient to deter aggression on the part of the adversaries of freedom.

The adoption of this legislation will further insure that the United States has the capability of deterring the use of mass destruction weapons that our potential enemies possess at this time.

In evaluating and reappraising our defense posture, we are concerned with the threat to our security which exists as a result of the tremendous progress that has been made in the technology of mass destruction.

We must have in our military inventory sufficient weapons and force that will survive an initial massive nuclear attack and be capable of delivering a decisive counterblow. We have the capability of doing this today.

We should make every effort that can reasonably be made to strengthen these vital retaliatory forces that we now have at our command. This bill will contribute greatly to the defense posture that is necessary and one which we should maintain in the best interests of this Nation.

It is imperative, however, that we have a mixed striking force of proper proportions. It is for this reason that I wholeheartedly support the committee action with respect to the RS-70 program. The capabilities and tremendous value of manned bombers have been demonstrated time and time again, and we should not neglect the manned bomber program in the future.

I disagree with the administration that the RS-70 should not be carried forward at this time as a full scale weapon system development.

Military experts recognize important advantages in a mixed missile and bomber force. The principal advantage of the RS-70 is its ability to operate under positive control and to deliver a large number of nuclear weapons in a single sortie. It is highly maneuverable, can employ tactics and does not have to fly over or into the target. It also possesses the advantage of having a human being aboard to exercise judgment consistent with changing environment.

It will have extraordinary reconnaissance aids which will permit the study of targets in detail and report the condition of same after an ICBM strike. It could then go in to finish a job. Its tremendous capabilities are vital to and will greatly complement our strategic military posture.

The budget that was submitted to us by President Eisenhower in January of 1961 provided that the then B-70 program be continued as a full weapons system development.

We shall continue to make every effort to have the present administration recommend the RS-70 development as a full weapons system. We sincerely hope that the study which is to be conducted by the Defense Department will result in an acceleration of the day in which the RS-70 becomes operational and part of our inventory.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GROSS].

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS: Mr. Chairman, I have listened attentively to all of the discussion this afternoon with the exception of about 5 minutes for a sandwich and a cup of coffee. I have heard repeatedly of a wonderful compromise that has been worked out on the bill by the House Armed Services Committee and how the House is winning its point. I guess I subscribe to and read too many newspapers. I had been reading for days about the struggle to the death between the colossus of the South and the colossus of the Northeast on the subject of the big bomber. But I found when I arrived on the House floor this noon that although the House Armed Services Committee had voted unanimously originally to direct the Secretary of Defense to spend \$491 million for the RS-70 that this was not the last word. I learned that overnight the gentleman from Georgia had trod the primrose path to the White House and the signals had been changed. I am not aware of another all night twist party at the White House last night. At any rate I came to the House floor this noon and found that the word "direct" would no longer be used in this legislation to force the Secretary of Defense to spend \$491 million for development of the RS-70 bomber.

I went to the dictionary a little while ago, for it was apparent the alleged compromise has been worked out on the basis of two words. I went to the dictionary to look up the difference between "direct" and "authorize." "Direct" is absolute; "authorize" is discretionary, as we all know in the House when we vote authorizations for appropriations. There is nothing mandatory upon the Appropriations Committee to provide the amount suggested in any authorization bill. One is absolute; the other is completely discretionary.

Then there was a letter from the President read into the Record this afternoon. Let me read just a few words from this letter from the President.

"I must, therefore, insist upon the full powers and discretions," and so on.

Is there anything mandatory about that? Of course there is. "I must insist upon the full powers of the executive branch of government," is what the President is saying in effect.

What kind of a compromise are we engaged in here this afternoon? What kind of fight is the Committee on Armed Services winning? What kind of fight is the House of Representatives winning, for this involves all of us?

Then I read the report accompanying this bill, and I found this:

To any student of government, it is eminently clear that the role of the Congress in determining national policy, defense or otherwise, has deteriorated over the years.

I agree with the distinguished gentleman from Georgia, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, that is absolutely true. You can scarcely turn

a page of H.R. 8400, the foreign give-away bill, last year, but what you find powers delegated to the executive branch of the Government that ought to have been retained by Congress.

The concluding paragraph entitled, "Deterioration of the Role of Congress," reads:

Perhaps this is the time, and the RS-70 is the occasion, to reverse this trend. Perhaps this is the time to reexamine the role and function of Congress and discover whether it is playing the part that the Founding Fathers ordained that it should.

Those are beautiful words, those are significant words. What now? Will you, before the afternoon is over, ask that these words be expunged from the report? I think that would be most fitting. I do not believe they belong in this report under any such compromise with the executive branch as is being suggested.

I say that Members of Congress and the public had been led to believe that here was a fight that would settle the question of separation of powers as between Congress and the executive branch of government.

I intend to support the bill for I believe this country must have incomparable defenses, but I deeply regret that this fight was started, for it is apparent now that it has been lost.

This is not a compromise; it is a defeat for the entire House of Representatives.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. FORD].

(Mr. FORD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, in all of the debate that I have listened to this afternoon I have not heard anybody quote the precise language which is in basic controversy, or was in basic controversy I should say, up until this morning.

This language on page 2 of H.R. 9751, which was in controversy, reads:

For the Air Force, \$3,626 million, of which the Secretary of the Air Force is directed to utilize authorization in an amount not less than \$491 million during fiscal year 1963 to proceed with production planning and long leadtime procurement for an RS-70 weapon system.

I want to go on record, as I have in the past, as being unalterably opposed to that language. I do agree there was no harm in the Committee on Armed Services recommending an authorization of \$491 million for the RS-70 program. Such a dollar authorization would not be objectionable. But I want it to be very clear that the language directing the Secretary of the Air Force, and in effect the Commander in Chief, is wrong for a number of reasons.

First, it would have invaded the responsibilities and the jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States. This would have been, in my judgment, an unconstitutional invasion of the responsibilities of the Chief Executive. Secondly, the language would have usurped the appropriating authority of the Committee on Appropriations. Thirdly, this language

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would have created inflexibility in the management of the RS-70 program which undoubtedly would have led or conceivably would have led to harm and detriment to the program rather than helping and assisting it. Inflexibility in such a complicated weapon system would hamstring the responsible management in the Air Force.

May I say to my highly respected friend, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], that if he is going to make a change in this committee amendment, to just change the word "directed" to "authorized" the result will be an awkward sentence.

Mr. VINSON. I grant you that is true. We are trying to make as little change as possible.

Mr. FORD. It is a very awkward sentence. If the gentleman makes that change, could the gentleman in his wisdom and good judgment revise the language of that sentence so we at least will have a decent-sounding sentence in any law?

Mr. VINSON. Well, I think in view of the letter from the President, when he uses a word, that is the word I adopt. Of course, there are different words we could adopt. We could just put a period after the figure and strike out the balance, but I do not want to do that, because I wanted the relationship of the RS-70 to the money figure to be reflected. It may not be exactly accurate from a grammatical standpoint, but nevertheless it is good enough from a legal standpoint, so I hope, therefore, that the gentleman will not be too technical and concur in the amendment.

Mr. FORD. I am always proud of the handiwork we do on the floor of the House and in committee, and I am very disappointed, I will say to my friend, when we do something that is awkward, that does not meet the standards that he and others establish in the drafting of legislation. If you just change the word "directed" to "authorized," it leaves a very awkward sentence.

Mr. VINSON. Well, that may be true. Let me read it: "of which the Secretary of the Air Force is authorized to utilize authorizations."

Mr. FORD. That does not sound very well.

Mr. VINSON. Well, that might not be exactly up to the latest and most proper phraseology, but nevertheless if I do it the other way, then I lose entirely the connection of the \$491 million with the RS-70.

Mr. FORD. May I respectfully suggest that you write it this way: "of which the Secretary of the Air Force is authorized \$491 million during fiscal year 1963 to proceed with the production, planning, and long-time procurement for RS-70 weapon systems."

Mr. VINSON. This question was raised in the committee this morning, and all that the gentleman says was under consideration. The thought of the committee was that we wanted to tie this in, that is, the \$491 million, with the RS-70 program. I trust that the gentleman will go along with the committee. I cannot now change the committee amendment without calling the commit-

tee back and going into the matter further.

Mr. FORD. I will rely entirely on the wisdom of the chairman in conference to correct this very awkward sounding sentence.

Mr. VINSON. Yes; it might be corrected in conference, I will say, before it becomes law. I assure you there I will try to improve on the sentence.

Mr. FORD. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take exception to some remarks made in the committee report. I earnestly request that members of the committee read this report, starting on page 3, under the heading "Manned Bombers" and running through page 9.

The committee report says in one heading on page 5: "Disregard of Congressional Will." On page 6 the committee cites 13 instances, beginning with fiscal year 1956, and running through fiscal year 1961, where the Executive has refused to do what the Congress has directed.

Mr. Chairman, I do not question the validity of those figures. But on the other hand I made a check to see how many times during this same 6-year period the Executive has followed the direction of the Congress on military matters. It is interesting to see, if one will look at the record, that during this same period of time the executive branch of the Government has followed the recommendations of the Congress 28 times in toto. In nine cases out of this same period of time the executive branch of the Government followed the recommendations of the Congress more than 50 percent. So, Mr. Chairman, the Chief Executive, whether it was former President Eisenhower, or President Kennedy, far more times has followed the recommendations of Congress on military matters than he has not. So, I am not convinced at all as to the validity of the statement made on page 6 of this committee report on the conclusion made therefrom.

Mr. Chairman, I must say that I agree in other portions with the committee report. Nothing is more obnoxious in my opinion than to have someone in the executive branch of the Government, whether he is in the Defense Department or the Department of Agriculture, place a halo over his head and decide on his own that all the wisdom in the world exists in his Department.

Mr. Chairman, this Congress does have a good record, and the facts which I recited before prove it. They have followed our recommendations, in toto, 28 times in this 5- or 6-year period. They have followed our recommendations substantially in nine more instances.

Mr. Chairman, I think that the Congress would have been unwise to approve the language "directs" because it would have caused trouble between two great committees, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations. I am very jealous of the prerogatives of my committee, the Committee on Appropriations. I am very envious that the Committee on Armed Services exercise to the fullest

its prerogatives. I do not want those of us who are members of the Committee on Appropriations drafting legislation on an appropriation bill. I opposed it in every instance that I can recall. On the other hand, I do not think it is the prerogative of the Committee on Armed Services to invade the jurisdiction of the Committee on Appropriations. This language, if it had been approved in its original form, would have been an invasion of the authority of the Appropriations Committee.

I am just as jealous that the Congress not invade the jurisdiction of the Chief Executive. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from New York [Mr. BECKER] earlier pointed out that President Kennedy has sought by one means or another to gain greater authority over the raising or lowering of taxes. The President currently wants some authority in a stand-by fashion to institute a vast public works program. I strongly disapprove of this authority in either of those cases, and I will not vote for them.

On the other hand, I do not want the Congress to usurp and take from the Chief Executive authority that is his. And so the amendment to this language, as originally proposed, is sound.

Now I should like to ask my good friend, the chairman of this committee, when he offers this amendment to change the language from "direct" to "authorize," whether or not he will agree that this part of the language in the committee report is also revised; and let me read it from page 9:

Let there be any doubt as to what the RS-70 amendment means let it be said that it means exactly what it says; i.e., that the Secretary of the Air Force, as an official of the executive branch, is directed, ordered, mandated, and required to utilize the full amount of the \$491 million authority granted "to proceed with production planning and long leadtime procurement for an RS-70 weapon system."

Are you changing this when you change the language by the amendment?

Mr. VINSON. Of course, when you use the word "direct" that argument is sound and logical. When you use the word "authorize" it would not be applicable to the section the gentleman has just quoted.

Mr. FORD. I am delighted to hear the gentleman say that when you change the language from "direct" to "authorize" that this part of the committee report is no longer applicable.

Mr. VINSON. I trust the distinguished gentlemen of the Committee on Appropriations. I am pleased at the high compliment the gentleman paid the report. I do think it is a very fine report and I point with lasting pride to the reports of the Armed Services Committee. I trust there is enough of information in the report to cause him to continue to give his strong and loyal support to the RS-70 concept.

Mr. FORD. I do agree with the RS-70 concept. Our House subcommittee on military appropriations last year, as the gentleman may remember, did not accept President Kennedy's cutback in the program. We stuck with former President Eisenhower's dollar amount of \$358 million.

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Mr. VINSON. That is right.

Mr. FORD. I must say I have not passed judgment on whether we should have \$171 million or \$491 million for the fiscal year 1963. Our committee has not marked up our bill and it would be premature on my part to make any such decision at this point.

Mr. VINSON. Yes; but I was referring to the fact that in last year's debate, the gentleman so clearly pointed out the justification for a continued appropriation for the then B-70. I trust he will follow the same logical course this year with the RS-70. I think he was right then and I hope he will continue on the beaten path he has already laid out.

Mr. FORD. May I comment on this letter from Secretary McNamara to the chairman. This letter is a very carefully drawn letter. May I read it so there is no misapprehension on anybody's part who heard it earlier:

This study will give full consideration to the magnitude of the committee program and the depth with which the committee has emphasized this.

Here is the real guts of the letter:

Furthermore, if technological developments related to sideview radar, and associated data processing and display systems, advance more rapidly than we anticipated when the fiscal 1963 Defense budget was prepared, we will wish to take advantage of these advances by increasing our development expenditures; and we would then wish to expend whatever proportions of any increase voted by the Congress these advances in radar technology would warrant.

There is not a scintilla of evidence in this letter that the Secretary of Defense is going to recommend the procurement of aircraft four, five, and six in either the B-70 or the RS-70 configuration. All he has said is we are taking a look to see whether in the radar and subsystem components program we should spend more money in fiscal year 1963.

All the testimony before our committee is to the effect that if there is an expanded program in this area, all they will spend is an additional \$10 million to \$30 million in fiscal year 1963. This they can easily get from the emergency fund or from the contingency fund, \$30 million in the contingency fund and \$150 million in the emergency fund.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. COHELAN. The gentleman understands, however, that the Secretary intends to spend that money provided the breakthroughs in this radar area should come through. What is wrong with that?

Mr. FORD. Nothing is wrong with that, but some people got the impression and some people said to me after the letter was read that the Secretary, in effect, was saying that he was going to push with aircraft four, five, and six. He did not say that.

Mr. COHELAN. That is quite correct. The gentleman would not, certainly, as a member of the Appropriations Committee suggest that the House burn dollar bills just to get this program going.

Mr. FORD. Not at all. As a matter of fact, I think I am saying quite the contrary. I just want to clarify what this letter said.

I want to commend the committee for making the change, and I will support them despite the awkwardness of the sentence because I think we are now doing what this committee and this House ought to do at this time.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may require to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. WICKERSHAM].

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I have, for a long period of time, urged the continuation of the research, development, and actual production of the B-70, and later, the RS-70 on a 24-hour-a-day, round-the-clock basis.

The passage of this measure means continued life, rather than an approaching death, not only to the RS-70 program and the manned bomber program, but the life of the Air Force itself. Also, a much longer life for our valuable SAC bases.

The overwhelming majority of the committee not only favored this measure but favored the continued production line of the B-52 until sufficient RS-70's are available to replace them.

The result of the agreement that has been reached means increased stature for Gen. Curtis LeMay and Secretary of the Air Force, Eugene Zuckert.

The enactment of this well-considered bill means more security and less insecurity for the free world.

Furthermore, it means that the President, in his wisdom, has remembered some of the lessons he learned while a U.S. Representative and as a Senator, and, consequently, has followed to a great degree, the wishes of the legislative branch—the Congress.

Our action here today, and the understanding that has been reached, will enhance the future of the Nike-Zeus production.

This measure will act as a further deterrent to the Communist world.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may require to the gentleman from California [Mr. DOYLE].

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my approval of the proposed change of the text of the bill before the House by striking the word "direct" at line 2, page 2, from the text of the bill and substituting the word "authorize." This I believe is in accord with the actual situation as it exists under our constitutional form of government because the Commander in Chief, who is always the President of the United States, is the sole elective officer who can actually direct what shall be done with the money which we in Congress authorize to be expended. It is his constitutional responsibility to do that; it is our constitutional responsibility as the Armed Services Committee to authorize an amount, and which authorizing action by our Armed Services Committee must then

go to the House Appropriations Committee.

I respectfully suggest that in my humble judgment the wording of the bill in line 2, page 2, would be in substantial contravention of the jurisdiction of the House Appropriations Committee, unless the word "direct" is stricken. The very honorable, timely, and constructive adjustment made yesterday afternoon late by the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense in conference with our distinguished Armed Services Committee chairman, the gentleman from Georgia, the Honorable CARL VINSON, all of whom met at the White House on yesterday, is very pleasing and inspiring to me. This is because this important incident in the history of our legislative and Executive department responsibilities again gives crystal clear evidence of the fact that our constitutional form of government can and does work efficiently and with utmost accord between these department set up by our constitutional frameworkers when there is an actual emergency arising either by way of important differences of opinion, or by way of any other emergency which should be cooperatively understood and honorably adjusted.

Having sat all through this important debate from the very beginning until this minute in the debate, and with the closing of the debate within the next few minutes, it appears to me there will be a very sparse number of votes "nay." This is as I believe it should be; as it must be, and in the best interests of our national defense. Therefore, I shall vote to approve the bill on its merits and on the deletion of the word "direct" on its merits. I cordially compliment our distinguished committee chairman, the gentleman from Georgia, the Honorable CARL VINSON, who has served in this great legislative body for 48 years last past.

I repeat, I compliment all in connection with this timely adjustment of sincere and responsible differences of opinion. I believe my Armed Services Committee has achieved its purposes in maintaining its responsibilities in the premises and I honor the executive department of our Government for maintaining its constitutional responsibilities likewise.

(Mr. DOYLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

(Mr. COHELAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to take this opportunity to offer my high compliments to our distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], for the wisdom and judgment he has once again demonstrated in the handling of this most complex and difficult problem.

Our country is blessed in these difficult times with outstanding leaders in every branch of our remarkable system of government. The President and his most brilliant and distinguished Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert McNamara, have acted with discretion and restraint in keeping with their awesome responsibilities.

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I congratulate all parties to this great public debate for their superb leadership.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may require to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BOLAND].

(Mr. BOLAND asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks at this point.)

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to hear from the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], that an agreement has been reached with respect to the B-70 bomber, now known as the RS-70. Otherwise, I would be opposed to the Armed Services Committee's original recommendation, which, in effect directs the President of the United States to build the bomber. Here we get into a deep constitutional question.

President Kennedy has said that this aircraft is too costly, with a price tag conservatively estimated at over \$10 billion, and it will be obsolete for military purposes before it is ready to fly.

Mr. Chairman, the Congress should not command nor should the Congress direct the President on how to arm the military forces for the missions the President decides are in the national interest. The President is the one person in government and in the Nation with all of the facts and intelligence at his fingertips. He is the man who has to make the big decisions on weapons. He is the man who knows whether or not it is worth the cost of billions of dollars for a weapon which may be obsolete before it is placed in the national arsenal. And the President is the man who has access to secret information which may be the cornerstone of his final decision.

I am sure my colleagues will agree with me that no President will gamble our national security and preservation to save dollars. Neither does any President want to embark on a crash program of bomber construction when he knows the weapon will be obsolete in a few years hence. Yet, the Armed Services Committee originally recommended in its report "that the Secretary of the Air Force, as an official of the executive branch, is directed, ordered, mandated, and required to utilize the full amount of the \$491 million authority granted to proceed with production planning and long leadtime procurement for an RS-70 weapon system."

Mr. Chairman, I believe that Congress should carry out the intent of the Founding Fathers who drafted the Constitution, and that we limit our activity to the traditional and time-tested role of "advise and consent" and "to investigate and propose."

President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara, after taking office last year, approached the B-70 bomber controversy with an open mind. Their investigation showed that the B-70 never enjoyed the full support of President Eisenhower, his Secretary of Defense, his principal civilian advisers nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body. In fact, the only consistent supporter of the B-70 program was the Air Force. The

secretaries and chiefs of the other services, whether under the Kennedy administration or the Eisenhower administration, never supported the B-70 for full weapon system development or procurement and, indeed, many vigorously opposed it. So, it is a matter of record that the B-70 has long been considered a very doubtful proposition, with the weight of competent scientific, technical and military opinion against it for many years.

President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara have not closed their minds to the B-70, or RS-70, problem. They feel that by continuing our XB-70 program of three prototype aircraft and by proceeding with the exploratory development of the key subsystems of the proposed RS-70 for which funds have been included in the 1963 budget, they will have open to them the option of producing and deploying an RS-70 system at a later time if the need for such a system should become apparent.

Mr. Chairman, since the key subsystems of the aircraft have yet to be developed, delaying the decision for 1 year would not postpone the real operational readiness of the first wing at all. But, President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara, after thoroughly reviewing all aspects of the problem, have decided that the RS-70 program will not add significantly to our strategic retaliatory capability in the period after 1967.

Therefore, I am extremely pleased that a compromise has been worked out and the original committee recommendation has been substituted.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PUCINSKI].

(Mr. PUCINSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the bill H.R. 9751, as I understand it will be amended by the committee. I congratulate the chairman of the committee, the distinguished gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], and the members of his committee for calling to the attention of the American people the tremendously important consequence of a successful development of the RS-70 weapons system. I think the American people owe this committee a debt of gratitude for bringing this subject to the attention of the entire Nation. But with equal conviction, Mr. Chairman, I think the President of the United States deserves a great deal of credit and the Nation owes him a debt of gratitude for proposing a compromise formula and a solution which, indeed, will move this important program forward. Earlier, Mr. Chairman, during debate today, some doubt was cast upon the wisdom of the compromise language which was agreed upon by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services and the President. It is my judgment that President Kennedy and Chairman VINSON have demonstrated that reasonable men can reach reasonable agreements under the democratic processes in our Republic. The compromise proposed by President Kennedy will in no way deter

or delay the successful development of the RS-70 program.

Earlier in debate, an effort was made to create the impression that Mr. Kennedy supported the RS-70 program as a candidate for the Presidency, but has now reversed his position. The President has not changed his position. The President believes in the development of this RS-70 program. The question involved here is whether or not \$491 million can be spent in this fiscal year. It was the judgment of the President's advisers that this money could not be spent at this time because the entire program is not sufficiently advanced to justify this large appropriation at the time and that, therefore, there was no sense in throwing the budget out of balance for fiscal 1963. For these reasons I think both these men have reached an excellent compromise which will actually speed up basic research and development in this program.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the long-range manned bomber is still our first line of defense. The Strategic Air Command has provided for our Nation and the entire free world, the greatest deterrent to war that we ever had. There is no question in my mind that if Mr. Khrushchev is twisting and turning today and starting all sorts of local provocations and has not touched off a third world war, it is only because he is mindful of the awesome strength, the defense, the retaliatory power that the United States has in its manned bombers in the Strategic Air Command. Let there be no mistake. Our manned bombers can obliterate the Soviet Union if Mr. Khrushchev is foolish enough to violate the peace at this time. No one knows this better than Mr. Khrushchev himself.

It was my honor to lead my bomber group in the first B-29 raid over Tokyo in World War II. It was also my privilege to serve under General LeMay who was commanding general of the 20th Global Air Force in World War II. I think that General LeMay is one of the greatest military leaders this country has ever produced. Millions of American soldiers were spared the horror of invading Japan's rocky shores because General LeMay helped bring the war in Japan to a successful conclusion with massive bombing raids under his personal leadership and supervision. The Defense Department will be wise in seeking his continued counsel. Like him, I believe we must go forward with this long-range manned bomber program. We should make all the progress we can in missilery, but we cannot for one moment weaken our manned bomber program.

Reference has been made here today to Colonel Glenn and the fact that he stated right from this podium that if human beings had not been in the space vehicle he controlled, the mission might not have been successfully accomplished. Perhaps we should also recall another incident last year when we launched the spy-in-the-sky satellite, Tiros. It was designed to give us information about weather and to give us other information that we need about various parts of the world from a military standpoint.

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You will all recall that on that particular flight, somebody had forgotten to properly activate one of the lenses in that space capsule, and the mission failed to get the information it was designed to produce. Tiros failed because we relied exclusively on electronic devices.

This business of relying completely on the marvels of electronics is not, in my opinion, serving the best interests of this country. We will need human manpower for many years in our struggle for survival. And it is for this reason that I am glad the Committee today has brought before the House this subject. It is most important that research and development go ahead on a manned bomber that will have the flexibility, that will have the maneuverability that it is needed in our first line of defense. I am sure that every single American wants to have a strong Defense Establishment, not because it is an instrument of war but because it serves as the greatest bulwark for peace. There is no question in my mind but that Hitler would not have dared start World War II in 1939 if the United States and the rest of the free world had had anywhere near the retaliatory power that we have today. Therefore I think that every Member of Congress who has worked on this bill and who will support this legislation is indeed making one of the most profound contributions for the preservation of peace, because Khrushchev understands only one language, the language of strength.

An orderly development of the RS-70 program will make a most significant contribution to our defense network and help increase our retaliatory strength to new heights of perfection. For this reason, Mr. Speaker, I hope H.R. 9751 will be approved overwhelmingly with the amendment suggested by President Kennedy and accepted by Chairman VINSON.

Mr. Chairman, as I see it, the principal question confronting the House in debate here today is whether the RS-70 weapons system shall be produced as speedily as possible or whether we shall abandon perhaps our one most important weapon in the defense posture of the United States.

We hear great wails about economy everytime the RS-70 is mentioned. And all of this at a time when we have thousands and thousands of well-trained men, called back into duty, who are spending their time policing up the grounds and engaged in other nonessential activities.

As a man of medicine, I know that when we are ill we consult a doctor. By the same token, I say that when we are considering the military might of this Nation we should consult military men who are in a position to know. We cannot hide behind the cloak of penny-pinching when the entire future of our country may be at stake.

For me, I need turn back only a few months to the inspiring and forthright testimony of our Air Force chiefs on the role of the RS-70. Hear well the words of Gen. Thomas D. White, then Air Force Chief of Staff, when he said:

I am deeply concerned with the need to maintain a proper mix of manned and un-

manned weapon systems in our future aerospace program. There is no question, for example, that this country's defense posture will be greatly improved by the phase-in of effective and reliable ballistic missiles. They are exceptional weapons. Nevertheless, they cannot perform all essential combat tasks.

Again, this is General White speaking:

We will have to rely upon manned weapon systems to perform vital war functions which require on-the-spot, trained human judgment. * * * In any future war, there is almost certain probability that events will not unfold exactly as planned. Thus, there will be a tremendous premium on systems which can look, and find, and report, and attack, and return to attack again. We will always need systems which can search out and destroy mobile targets as well as fixed or rapidly developing targets whose positions are unknown or uncertain until observed.

What more powerful a recommendation for the RS-70 than that? What greater reason could we give for the House to issue a mandate that work on the RS-70 be pushed forward as rapidly as possible to completion?

Further consultation with military experts—with men who ought to know—reveals what a wondrous weapon the RS-70 actually will be. We learn that because of its design, this powerful weapon will be able to utilize existing military and civilian air fields. The aircraft will have intercontinental range which can be expanded to global capacity with the use of refueling tankers. The RS-70 will have all the guidance features of an intercontinental missile—and more. The navigation system can automatically navigate the aircraft to any point on earth. The digital computer provides a rapid solution to both the bombing and navigation equations. It can handle more than one target at a time and switch targets in a fraction of a second. The RS-70 will have the capability of carrying a multiple and varied weapon load. The flexibility of weapon loads offered by the RS-70 insures us the advantage of selection of the proper weapon for each target.

Are not these powerful arguments that should persuade anyone of the vital role of the RS-70 in our defense scheme?

The problems that confront the RS-70 today are nothing new. General White is the authority for this statement:

Throughout our history, all bombers have had a hard life. Every system I can think of—the B-17, the B-29, the B-36, the B-47, and the B-52—have almost died on the vine, and yet I submit that each one of those systems has been the thing that has saved this Nation. I ask you to think where we would be today if we didn't have the B-52's and B-47's.

General White further declares that he is absolutely convinced that the same kind of situation is likely to confront us in the future. And he adds:

Therefore, I say manned weapons systems are required from here on out in some proportion. That being the case, I would say that the B-70 is the necessity because it is the latest thing in the state of the art.

It is General White's expert opinion that a delay in producing the RS-70 is the difference between whether we ought

to produce it or not. Just that time-sensitive is this project. It is likewise the consensus of much military thinking that our enemy's potentialities for the future are such that it would be wise to get the RS-70 weapons system into our inventory just as soon as possible.

This House cannot afford to let the RS-70 die on the vine. I repeat: we must issue a mandate that it be put into work fully and promptly.

It has been said by civilians in the Department of Defense that the financial resources are not adequate to provide us with sufficient ground forces, to modernize the weapons of the ground forces, to provide an adequate airlift, to implement the RS-70 program in the proper manner, or to embark full speed ahead on the development and production of an antimissile missile.

But, as I see it, instead of maintaining adequate ground forces and obtaining essential weapons, the United States has been devoting a great portion of its financial resources to foreign aid.

The cost of this great weapon is infinitesimal when contrasted with the billions upon billions of dollars we have squandered in lands scattered all around the globe. We say we want to hem in the Communists. There is no better way than to build the RS-70.

And it is my observation that Americans would be much more content to see their tax dollars being used for projects that will provide for our own safekeeping in time of need.

This, the military tells us, the RS-70 will do.

It has been estimated it will cost the Russians 40 billions of dollars to prepare a defense against the RS-70, if they wanted to tackle the job at all. This weapons system would give America a tremendous military show of might at any spot on the globe in less than 5 hours time. And, more importantly, it will have a man at the controls.

I am persuaded that there will never be a thinking machine that could be substituted for the human mind in the accurate and flexible maneuvering of an air vehicle. We saw a near classic example of this in the recent space orbit by Colonel Glenn.

As a part of my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I wish to include a statement that was made by a professional soldier in whom I have the utmost confidence. This statement is by Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers, U.S. Army, retired. General Fellers has had an outstanding career, including a tour of duty as chief of planning under Gen. Douglas MacArthur in the Pacific in 1943-44. General Fellers' statement is as follows:

The only effective free world military shield is U.S. nuclear striking power. This is the only decisive force which stands between freedom and slavery. It is the only military force which the Kremlin fears.

Despite these obvious facts, our 1963 defense budget falls to insure continuance of U.S. supremacy in nuclear capability. Instead of continuing superior nuclear striking power—a wholly inadequate conventional warfare capability is gradually to be substituted. This conventional warfare program is no threat whatsoever to the vast

Red Army, submarine fleet, and air force. Here is the plan as reflected in the fiscal year 1963 defense budget:

The Minuteman missile production program is to be cut from 600 to 100 a year. The mobile (railway) Minuteman production is to be cut from 300 to 100. This reduces the total production from about 3,300 to 900.

The B-70 bomber program is being reduced to three—more likely to one—transport type aircraft with no usefulness as a weapon. The B-70 would be the most destructive and versatile weapon ever developed. In 5 hours it could find and destroy any target, anywhere. Traveling at 2,000 miles per hour and above 70,000 feet, its probability of penetrating enemy defenses is nine times that of the B-52.

It has been calculated that were a B-70 bomber force in existence, it would cost the Soviets \$40 billion to build a defense against it.

No more B-52 bombers (the backbone of our present striking power) will be built after the current contract runs out in 1962.

No more B-58's are to be built.

The F-108 supersonic fighter production was canceled last year (1960). The F-106 now in production will be discontinued upon completion of the present small contract.

The F-100 was scheduled to be retired in 1965. Now it will be retained until 1970 and used for delivery of conventional bombs.

Funds for the Dyna-Soar X-15, which has already proved that it can orbit and then reenter the atmosphere under manual control—an advance over Russian development—have been cut from \$185 to \$65 million.

No more advanced aircraft are to be produced. Inferior subsonic aircraft will be substituted; 585 such craft are to be built. For arming them \$500 million is to be spent annually on old-fashioned conventional bombs.

The atomic warhead production for Nike missiles is being cut back.

Air Force research and development for fiscal year 1963 is cut in half—a \$2 billion cut.

Turning from nuclear to conventional warfare weapons could be suicidal for us. We and the free world are not equipped either to deter or to win a war against the Soviets with conventional weapons. On the other hand, we can build better planes; we have better trained crews to fly them; we are not committed to a vast land army as is Russia. As a consequence, it is readily within our capability to create and maintain superior nuclear striking forces.

Despite these well-known facts, within 3 years, present Pentagon planning will provide almost no new U.S. aircraft or missile production. By then, and with our gradual shift from nuclear to conventional capability, we shall be at the mercy of the Kremlin.

Could it be that we are deliberately permitting our striking power to fall into second place? Will we next be told that since the Soviets have become stronger and have the power to destroy us, our only hope for survival is to join a world order?

Only the Congress can correct this alarming situation. All funds for the executive branch should be withheld until a sound defense program is instituted.

Mr. Chairman, this statement by General Fellers along with statements of distinguished general officers of our Air Force is why I am more persuaded than ever that we need the RS-70 and we need it now.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, the debate on H.R. 9751 being the bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1963 for aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels was heralded earlier as certain to

result in a collision between the legislative and executive branches of Government. Comment was heard that the President, as Commander, was in complete command over his forces and that he should not be likened to a general who has command but cannot dictate the precise weapons with which his forces will be armed. On the other hand, comment was heard that the Congress should not be restricted to simply a passive role or to supine acquiescence in programs handed to it by the Department of Defense. In preliminary considerations of this bill there were such comments heard as "Congress has deteriorated over the years." In news analyses printed in the press and elsewhere, the Constitution was quoted and particularly article I, section 8, wherein the Congress was granted powers relating to the armed services which all turned upon whether the Congress could direct the executive branch, and in this case the Secretary of the Air Force, to utilize an authorization in an amount of not less than \$491 million during fiscal year 1962, to proceed with production planning and long leadtime procurement for the RS-70 weapon system.

But as is so often true of so much good legislation, a compromise was at the last moment agreed upon and the word "authorized" was substituted for the word "directed."

The final vote reflected the temper of the House and the complete agreement of every Member present and voting that the substitution of words was a wise choice. A collision was averted and a favorable result was reached. The final vote was 403 yeas, and the nays, 0. No one voted against the authorization bill on a rollcall vote.

The only reason we are asking that our comments be spread upon the Record is that in connection with an official trip to the Pacific Missile Range at Vandenberg Air Force Base during December, we visited the North American Aviation plant at Los Angeles and had the privilege of looking at the B-70 mockup, which is the principal component of what is now described as the RS-70 weapon system. There are many details which the Air Force would prefer not be commented upon, and some of course are strictly classified, but it can be said that when one leaves the great hangar where the mockup is housed, he has the impression that he has seen something almost unbelievable in terms of size and in terms of potential accomplishments.

We do not profess to know whether or not further development can quickly be accomplished in the necessary high resolution radar which would be required to provide capability as a post-attack weapon to recognize, seek out, and destroy any unknown enemy missiles after a nuclear exchange and which objectives would be completely out of eye range. Further, we do not profess to know whether or not additional money now could speed development of the RS-70 and have it ready earlier than the 1970 estimate. But we believe that the House exercised sound judgment in providing for the authorization and leav-

ing it to the Air Force to determine in the year ahead if we have an adequate stock of ICBM's and Polaris-based missiles, and also, B-52's and B-58's, as to give us a powerful nuclear striking power. The determination has rightly been left to the Department of Defense with authority to act, and not under a compelling directive, to determine whether or not we need this plane to send into enemy territory in the event some of our missiles are off target, or in any event, to determine if this weapon system is needed to go in and take a look after our missiles have been fired.

Finally, apart from the great cost which is being charged to the military, we learned from our visit to the North American plant at Los Angeles, and a personal inspection of the B-70 mockup, that much knowledge has been gained as a result of the research on this faster-than-sound bomber which will yield a dividend and have great value in the field of supersonic commercial aircraft for the future.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, we are once again addressing ourselves to the controversy that has arisen concerning the pace of development of the RS-70, the Air Forces' reconnaissance-strike super bomber. Until recently, this plane has been known as the B-70.

The issue at hand is the speed with which we propose to develop this new and revolutionary weapon.

I am acquainted with arguments presented by the administration, and I am still of the opinion that the development of the RS-70 could be accelerated in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee on Armed Forces. I will try to explain why I have taken this position.

Our Nation, and the free world, continues to be faced with a determined and aggressive adversary—the Communist monolith. The Communist leaders of the Soviet Union, and of Red China, have not abandoned their plans for world domination. They are determined to achieve this objective—by every means possible, particularly they propose to do this by gaining control of space.

Just last week, when Soviet Russia orbited its latest satellite, Khrushchev boasted that the Soviet's are developing—or have already developed—a global missile which can annihilate opposition on any continent.

Obviously, therefore, the race for the control of space is of utmost importance to our own security and the survival for our civilization.

In this race, the development of the RS-70 can play a very important part. It can enable us to achieve and maintain military superiority in one vital area.

The RS-70 is a new airplane which will operate higher and faster than any combat aircraft the world has ever known. It is expected to insure that the Air Force and the Strategic Air Command will have the proper military vehicle to carry out their combat responsibilities in the post-1965 time period.

Mr. Chairman, the opponents of the program recommended by the House

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Armed Services Committee argue that we can not speed up the rate of development of the RS-70. Mr. Chairman, similar arguments were used on many occasions in the past with respect to many types of weapons. Arguments were and are used with respect to the development of missiles. And yet, when the chips were down, we proved that the development of our spacecraft could be accelerated beyond original estimates.

Everyone agrees that RS-70 will constitute an important addition to our defense posture. I believe that we can accelerate the development of this weapon if we put our minds to it. I will, therefore, support the recommendations of the House Armed Services Committee on this vital issue.

Mr. PETERSON. Mr. Chairman, on August 29, 1961, I directed attention to the abandonment and scrapping of the Bomarc manufacturing and deployment program after the program had been authorized and funded by Congress, and I urged military leaders to review our whole defense posture as it related to the Bomarc.

The production center of the Bomarc engine was established in my congressional district, Ogden, Utah, nearly 6 years ago at a Marquardt facility. Two years later the facility was doubled and a 184 acre test facility was established nearby on the shore of our Great Salt Lake.

The first Bomarc A missile was phased-out in 1960 and production was started on the new Bomarc B missile. A year later this missile was phased-out completely by the military.

Today we learn from the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee that by June 1, 1962 the United States will have 12 squadrons of 50 Minuteman missiles each, or a total of 600; that the Defense Department asked for four more squadrons in fiscal 1963 at a cost of \$2½ billion; that the committee felt this was not adequate and added another \$10 million for a long-lead start on additional Minuteman missiles.

Today we also learn that by June, 1962 the Navy will have 29 Polaris submarines missile equipped; that Defense officials asked to add 6 in 1963 and stated they plan to ask for another 6 in 1964 for a total of 41. The House Committee, according to the able chairman, feels there should be more.

Again today we learn Defense officials insist on plans to phase out manned bombers in favor of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The House committee questioned the reliability of the ICBM last year. Defense officials requested at that time \$220 million for B-70's; the Congress gave them an additional \$180 million, suggesting that the resulting increase in manned bombers was essential to the defense of this Nation until such time as the workability of the ICBM's got out of the textbooks and the laboratories. Defense officials did not carry out the mandate of the Congress in fiscal 1962. None of the additional funds was spent.

This year Defense officials requested \$3.135 billion and the House committee in its wisdom increased that amount by \$491 million; at first they directed and

then by amendment authorized that this "be utilized in fiscal 1963 to proceed with production, planning and long-lead procurement for the RS-70 weapon system," which is the current nomenclature for the B-70 manned bomber.

As the chairman of the House committee has so cautiously pointed out to us: If our hopes are realized and nuclear weapons are outlawed by international agreement, we would be in an untenable position with no conventional defense capability.

I again urge review and reevaluation of the entire Bomarc program, particularly in light of the importance of manned bomber program to the defense of this Nation.

Mr. BASS of New Hampshire. Mr. Speaker, I am in opposition to the provision that the Secretary of the Air Force is directed to spend \$491 million for the RS-70 bomber program.

My objection goes beyond the merits of the bomber program itself. But it is worth noting that when the B-70 program was considered last year by the Science and Astronautics Committee, of which I am a member, there were differences of opinion by experts on our national defense about the program—differences which still have not been resolved. As of now, the program has been modified and is now redesignated as the RS-70 program.

My objection is based on my concern for the separation of powers in our governmental system as specified in our Constitution.

This legislation proposes to direct the executive department to spend money which the President—right or wrongly—had decided not to spend. I do not believe Congress has the right to so direct the executive, nor should it presume to take that right.

The President of the United States is Commander in Chief. It is inconceivable to me that Congress should tell a Commander in Chief what weapons system to develop any more than it should attempt to tell a general in the field which weapons to fire. These are the rights and duties of the Executive. We in Congress should neither attempt to assume executive powers nor should we relieve the President of the responsibility for making the right decisions.

Throughout my 7 years in Congress, I have fought attempts by the President to usurp powers that belong in Congress. I have voted in favor of annual—rather than 5-year—appropriations for foreign aid and I have voted against many agriculture programs because, among other reasons, I believed that the action proposed by the administration would put too much power into the hands of the Executive. This argument works both ways. I believe that the legislation we are considering today would assume powers which properly belong to the President.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time on this side.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the Clerk read the bill.

The Clerk read as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during fiscal year 1963 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

AIRCRAFT

For aircraft: For the Army, \$218,500,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, \$2,134,600,000; for the Air Force, \$3,135,000,000.

MISSILES

For missiles: For the Army, \$558,300,000; for the Navy, \$930,400,000; for the Marine Corps, \$22,300,000; for the Air Force, \$2,500,000,000.

NAVAL VESSELS

For naval vessels: For the Navy, \$2,982,000,000: *Provided*, That effective July 1, 1962, restrictions on the fund authorization contained in Public Law 87-53, approved June 21, 1961, for the procurement of aircraft, will no longer apply.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the committee amendments.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 1, line 8, strike "\$218,500,000" and insert "\$273,790,000".

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

Committee amendment: Page 1, line 10, strike "\$3,135,000,000" and insert "\$3,626,000,000", and add the following language: "of which the Secretary of the Air Force is directed to utilize authorization in an amount not less than \$491,000,000 during fiscal year 1963 to proceed with production planning and long leadtime procurement for an RS-70 weapon system."

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Committee amendment offered by Mr. VINSON: On page 2, line 2, strike out the word "directed" and insert in lieu thereof the word "authorized".

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment to the amendment.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question now recurs on the committee amendment, as amended.

The committee amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

Committee amendment: On page 2, line 2, strike "\$558,300,000" and insert "\$589,482,000".

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

Committee amendment: Page 2, line 4, strike "\$2,500,000,000" and insert "\$2,510,000,000".

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 2, line 6, strike "\$2,982,000,000," and insert "\$2,979,200,000".

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

Committee amendment: Page 2 line 17 insert: "Sec. 2. Section 412(b) of Public Law 86-149 is amended to read as follows:

"(b) No funds may be appropriated after December 31, 1960, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels, unless the appropriation of such funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after such date: *Provided, however, That* no funds may be appropriated after December 31, 1961, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for research, development or procurement of the RS-70 weapon system unless the appropriation of such funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after such date."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

DEFENSE LEGISLATION BILL

Mr. Chairman, I have felt that the language originally incorporated in the pending military authorization bill, which directed the executive branch to utilize a \$491 million authorization for the planning and production of the RS-70 aircraft was very unwise. The language raised serious constitutional questions and tended to bypass the regular procedures which call for direct action by the Congress on funds recommended by its Appropriations Committees before authorized programs can be executed.

I am very happy over the masterful way the gentlemen of the committee and their distinguished chairman have resolved this problem. It will now be possible for the matter to be handled in the usual orderly way, and in keeping with traditional procedures. The gentleman from Georgia has dramatized an interesting and important matter, yet he has done no disservice to relationships between congressional committees and between Congress and the executive branch.

ACTION REQUIRED BY APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

The great Committee on Armed Services has brought to bear its best judgment, after many hearings and much deliberation, on the RS-70 airplane matter and on the many other important procurement matters pending in the President's budget.

I know that this great committee, and the House as well, will expect the Appropriations Committee to bring to bear its very best judgment also in determining what funds shall be recommended under the pending authorization bill for the RS-70 and other procurement items. It is, of course, impossible to predict today just what action the Appropriations Committee will take. The Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations is still conducting hearings on the various programs which are authorized in this bill and the other details involved in the regular annual appropriations.

The members of the Committee on Appropriations always do their best to handle defense appropriations to the best of their ability. I think our actions are usually reasonably satisfactory to the Committee on Armed Services, to the House, and to the country as a whole. I am glad to see this system of checks and balances, between the authorizing committee and the Appropriations Committee, preserved. This is good for the

Congress and the country, and the course followed is in keeping with constitutional precedents.

COMMENDATION OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS

In the heat of controversy, we are often inclined to make critical remarks in haste that may not be fully justified.

I want to say, after long years of dealing with the civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense, I have found them, on a whole, to be men of ability and dedication who seek to serve the best interest of the country and who seek to be cooperative, as a general rule, with Congress.

I think we have excellent leadership in the Pentagon, with Mr. Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense; Mr. Elvis J. Stahr, Secretary of the Army; Mr. Fred Korth, Secretary of the Navy; and Mr. Eugene Zuckert, Secretary of the Air Force.

The Chairman, General Lemnitzer, and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are men of high quality and dedication. They are not men who agree on all subjects. It is a normal and wholesome situation in a free country such as ours.

COOPERATION BETWEEN CONGRESS AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

I have asked the members of the staff of the Appropriations Committee to help me assemble some information in regard to examples of cooperation by the Defense Department with Congress during the past few years. It is true that Defense officials and the President do not always comply to the letter with the recommendations of Congress in defense matters. However, as a general proposition, the President and officials in the Department of Defense do seek to carry out the will of Congress. There are some notable exceptions which have been referred to in the debate today, and I shall not dwell upon them. I should now like to extend my remarks at this point in the Record and recite some of the examples having to do with actions by the executive branch on specific recommendations of the Congress during recent years.

INFLUENCE OF CONGRESS ON DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Congress has exercised a strong influence on the character of Defense programs. Some of these influences can be summarized briefly:

In fiscal year 1956, Congress increased funds by \$46.7 million for two purposes. The lesser increase was used, the major increase for the Marine Corps strength was not used.

In fiscal year 1957 Congress increased four specific programs by a total of about \$930 million, all of which was used. This was the year in which the B-52 program was given a substantial boost, forming the character of our Strategic Air Forces as of today.

In fiscal year 1958, funds totaling \$35.3 million were added for the Army National Guard and the VORTAC air navigation system, and were all utilized.

In fiscal year 1959 increases voted by Congress totaled \$1.3 billion for 15 specific purposes. About \$730 million was utilized, including \$550 million of \$609 million voted for Polaris. Funds were not used in 1959 for Army modern-

ization, the Hound Dog missile, and tanker and airlift aircraft, but the Department in later years fully adopted the policies urged by Congress.

In fiscal year 1960, \$650 million was used out of congressional add-ons of \$922 million. The principal items used were \$140 million to support the strength of the Army Reserve and National Guard, \$200 million for Army modernization, \$137 for ASW, and \$172 million for Atlas and Minuteman.

In fiscal year 1961, Congress voted \$1.8 billion additional funds, of which \$1.6 billion was used for such major programs as Polaris, Atlas, Minuteman, airlift aircraft, and satellite programs.

DETAILS BY FISCAL YEARS

The influence of Congress has been exerted not only in negative ways, that is by cutting funds, but also in positive ways, by adding funds for specific programs.

Let us look at the record, year by year.

FISCAL YEAR 1956

The Congress made two increases in that year: First, \$250,000 for the promotion of rifle practice, which was utilized in full; second, \$46.4 million for an increase in Marine Corps strength, which was not utilized.

There were two add-ons, one minor and one major. The minor one was used; the major one was not. And the position of Congress on the major matter did not prevail.

FISCAL YEAR 1957

The Congress increased the President's budget in four principal areas in that fiscal year:

First, \$15 million for Army Reserve Forces military construction—utilized in full.

Second, \$14 million to increase the strength of the Army National Guard and the number of its civilian technicians—utilized in full.

Third, \$800 million to increase the procurement of Air Force heavy bombers, tankers, and other essential weapons—utilized in full.

Fourth, \$100 million to expedite the Air Force's overall research and development program—utilized in full.

Thus, in fiscal year 1957, increases totaling almost \$930 million were voted and all were utilized in full as desired by the Congress. This was the year where the Congress gave the B-52 program a big boost forward, thereby shaping the character of our Strategic Air Forces to this present day.

FISCAL YEAR 1958

In this year the Congress made two increases: First, \$13.8 million for the Army National Guard, which was utilized in full; second, \$21.5 million for the Air Force for transfer to the Civil Aeronautics Administration for VORTAC, which was also utilized in full.

Here again, the add-ons made by the Congress were fully utilized.

FISCAL YEAR 1959

In that fiscal year the Congress made a large number of increases, aggregating over \$1.3 billion, of which about \$730 million was actually applied as desired by the Congress.

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First, \$65 million for the OSD emergency fund to take care of breakthroughs in research and development—utilized in full.

Second, \$99 million to increase the Army strength from 870,000 to 900,000—only about \$19.1 million was utilized.

Third, \$41 million to increase Army Reserve drill pay strength from 270,000 to 300,000—\$27.7 million was utilized to achieve that goal.

Fourth, \$55.7 million to increase Army National Guard drill pay strength from 360,000 to 400,000 and maintain the civilian technicians program—\$38.6 million was utilized to meet that objective.

Fifth, \$5 million to increase Army mapping—utilized in full.

Sixth, \$37 million for Army modernization—not utilized in that year.

Seventh, \$6 million for Army Reserve Forces military construction—not utilized in that year.

Eighth, \$45.2 million to increase Marine Corps strength from 175,000 to 200,000—about \$10.6 million was utilized.

Ninth, \$609 million to increase the Polaris program—about \$550 million was subsequently utilized. This includes about \$241 million released in fiscal year 1959 to permit letting of contracts early in July 1959 for Polaris submarines 7, 8, and 9.

Tenth, \$11 million to speed work on Regulus submarines—not utilized. This program was later terminated in favor of the Polaris.

Eleventh, \$13 million for two destroyer escorts—utilized in full.

Twelfth, \$48 million for Hound Dog—not utilized in that year.

Thirteenth, \$90 million for Minuteman—although these particular funds were not utilized, the Air Force, through the reprogramming of funds no longer required for other projects, did carry on a program in that year on the expanded scale desired by the Congress. The House Armed Services Committee report, while technically correct in showing this \$90 million as not utilized, leads to the wrong conclusion.

Fourteenth, \$55.6 million for KC-135 tankers—not utilized in that year.

Fifteenth, \$140 million for airlift aircraft—not utilized in that year, although, here again, the program was increased through reprogramming of other funds.

Thus, in fiscal year 1959, most of the increases were utilized in whole or in part for the purposes intended by the Congress. But it is interesting to note that although the Department did not choose to use some of these increases in 1959—such as for Army modernization, Hound Dog, KC-135 tankers and airlift aircraft—the Department in later years fully adopted the policies urged by the Congress and increased these programs very substantially. Moreover, the Congress, in that year, laid a very substantial foundation for our Polaris submarine program upon which the executive branch was able to build in later years.

FISCAL YEAR 1960

In that year the Congress added about \$922 million, of which the Defense Department utilized almost \$650 million.

First, \$147.2 million was added to maintain the Army Reserve and National Guard at 300,000 and 400,000 drill pay strength, respectively—\$140.2 million was utilized to accomplish that purpose.

Second, \$43.1 million was added to provide a Marine Corps strength of 200,000—this sum was not utilized.

Third, \$375 million was added for Nike-Zeus and/or Army modernization—\$200 million was used for Army modernization.

Fourth, \$137.3 million was added to increase the ASW capability—all of which was fully utilized.

Fifth, \$35 million was provided for advanced procurement for a nuclear-powered carrier—none of this money was utilized.

Sixth, \$85 million was added for Atlas—all of which was utilized for Atlas-Titan.

Seventh, \$87 million was added for Minuteman—all was utilized.

Eighth, \$12 million was added for Army National Guard construction—the funds were not utilized in that year.

Thus, in fiscal year 1960, most of the items added by the Congress were utilized in whole or in part and, here again, the executive branch eventually followed the direction pointed by the Congress and later increased the Marine Corps strength and Army procurement.

FISCAL YEAR 1961

In this year the Congress again made a number of important additions to the program, some of which were requested by the Department of Defense. The net increase totaled over \$1.8 billion, of which over \$1.6 billion was utilized.

First, \$105 million was added to maintain the Army Reserve and Guard strength—all of which was utilized.

Second, \$5 million was added to increase the Army National Guard technicians program—all utilized.

Third, \$201,000 was added for the promotion of rifle practice—all utilized.

Fourth, \$158 million was added for Army modernization—over \$113 million was utilized.

Fifth, \$382 million was added for Polaris—over \$345 million was utilized.

Sixth, \$105 million was added for ASW—all of which was utilized.

Seventh, \$194 million was added for airlift aircraft—almost \$172 million was utilized.

Eighth, \$97 million was added for air defense aircraft—not utilized.

Ninth, \$82.9 million was added for an airborne alert capability—all of which was utilized.

Tenth, \$184.3 million was added for the B-70—all of which was utilized.

Eleventh, \$83.8 million was added for Samos—utilized in full.

Twelfth, \$26.2 million was added for Minuteman—utilized in full.

Thirteenth, \$26.4 million was added for Midas—utilized in full.

Fourteenth, \$35 million was added for Discoverer—utilized in full.

Fifteenth, \$132 million was added for interceptor aircraft improvements—utilized in full.

Sixteenth, \$131.9 million was added for Atlas—utilized in full.

Seventeenth, \$34 million was added for Bmews—utilized in full.

Eighteenth, \$16.2 million was added for the surveillance program—utilized in full.

Nineteenth, \$15 million was added for the Gar-9 air-to-air rocket and ASG-18 fire control programs—utilized in full.

Twentieth, \$20.4 million was added for Reserve and National Guard construction—almost all was utilized.

Here, again, was a year in which the Congress exerted a major influence on the pace and character of the defense program. The Polaris program was again accelerated, Army modernization was speeded up, the antisubmarine warfare effort considerably expanded, the airlift aircraft program was finally gotten off dead center, an airborne alert capability for our heavy bombers was firmly established, the reorientation of our air defense program was begun, and a sharp impetus was given to our military satellite programs. Even the B-70 program was moved forward in that year. It cannot be said with accuracy that the Congress has little or no influence on the defense program.

FISCAL YEAR 1962

This brings us to the current fiscal year. For this year the Congress provided a total of about \$1 billion above the President's amended budget, of which the Department presently plans to use about \$230 million. Increases were made in over 20 items, of which the Department plans to carry out all but three. These three, however, are the big ones—the B-52, the B-70, and the Dyna-Soar add-ons—totaling a little over \$780 million.

The arguments, pro and con, on these three items are well known to all. But some of the Members may not realize that the Department is following the desires of the Congress on a number of other quite significant items. These include maintaining the Army Reserve and Guard strength at 300,000 and 400,000, respectively, to the extent possible under the present circumstances; substituting one nuclear-powered frigate for one conventionally powered frigate—this is an item of about \$41 million; installing turbofan engines in 15 of the C-135's—an item of about \$21 million; procurement of a long-range jet passenger transport—\$7.8 million; a \$7½-million increase in the development effort on special forces equipment; and, finally, an increase in Reserve Forces construction—an item of \$16.1 million. And the year is not yet over.

It is important that we continue the spirit of good will and cooperation which exists between Congress and the executive branch in defense matters. There is room for improvement, but I would not want to minimize the fine spirit of cooperation which has been typical in the past.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I take this time to ask the question as to

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whether the funds appropriated for naval vessels may be used for renovation or whether this is entirely for new construction?

Mr. VINSON. I may say to the distinguished gentleman that the bill authorizes 37 new ships, and 35 conversions, all set out in the report and referred to in my remarks in a more limited way earlier. I will put in the RECORD at this point a complete breakdown of each one of the new ships and in addition the conversion of some 35 ships.

The matter referred to is as follows:

One attack aircraft carrier—CVA; cost, \$310 million: This ship is the prime offensive unit in an attack carrier striking force—the Navy's major weapon for control of the seas.

The carrier provides a continuously ready modern airfield capable of operating all types of aircraft in any navigable waters of the world. These characteristics of versatility and mobility are unique to sea service forces and are equally applicable in general, limited, or cold war.

The carrier in this program will replace an old *Essex*-class carrier. This attack carrier will be an improved *Forrestal* and the eighth ship in this class.

One guided missile frigate—DLG(N); cost, \$190 million: This guided missile frigate is the only nuclear-powered surface ship in this year's program. It is also the first ship to receive the new typhon weapons system incorporating many significant improvements including greater target-handling capability, greater range, shorter reaction time, and almost complete immunity to countermeasures. The typhon weapons system will provide this ship with an air-control, anti-aircraft, and antimissile capability which hitherto have not been approached by any naval weapons system. In addition to the greatly improved weapons systems, this ship will have the extended range and endurance at sustained speed resulting from nuclear power.

Twenty-eight conventional and 2 nuclear-powered guided missile frigates have been authorized in previous programs, 10 of which have joined the fleet.

Eight nuclear-powered submarines—SS(N); cost, \$509.9 million: These fleet attack submarines are designed for optimum operations against enemy submarines and surface ships.

They are essentially repeats of *Thresher* class included in previous programs.

These submarines will be the first to include the capability of firing the submerged launched rocket weapon, SUBROC. This weapon is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, and is designed to destroy submarines or ships.

Combined with previous new construction, these 8 will give the Navy a total of 40 nuclear-powered attack submarines, 16 of which have joined the fleet.

Six fleet ballistic missile submarines—SSB(N); cost, \$720.3 million: These fleet ballistic missile submarines are a vital addition to our national deterrent forces. These six *Polaris* submarines are essentially the same as those in prior programs incorporating improvements which have been dictated by experience.

Twenty-nine fleet ballistic missile submarines have been authorized in previous programs. These 6 will give the Navy a total of 35, carrying 560 ballistic missiles. Six have joined the fleet.

Four amphibious transport, dock—LPD; cost, \$181.6 million: These ships will increase the effectiveness of modern amphibious operations.

These ships each carry 930 troops, 2,500 tons of cargo and equipment, plus 6 heli-

copters and various combinations of landing craft.

Six of these ships have been previously authorized. The first two are scheduled to be commissioned this year.

One amphibious assault ship—LPH; cost, \$60 million: The amphibious assault ship (LPH) in conjunction with the LPD is capable of combat loading, transporting, and landing a battalion landing team. This ship carries 2,000 troops and 30 HUS helicopters.

Four ships of this type have been approved in prior programs. One, *Iwo Jima*, has reported to the fleet.

Five escort ships—DE; cost, \$128.3 million: These ships are all repeats of similar types contained in previous programs and are designed for effective performance in locating and destroying enemy submarines. These ships are fitted with the latest and best ASW weapons systems including *Asroc*, *Dash*, and homing torpedoes.

Twenty-four ocean escorts have been authorized in previous programs. Seventeen have joined the fleet.

Three guided missile escort ships—DEG; cost, \$93.9 million: These 3 DEG's are similar in all respects to the escort ships except that the after 5-inch, 38-caliber gun mount has been replaced by a Tartar missile battery (16 missiles). Three of these ships were authorized in the 1962 program.

Two motor gunboats—PGM; cost, \$4.1 million: These are the first of a new class specifically designed for operations in restricted waters, such as coastal patrol blockade and paramilitary warfare. The final armament is still to be decided; however, 20 tons have been reserved for this purpose.

One fast combat support ship—AOE; cost, \$67 million: This is the second ship of this design combining the essential features of both the fleet oiler and ammunition ship. Having a top speed of 26 knots, this ship will be capable of staying with the fast task forces and providing most replenishment services on a one-stop basis. One has been authorized in previous programs.

One submarine tender—AS (FBM); cost, \$73 million: This is the third new construction tender designed primarily to support the *Polaris* submarines. It will be equipped to provide logistic support for nine submarines and complete alongside services to three at any one time. These ships also have the capability to check out, maintain, and issue missiles and missile components. The first new construction tender will join the fleet later in the year.

Two oceanographic research ships—AGOR; cost, \$8.8 million: These are relatively small ships of about 1,300 tons and are designed to conduct basic and applied oceanographic research in support of the national oceanographic program. They will be civilian manned. Five ships of this type have already been authorized. The first two are scheduled for completion during the fourth quarter of this year.

One surveying ship—AGS; cost, \$9.4 million: This ship is about twice the size of the oceanographic research ship and will be equipped to conduct hydrographic surveys and collect other oceanographic, acoustic, and meteorological data under the direction of the Navy oceanographer. This is the first ship of its class. Like the preceding oceanographic research ship, it will be civilian manned.

One cargo ship—MSTS roll-on/roll-off; cost, \$20 million: This Military Sea Transportation Service ship is similar to the very successful *Comet*, roll-on/roll-off ship now in regular service between New York and St. Nazaire. It is designed to transport and deliver wheeled and tracked vehicles, troop equipment, and general cargo. Its configuration of internal ramps will provide for quick loading or unloading. This is the first ship to be funded under this appropriation for Military Sea Transportation Service.

The Navy authorization also provides funds for 45 service and landing craft, the rehabilitation and modernization of 24 World War II destroyers and the conversion of 1 major communication relay ship, 1 command ship, 1 mine countermeasures support ship, 2 ammunition ships (FAST), 2 oilers (Jumbo), 2 technical research ships, 1 cargo ship (FBM), 1 guided missile ship, and 1 service craft, a floating drydock.

Mr. GROSS. Then the bill does provide for such conversion or renovation. The gentleman might be able to answer the question whether funds are provided in this bill—

Mr. VINSON. No; that comes before the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. GROSS. I mean funds authorized. Let me correct the statement.

Mr. VINSON. Yes, authorized.

Mr. GROSS. "Authorize." That is a good word around here today.

Mr. VINSON. That is right; it is a good word.

Mr. GROSS. Whether funds are authorized in this bill for the taking of a yacht out of mothballs, air conditioning the yacht, and giving it to Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia; does the gentleman know?

Mr. VINSON. Well, I will say the distinguished gentleman from Texas developed that fact. All we are doing today is authorizing these things. He would not give his approval to anything that would be converted without having some military value to the country.

Mr. GROSS. Well, would the gentleman think that a yacht, an air-conditioned pleasure yacht, is intended to have military value?

Mr. VINSON. No; I do not know what the gentleman has reference to, but I can tell you that conversions in this bill are for military purposes.

Mr. GROSS. Well, then, can the gentleman tell me this: The bill provides for the construction of helicopters; is that right?

Mr. VINSON. In another part of the bill, yes.

Mr. GROSS. This bill authorizes funds for the construction of helicopters?

Mr. VINSON. That is right, and we are increasing it in that respect by raising the amount about \$55 million.

Mr. GROSS. How many of these new helicopters will be assigned to the White House?

Mr. VINSON. Well, I do not know about that.

Mr. GROSS. Did the military not justify the construction of helicopters when they came before your committee?

Mr. VINSON. I cannot reveal the number involved.

Mr. GROSS. Someone here indicates there may be 10 new helicopters assigned to the White House. Now, my question is this: Will these helicopters continue to be used at the rate of two flights in 2 days to transport the First Lady, Mrs. Kennedy, to go fox hunting down in Virginia? Does the gentleman have any idea?

Mr. VINSON. The gentleman will have to do like I do in a press conference. I ask the questions and then I answer them. The gentleman will have to do the same thing.

Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman.

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Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I support H.R. 9751 and particularly appreciate the initiative of the Committee on Armed Services in seeking a speedup in development and production of the RS-70.

Under date of February 20, 1962, I wrote Secretary of Defense McNamara urging such a speedup, in the light of my own understanding of the need and justification for such a weapons development.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense who replied to my letter, on March 15, cited many of the arguments for proceeding slowly with the RS-70 program, and brought to my attention for the first time several factors of admitted importance in this matter.

Nonetheless, the reasons for expediting development and production of the RS-70 continue to outweigh, in my judgment, those reasons advanced for the Defense Department position, and I am greatly pleased by the Secretary's announced decision to re-examine the Department's conclusion in the light of congressional recommendations.

This bill is another major step forward in substantially strengthening our country's defense and I am confident it will be overwhelmingly approved, in further testimony, to the resolution and determination of the Congress and the American people to provide preparedness second to none in the world today.

A strong and prepared America continues to be the world's best guarantee of peace, and we add significantly to that guarantee by today's action.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the committee amendment is agreed to. There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further amendments? If not, under the rule the Committee rises.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. KARSTEN, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 9751) to authorize appropriations during fiscal year 1963 for aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 562, he reported the bill back to the House with sundry amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will put them en gros.

The amendments were agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 403, nays 0, not voting 33, as follows:

[Roll No. 43]
YEAS—403

Abblitt
Adair
Addabbo
Addonizio
Albert
Alford
Alger
Andersen,
Minn.
Anderson, Ill.
Anfuso
Arends
Ashbrook
Ashley
Ashmore
Aspinall
Auchincloss
Avery
Ayres
Bailey
Baker
Baldwin
Baring
Barrett
Barry
Bass, Tenn.
Bates
Becker
Beckworth
Beermann
Belcher
Bell
Bennett, Fla.
Berry
Betts
Blatnik
Blitch
Boggs
Boland
Bolling
Bolton
Bonner
Bow
Brademas
Bray
Breeding
Brewster
Bromwell
Brooks
Broomfield
Brown
Broyhill
Bruce
Burke, Ky.
Burke, Mass.
Burlison
Byrne, Pa.
Byrnes, Wis.
Cahill
Cannon
Carey
Casey
Cederberg
Celler
Chamberlain
Chelf
Chenoweth
Chiperfield
Church
Clancy
Clark
Coad
Cohelan
Colmer
Conte
Cook
Corbett
Corman
Cramer
Cunningham
Curtin
Curtis, Mass.
Curtis, Mo.
Daddario
Dague
Daniels
Davis, John W.
Davis, Tenn.
Dawson
Delaney
Dent
Denton
Derounian
Derwinski
Devine
Diggs
Dingell
Dole
Dominick
Donohue
Dooley
Dorn
Dowdy

Doyle
Dulski
Durno
Dwyer
Edmondson
Elliot
Ellsworth
Everett
Evins
Fallon
Farbstein
Fasell
Felghan
Fenton
Findley
Finnegan
Fino
Fisher
Flood
Flynt
Ford
Forrester
Fountain
Frazier
Frelinghuysen
Friedel
Fulton
Gallagher
Garland
Garmatz
Gathings
Gavin
Gialmo
Gilbert
Glenn
Gonzalez
Goodell
Goodling
Granahan
Gray
Green, Oreg.
Green, Pa.
Griffin
Gross
Gubser
Hagan, Ga.
Hagen, Calif.
Haley
Hall
Halleck
Halpern
Hansen
Harding
Hardy
Harris
Harrison, Va.
Harrison, Wyo.
Harsha
Harvey, Ind.
Harvey, Mich.
Hays
Healey
Hebert
Hechler
Hemphill
Henderson
Herlong
Hiestand
Hoeven
Hoffman, Ill.
Hollifield
Holland
Hosmer
Huddleston
Hull
Ichord, Mo.
Inouye
Jarman
Jennings
Joelson
Johansen
Johnson, Calif.
Johnson, Md.
Johnson, Wis.
Jonas
Jones, Mo.
Judd
Karsten
Kath
Kastenmiller
Kearns
Kee
Keith
Kelly
Keogh
Kilburn
Kilgore
King, Calif.
King, N.Y.
King, Utah
Kirwan
Kitchen

Kluczynski
Knox
Kornegay
Kowalski
Kunkel
Kyl
Laird
Landrum
Langen
Lankford
Latta
Lennon
Lesinski
Libonati
Lindsay
Lipcomb
Loser
McCulloch
McDonough
McDowell
McFall
McIntire
McMillan
McSweeney
McVey
Macdonald
MacGregor
Mack
Madden
Magnuson
Mahon
Mailliard
Marshall
Martin, Mass.
Martin, Nebr.
Mathias
Matthews
May
Meader
Morrow
Michel
Miller, Clem
Miller,
George P.
Miller, N.Y.
Milliken
Mills
Minshall
Moeller
Monagan
Montoya
Moore
Moorehead,
Ohio
Moorhead, Pa.
Morgan
Morris
Morrison
Morse
Mosher
Moss
Multer
Murphy
Murray
Natcher
Nedzi
Nelsen
Nix
Norblad
Norrell
Nygaard
O'Brien, Ill.
O'Brien, N.Y.
O'Hara, Ill.
O'Hara, Mich.
O'Konski
Olsen
O'Neill
Osmers
Ostertag
Passman
Patman
Pelly
Perkins
Peterson
Post
Philbin
Pike
Pilcher
Pillion
Pirnie
Poage
Poff
Powell
Price
Pucinski
Purcell
Quie
Randall
Ray
Reece
Reifel
Reuss

Rhodes, Ariz.
Rhodes, Pa.
Riehlman
Rivers, Alaska
Roberts, Tex.
Robison
Rodino
Rogers, Colo.
Rogers, Fla.
Rogers, Tex.
Rooney
Roosevelt
Rosenthal
Rostenkowski
Roudebush
Roush
Roussellot
Rutherford
Ryan, Mich.
Ryan, N.Y.
St. George
St. Germain
Santangelo
Saund
Saylor
Schadeberg
Scherer
Schneebeli
Schweiker
Schwengel
Scott
Scranton
Seely-Brown

Selden
Shelley
Sheppard
Shipley
Shriver
Sibal
Sikes
Siler
Sisk
Slack
Smith, Iowa
Smith, Va.
Springer
Stafford
Staggers
Steed
Stephens
Stratton
Stubblefield
Sullivan
Taber
Taylor
Teague, Calif.
Teague, Tex.
Thomas
Thompson, La.
Thompson, N.J.
Thompson, Tex.
Thomson, Wis.
Thornberry
Toll
Tollefson
Trimble

Tuck
Tupper
Udall, Morris K.
Ullman
Utt
Vanik
Van Pelt
Van Zandt
Vinson
Waggonner
Wallhauser
Watts
Weaver
Weiss
Westland
Whalley
Wharton
Whitener
Wickersham
Widnall
Williams
Willis
Wilson, Calif.
Wilson, Ind.
Winstead
Wright
Yates
Younger
Zablocki
Zelenko

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—33

Abernethy
Alexander
Andrews
Bass, N.H.
Battin
Bennett, Mich.
Boykin
Buckley
Collier
Cooley
Davis
James C.

Downing
Fogarty
Gary
Grant
Griffiths
Hoffman, Mich.
Jensen
Jones, Ala.
Lane
Mason
Moulder
Rains

Rivers, S.C.
Roberts, Ala.
Schenck
Short
Smith, Calif.
Smith, Miss.
Spence
Walter
Whitten

So the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Cooley with Mr. Schenck.
Mr. Alexander with Mr. Hoffman of Michigan.

Mr. Spence with Mr. Bennett of Michigan.
Mr. James C. Davis with Mr. Collier.
Mr. Fogarty with Mr. Bass of New Hampshire.

Mr. Lane with Mr. Smith of California.
Mr. Walter with Mr. Jensen.
Mr. Downing with Mr. Short.
Mr. Abernethy with Mr. Mason.
Mr. Gary with Mr. Battin.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND REMARKS

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks in the Record on the bill just passed.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

CORRECTION OF ROLL CALL

Mr. GIAMMO. Mr. Speaker, on Thursday last, March 15, on roll call No. 36, a call of the House, I was present in the chamber and responded when my name was called. I ask unanimous consent that the Record be corrected to so indicate.

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March 21

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Connecticut?

There was no objection.

FURTHER MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A further message from the Senate by Mr. McGeron, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate agree to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 5968) entitled "An act to amend the District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Act, as amended."

SPENDING, DEFICITS, DEBT, AND TAXES

(Mr. McSWEEN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. McSWEEN. Mr. Speaker, the President's foreign aid message of March 13 in which he asked Congress for \$4.9 billion in foreign aid for next year has prompted me to rise to comment about our economic strength.

I am deeply concerned about the high rate of spending which causes budget deficits and inflation, an increasing national debt, and pressures for even more taxes. We will be obliged to borrow this money to spend on foreign aid.

Since World War II U.S. foreign aid has exceeded \$101 billion and will rise above \$106 billion next year. Net foreign aid, after allowing for loan repayments and foreign currency credits received for surplus farm products, totals \$91 billion.

We pay interest of about \$2.75 billion annually on this \$91 billion portion of the national debt. So our actual total foreign aid cost for next year will be over \$7.5 billion.

The enormity of the foreign aid tab is one of the reasons why I have never supported this program since I have been in Congress. While I certainly realize that some military assistance is essential to our security I feel strongly that we are squandering our national heritage at a rate beyond the danger point.

Our military might is vital to the free world, but this depends upon our solvency. Our fiscal situation is vulnerable. In the 15 fiscal years since World War II there have been 6 surplus years and 9 deficit years with a net deficit of \$28 billion. The current fiscal year deficit will increase this figure to over \$35 billion.

The Federal budget cannot be balanced in the foreseeable future unless the rate of increase in expenditures indicated by present proposals is curtailed. Non defense expenditures have increased by 48 percent in the last 6 years until this year, while defense expenditures have increased only 15 percent.

I have been voting "no" on many bills having merit, not because I necessarily otherwise oppose these programs but because I am more concerned about our overall financial condition.

On February 20 I also voted against the bill to increase the national debt limit ceiling by \$2 billion to \$300 billion, although it passed 251 to 144. I understand there will be another proposal this year to increase the ceiling even higher.

I have concluded that the only way to reduce the debt is by a systematic and mandatory plan under which the budget must contain a specific item for an appropriation for debt retirement. I again call the House's attention to my bill, H.R. 6670, which would require as a start an annual 1 percent debt retirement appropriation. I find that the people back home are as concerned and disturbed about spending, deficits, debt, and taxes as I am.

PROGRAM FOR BALANCE OF THE WEEK

(Mr. KYL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, I take this time to ask the distinguished majority leader what legislative matters are scheduled for the remainder of this week.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, in response to the inquiry of the gentleman, tomorrow the conference report on H.R. 5968, amendments to the District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Act, will be called up; and the bill S. 2533, a bill to amend the requirements for participation in the 1962 feed grain program, will be on the calendar. I know of no other business for the balance of the week.

Mr. KYL. Could the gentleman inform the House at this time when we might expect to vote on the major revenue bill?

Mr. ALBERT. Well, if the gentleman will forbear, I think the bill will come up next week, but I would prefer to wait until tomorrow to announce the program.

Mr. KYL. I thank the gentleman.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE NOT GENERALLY AWARE THAT THEY HAVE TWO GOVERNMENTS—AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT AND A BANKERS' GOVERNMENT

(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, the Committee for Economic Development in a widely distributed statement has said that the lack of proper teaching of economics in our high schools and colleges has resulted in an "economic illiteracy" that is a growing national concern.

If it were not for this widespread illiteracy the American people would not tolerate for very long the present arrangement whereby their economic livelihoods are regulated through the money and banking system.

As to some aspects of the influence of governmental policy over economic activity in this country the general public does have some information. Most people

are aware that the Government's fiscal policies have a great influence over their economic lives. They know that the Government's tax and spending policies can stimulate economic activity or dampen economic activity, and the national income, the level of business profits, and the number of jobs available are affected thereby.

FED EXERCISES DISCRETIONARY CONTROL OVER SUPPLY OF MONEY

The general public is not generally aware, however, that the Federal Reserve authorities have complete discretionary control over the supply of money and the prices which will be paid for the use of money and that they exercise this discretion also to influence the level of economic activity, the rate of investment, the rate of consumer spending, and the percentage of the labor force which shall remain unemployed. In a money economy such as ours, those authorities who control the money supply and interest rates have the upper hand in regulating the economy.

IN NO OTHER MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY DOES THE EXECUTIVE HAVE SO LITTLE INFLUENCE OVER OPERATIONS OF CENTRAL BANK

In the United States today we have in effect two governments regulating levels of economic activity. We have the duly constituted Government carrying out laws enacted by the Congress and the President and reviewed by the judiciary. Then we have an independent, uncontrolled and uncoordinated government in the Federal Reserve System, operating the money powers which are reserved to Congress by the Constitution.

In no other major industrial country in the world today does the duly constituted government—the Chief Executive—have so little say and so little influence over the operations of the Nation's central bank.

How did this second government come about? Did Congress ever give the Federal Reserve authority to exercise discretion over the supply of money which the Nation will have or the level of interest rates which will be paid for the use of money? Did Congress ever give the Federal Reserve authority to try to influence levels of economic activity—either to try to dampen booms or to stimulate economic activity in periods of recession? The answer is no.

FED HAS USURPED POWERS

When the Federal Reserve System was set up under the act of 1913 Congress intended that the Federal Reserve would provide a system whereby the supply of money would be automatically determined by the volume of economic activity taking place, not by any discretion on the part of the Federal Reserve authorities, either currently or on the basis of the Federal Reserve people's forecast as to what the trend in business activity will be.

True, the Federal Reserve Act has been amended many times, but in none of these amendments has the basic conception of an automatic, non-discretionary money system been changed. You will not find in the statute anywhere any words giving the Federal Reserve